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Abstract
The central purpose of this dissertation is to study the role and relevance of the 
balance of power factor within regimes for cooperative security with special 
reference to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The balance of power concept is systematically 
applied to an examination of their history and modalities. This thesis addresses 
one core question: to what extent may the balance of power, defined in political 
terms, play a part in such associative security arrangements and in the calculations 
of the participants? Attention is therefore given to the balance of power factor and 
its co-existence with an associative dimension part of cooperative security 
regimes. The dissertation assesses the role of the balance of power as a disposition 
to promote countervailing arrangements to deny hegemony within and beyond 
cooperative security even if devoid of direct military content. The establishment 
of ASEAN and the ARF are analysed within a balance of power perspective. Both 
institutions were formed with the denial of hegemony in mind but not in a 
conventional sense. In addition, the balance of power remained a factor in their 
later developments. Its ongoing relevance is examined by discussing Brunei’s 
motives to join the Association, ASEAN’s response to the Third Indochina 
Conflict, the workings of the Forum, and the Association’s involvement in the 
South China Sea dispute.
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Introduction
The central theme of this dissertation is the role and relevance of the 
balance of power factor within inter-state regimes for regional cooperative 
security with special reference to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)1 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).2 ASEAN and the ARF are 
normally depicted as associative forms of security arrangements which may be 
defined as alternatives to those characteristic of and employing the traditional 
concept of the balance of power. This thesis will address one core question: to 
what extent may the balance of power, defined in political terms, play a part in 
such associative security arrangements and in the calculations of the participants? 
Hence, the dissertation will judge to what extent the balance of power may 
become a factor in cooperative security regimes. To that end, it will assess the role 
of the balance of power as a disposition to promote countervailing arrangements 
to deny hegemony within and beyond cooperative security even if devoid of direct 
military content.
What impact, if any, may balance of power have on the modalities of 
regimes for cooperative security is a central question to be addressed in this 
dissertation. Depending on the answers, it may be possible to argue that balance 
of power and cooperative security may co-exist in a complementary way within 
the same security arrangement. Yet, care should be taken in employing the term 
“complementary”. For example, traditional balance of power and associative 
dimensions may complement one another through separate structures within the 
same region. Indeed, military alliances and regional cooperative security regimes 
can exist independently from and simultaneously in complement to one another. 
Both may work together in the interest of preserving stable regional security 
relations. In short, collective defence alignments and cooperative security 
institutions may operate side by side, but separately. The aim of this thesis,
’The Association was established in Bangkok in August 1967. The original members were: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 
1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
2The founding dinner of the ARF was held in Singapore in July 1993. Its initial participants were: 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the 
United States, and Vietnam. Cambodia was admitted in 1995, India and Myanmar in 1996, 
Mongolia in 1998, and North Korea in 2000.
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however, is to study the factor of the balance of power as one consideration within 
a regime for cooperative security and to discuss its possible co-existence with an 
associative dimension part of the cooperative process.
This dissertation will seek to contribute to the study of regimes/institutions 
and may therefore be located in a specific body of the International Relations (IR) 
literature. It will be argued that an analysis of the balance of power is required to 
achieve a good understanding of the history of ASEAN and the ARF. 
Consequently, the primary contribution made to the study of both cooperative 
security arrangements will be the systematic application of the balance of power 
concept to an examination of their modalities. The thesis will aim to reject the 
notion that regimes for cooperative security may be defined as alternatives to 
balance of power by arguing that ASEAN and the ARF were informed with some 
reference to the concept. As a result, it will attempt to demonstrate the co­
existence of associative and balance of power dimensions within the same 
arrangement.
In the IR literature, ASEAN and the ARF are discussed in the context of 
security theory, international cooperation and institution-building. In particular, 
some scholars of Southeast Asian security relations have classified ASEAN as a 
security regime.3 Regimes can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.”4 A consensus seems to exist in 
the academic literature that the Association has remained a rather weak security 
regime.5 For instance, Professor Michael Leifer wrote in 1992 that “it is as well to 
temper enthusiasm about the kind of security regime which has evolved among 
the ASEAN states” due to the fact that the Association has never invoked its own 
dispute resolution mechanism, the so-called High Council.6
3See William T. Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder, Col.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1990), pp. 13-14, 23-45; Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community 
in Southeast Asia?,” The Journal o f Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sept. 1995), p. 191; Tim 
Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies, 1993), p. 4.
4Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as intervening 
Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 186.
5For a comprehensive literature review on this question see Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in the 
Study of International Relations: The Rise and Decline of a Region,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 9, 
No. 2 (1996), pp. 215-216.
6Michael Leifer, “Debating Asian Security: Michael Leifer Responds to Geoffrey Wiseman,” The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1992), p. 169.
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The study of regimes/institutions can be located within the theoretical 
framework of a neo-liberal understanding of inter-state cooperation. This 
institutionalist literature is represented by the work of Robert Keohane and 
others.7 Regimes are inter-state agreements that aim to enhance common interests 
in a specific sphere of policies. According to an institutionalist model, regimes are 
formed to promote common long-term interests. Keohane and Martin claim that 
“institutions are created by states because o f  their anticipated effects on patterns 
of behavior.”8 A security regime is expected to enhance regional security through 
the application of a code of conduct that influences the behaviour of states. 
Institutionalists do not view security regimes in terms of the balance of power.9 
Indeed, they refer to the idea of a shift from the traditional concept of the balance 
of power to long-term security cooperation. In contrast, realists discuss (security) 
regimes as instruments available to states to take part in the play of power politics. 
According to this perspective, regimes are “merely arenas for acting out power 
relationships.”10 The realist interpretation of regimes focuses on power politics 
and tends to minimise issues essential to their understanding, including the 
importance of norms and principles and the possible long-term convergence of 
interests.
The neo-liberal institutionalist approach offers an account of ASEAN as a 
security regime. The Association constitutes a form of cooperation among 
sovereign states that share common interests. It is based on a set of norms and 
principles which are supposed to influence state behaviour and enhance inter-state 
relations. ASEAN has operated as an instrument to avoid the recurrence of 
conflict and has improved the climate of regional relations in Southeast Asia. It is
7Please refer to Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, 
International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, 
Col.: Westview Press, 1989); Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge 
after the Cold War,” in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 269-300; Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining 
Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 
1985), pp. 1-24; Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural 
Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
8Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 46.
9Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), pp. 351-352.
10 Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, “Regime Theory and the English School of International 
Relations: A Comparison,” Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), p. 
330.
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considered as a security regime whose operation should not be understood within 
the framework of the balance of power concept. In comparison, ASEAN was 
established, according to a realist perspective, during the Second Indochina 
Conflict as a response to a Vietnamese and Chinese threat. Yet, in contrast to a 
realist interpretation of security cooperation, ASEAN has never evolved into a 
formal or tacit alliance despite the presence of external threats since its formation 
in 1967.
In the post-Cold War, the Association has been related to the concept of 
cooperative security.11 Leifer argues that “ASEAN is best understood as an 
institutionalized, albeit relatively informal, expression of ‘cooperative security’ 
which may serve as both a complement and as an alternative to balance-of-power
1 9practice.” The ARF has also been discussed as an institutional manifestation of 
cooperative security.13 The latter operates through dialogue and seeks to address 
the climate of international relations. It relies on promoting standard international 
norms, principles and codes of conduct among regional states in order to decrease 
regional tensions. Focusing on reassurance, cooperative security arrangements 
aim to develop a dialogue amongst the participants and to promote confidence- 
building and possibly preventive diplomacy measures. ASEAN will be identified 
in this dissertation as a regime for cooperative security or as a cooperative 
security arrangement. The ARF is a multilateral discussion group focusing on 
dialogue and confidence-building measures as a first step to cooperative security. 
It should, therefore, be viewed as an embryonic regime for cooperative security.
ASEAN is also often examined in terms of the “ASEAN Way”, an 
allegedly distinctive and informal process of interaction.14 The “ASEAN Way” is
uFor a discussion on the concept of cooperative security, please refer to David Dewitt, “Common, 
Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994), pp. 7-12; 
and Pierre Lizee, “Securite et Integration en Asie-Pacifique: Dynamiques et Implications 
Theoriques,” Etudes Internationales, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Juin 1997), pp. 346-347.
12Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1999), p. 27.
13See for instance Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security 
in the Middle East? (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1998), p. 4; Amitav 
Acharya, Reordering Asia: "Cooperative Security” or Concert o f Powers?, IDSS Working Paper 
No. 3 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 1999), p. 8.
14Please refer to Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f Accommodation (Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1990); Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations: 
Two Insights (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 10-15; Hussin Mutalib, 
“At Thirty, ASEAN looks to Challenges in the New Millennium,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (June 1997), pp. 78-80; Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Mechanisms of Dispute 
Settlement: The ASEAN Experience,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 1998),
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based on standard international norms and various features through which the 
members reach but also avoid common decisions. This process of interaction 
should be distinguished from a European model of political and economic 
integration or from other sub-regional cooperative groupings. In contrast to 
European integration, the “ASEAN Way” avoids bureaucratic and supra-national 
arrangements and reaffirms the principles of national sovereignty and non­
interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Hence, the Association is said 
to offer a unique model of cooperation based on specific cultural attributes. The 
relevance of the “ASEAN Way” has recently been considered in light of a 
constructivist perspective.15 When applied to the study of ASEAN and the ARF, 
this approach concentrates on the formation and evolution of regional identities, 
ideas and norms.16 Attention has been given to the “ASEAN Way” as a shared 
collective identity that influences the behaviour of states and its possible 
extension to the Asia-Pacific through the formation of the ARF.17
Despite a tendency in the current IR literature to study ASEAN and the 
ARF mostly in terms of an institutionalist, constructivist and “ASEAN Way” 
approach, this thesis will adopt a different angle and focus on the relevance of the 
balance of power factor within and beyond both regimes for cooperative security. 
It will be claimed that the balance of power dimension needs to be addressed 
when examining ASEAN and the ARF despite a recent inclination in the 
discipline to ignore it. The academic literature has traditionally found all kinds of 
reasons to criticise the balance of power. Schroeder writes, for instance, that 
“Students of international politics do not need to be told of the unsatisfactory state 
of the balance of power theory.” 18 Without a doubt, the concept contains
pp. 51-62. For a recent critic of the “ASEAN Way”, see Tobias Ingo Nischalke, “Insights from 
ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-operation: The ‘ASEAN Way’, a Real Spirit or a Phantom?,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 89-112.
15For an understanding of the constructivist argument please refer to Alexander Wendt, “Collective 
Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 
(June 1994), pp. 384-396.
16See for instance Richard Higgott, “Ideas, Identity and Policy Coordination in the Asia-Pacific,” 
The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1994), pp. 367-379; Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and 
Conflict Management in Southeast Asia,” in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security 
Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 198-227; and Mikolas Busse, 
“Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security,” Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1999), pp. 39-60.
17See for instance Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN 
Way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way’?,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), pp.328-342.
18 Paul W. Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political 
Equilibrium?,” Review o f International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), p. 135.
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shortcomings that complicate its analysis. The term is often used loosely, which 
leads to confusion and vagueness. In addition to being ill-defined, the balance of 
power is based on a narrow comprehension of the notions of power and security 
and fails to take into account domestic issues. Moreover, it tends to exaggerate the 
potential danger resulting from emerging hegemons and accepts war as the 
traditional instrument of the balance. That said, the concept has remained at the 
core of the realist paradigm. Thanks to its simplicity and explanatory qualities, the 
balance of power remains a valuable tool of analysis in the study of international 
politics attracting constant academic use and interest.
The relevance of the balance of power to an examination of ASEAN and 
the ARF is indicated in the writings of Michael Leifer.19 In contrast with the 
advocates of neo-realism who judge the balance of power entirely in terms of 
adversarial relations and self-help, Leifer seems to adhere to both a realist and 
neo-Grotian understanding of the balance of power concept. In that respect, the 
works of traditional realists and exponents of the English School of International 
Relations influence his intellectual framework. The question of the balance of
9 0power was explicitly discussed in his 1996 Adelphi Paper on the ARF. In his 
analysis, Leifer remained pragmatic about the potential role of the Forum and 
argued that it should be viewed “as a modest contribution to a viable balance or
91distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific by other than traditional means.” 
He also noted that “its structural problem is that its viability seems to depend on 
the prior existence of a stable balance, but it is not really in a position to create
99it.” Leifer’s academic interest in the concept of the balance of power, as 
displayed both in his own publications and in his supervision and guidance of this 
specific work, has had a profound influence on the writing of the dissertation.
19See for instance Michael Leifer, “The Role and Paradox of ASEAN,” in M. Leifer, ed., The 
Balance o f Power in East Asia (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), pp. 119-131; Michael 
Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989); Michael Leifer, 
“ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?,” in Hadi Soesastro, ed., ASEAN in a Changed 
Regional and International Political Economy (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1995), pp. 138-142; Michael Leifer, “Truth about the Balance of Power,” in Derek da 
Cunha, ed., The Evolving Pacific Power Structure (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1996), pp. 47-51.
20Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f Regional Security, 
Adelphi Paper No. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also Khong Yuen Foong, 
“Review Article: Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia Pacific?,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 2 (1997), pp. 289-300.
21Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 59.
^Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 58.
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The rhetoric of ASEAN and the ARF implicitly reject conventional 
balance of power politics. Their declarations and statements never mention the 
phrase and emphasise instead the importance of the “ASEAN Way”. That said, 
the decision to examine the role and relevance of the balance of power factor 
within both regimes for cooperative security has derived from a theoretical and 
empirical realisation. Offering a satisfactory analysis of security regimes, neo­
liberals may still underestimate the possible persistence of realist beliefs among 
political leaders taking part in this kind of inter-state arrangements. Hence, this 
thesis contends that close attention needs to be given when examining security 
regimes to the power considerations involved. In particular, it is the role played by 
the constraining of power in security regime dynamics that ought to be studied 
further. This thesis therefore concentrates on the balance of power factor and 
examines how it may influence the workings Of such institutions and the 
underlying calculations made by the participants.
It has been found that the balance of power concept, rather than being a 
Euro-centric approach which loses most of its significance outside of a Western 
context, has been very much in existence and applied in post-colonial Southeast 
Asia. Despite long-term cooperation, intra-ASEAN relations have continued to be 
affected by persistent feelings of mistrust, bilateral disputes and contradictory 
strategic perspectives. Most ASEAN states have been dependent on external 
guarantees to ensure their individual security. In particular, Singapore and others 
have relied on the United States to operate as a conventional source of 
countervailing power in the region. Keeping in mind that most members of the 
Association have relied on realist practices to guarantee their security, the thesis 
explores whether the formation and later development of ASEAN and the ARF 
may have been influenced by power balancing considerations.
Having introduced the motives to investigate the role of the balance of 
power factor within regimes for cooperative security, an explanation needs to be 
given of the various meanings of the term that will be followed in this dissertation. 
Essential differences exist between balance of power in its conventional 
interpretation and practice and the balance of power factor within cooperative 
security. This factor may aim to contain a disposition to hegemony on the part of a 
rising part by enmeshing it within a rule-based regime which includes sufficient 
incentive to constrain any hegemonic ambitions. Traditional realist motives may
12
thus be achieved at an intra-mural level through non-military constraints to 
hegemony. Indeed, the constraining of power within cooperative security could 
become dependent on political means. Beyond the denial of intra-mural 
hegemony, the balance of power factor may also involve the promotion of 
countervailing responses to external military threats. The participants to a regime 
for cooperative security could join external states through diplomatic alignment to 
engage in conventional balance of power practices. In sum, the balance of power 
factor will be applied differently in an intra- and extra-mural context.
The first three chapters of the dissertation will provide a theoretical 
framework as well as an examination of the establishment and institutional 
evolution of ASEAN and the ARF. Chapter one will consider how regional 
security cooperation has been analysed through a neo-liberal interpretation of 
security regimes. This discussion will be completed by introducing the notion of 
balance of power as an important complementary factor within regimes for 
cooperative security. The second chapter will demonstrate the relevance of neo­
liberal cooperative theory in analysing the associative experience of both ASEAN 
and the ARF. Most of chapter three will discuss the balance of power concept and 
address theoretically its significance as a factor within and beyond regimes for 
cooperative security.
The role of the balance of power factor will first be studied at the end of 
chapter three by illustrating one specific aspect of the founding moments of the 
Association. Chapter four will consider ASEAN’s early years from 1967 until 
1975 and the motives for Brunei to join the cooperative security arrangement in 
1984. Beyond the benefits of cooperative security and political and economic 
cooperation, joining the Association may have had a geo-political significance. 
Chapter five will examine the associative and balance of power dimensions in 
ASEAN’s response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. In 
addition to analysing the power balancing considerations involved with the 
creation of the ARF, chapter six will discuss how the role of the balance of power 
factor has carried over in the workings of the arrangement. Finally, chapter seven 
will focus on the South China Sea dispute in the post-Cold War with reference to 
ASEAN’s ability to conduct itself as an associative body and will consider its 
initiatives to bring the balance of power to bear.
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The main audience of this dissertation may be expected to be regional 
specialists concentrating on the international politics and security relations of 
Southeast Asia. Moreover, it may be of interest to theorists of the balance of 
power and IR scholars researching issues related to regionalism and security 
cooperation. The thesis does not aim to add to the field of policy-making or to 
make any empirical contribution to the study of Southeast Asian security relations. 
Instead, it adopts an historical approach to offer an interpretation of well-known 
events.
Data for this research project has been collected from a variety of sources. 
First, great importance has been given to primary documents that include ASEAN 
and ARF declarations and statements, official speeches and governmental 
communiques. All the primary sources consulted were in English. Second, 
primary information has been gathered through interviews with governmental 
officials, former ambassadors, a retired foreign minister and with academics of 
various universities and research institutes interested in ASEAN, the ARF, and 
East and Southeast Asian security relations. Most interviews were conducted 
during field research in Singapore and Indonesia in February and March 2000. 
The individual interviews generally lasted for about one hour and were not tape- 
recorded. Every interview was started with a brief summary of the research 
project. All the interviewees spoke openly and answered frankly to the questions 
they were asked. Governmental officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
of Singapore demanded not to be named in the text. Finally, the author has relied 
on numerous secondary sources that include books on the subject and other 
related topics, monographs, autobiographies as well as articles published in 
scholarly journals, newspapers and magazines.
The methodological approach adopted in this dissertation aims to combine 
a theoretical and factual understanding of ASEAN and the ARF. The 
methodology used is based on an historical narrative. As a research practice, 
historical narration concentrates on the description and interpretation of events. 
The historical narrative has as a central subject a specific aspect of the history of 
ASEAN and the ARF and covers a period from the few years that preceded the 
formation of the Association in 1967 until the year 2000. The need for such an 
historical approach can be justified by the fact that the balance of power factor has 
been significant at different periods of the evolution of ASEAN and the ARF. In
14
fact, it will be indicated in this thesis that the balance of power factor has 
influenced most of their crucial moments and developments. Consequently, the 
use of an historical narrative enables the reader to acquire a complete 
understanding of the role of this factor within both cooperative security regimes.
The practical relevance of the balance of power to regimes for cooperative 
security is primarily examined in four separate case studies. Except for the 
discussion on the ARF, the case studies are analysed in a similar way. They are 
considered by first focusing on the associative perspective involved before trying 
to determine how the balance of power factor played a role. This descriptive 
section is then followed by a discussion on how each perspective interacted with 
the other. It is important to note that the objective of this research project will not 
be to quantify the significance of the balance of power factor within ASEAN and 
the ARF due to the fact that it impossible to measure the relative importance of 
this specific dimension on the cooperative process.
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Chapter One
A Theoretical Discussion of Regimes for Cooperative Security 
Introduction
In this first chapter, the rise of multilateral security cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War will be addressed within a theoretical 
framework by considering how cooperative security arrangements have been 
analysed through a neo-liberal interpretation of security regimes. It will be argued 
that this neo-liberal analysis may be complemented by a consideration of the 
balance of power factor. The chapter will include three sections. The first will 
address the experience of post-Cold War multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. It 
will involve describing the rise of multilateral security cooperation in the region 
and examining cooperative security as one of its' underlying core principles. The 
second section will locate regional inter-state arrangements for cooperative 
security within a wider theoretical discussion by reviewing the neo-liberal 
understanding of security regimes. This part will be completed by a realist 
discussion of security cooperation. The prospect will be raised that the underlying 
calculations made by participants in such cooperation include considerations that 
are alien to neo-liberal cooperative theory. The final section will discuss the 
balance of power factor by introducing a conventional understanding of the term. 
Having done so, the notion of balance of power will be discussed as a possible 
complementary factor within inter-state cooperative security regimes.
I. Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific
A. Multilateralism. ASEAN and the Establishment of the ARF
With the exception of ASEAN, the East-West ideological rivalry as well as 
a series of strong bilateral security agreements linking the United States to its 
regional allies meant that bilateralism had dominated the Cold War regional 
security architecture. Moreover, the absence of multilateralism1 in East Asia
'Ruggie explains that “At its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or 
more states in accordance with certain principles.” John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The 
Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), p. 568.
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resulted from the region’s extreme diversity in economic and political systems but 
also in strategic perspectives.2 Western attempts to promote multilateral security 
cooperation came in the form of multilateral alliances. They included the South- 
East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, or Manila Pact, of September 1954 and its 
institutional structure, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) created 
in February 1955. The ANZUS Treaty was signed by the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand in September 1951 and the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement 
came into effect in October 1957. The Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, that 
included by 1963 Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, was 
replaced in November 1971 by a consultative Five Power Defence Arrangements. 
In short, these multilateral security undertakings were entangled into the East- 
West confrontation and dominated by a military dimension and by the 
participation of external powers.
In contrast, ASEAN took a different approach to multilateral security 
cooperation; namely, cooperative security. It lacked a military aspect and focused 
instead on confidence-building, dialogue and conflict avoidance rather than 
dispute resolution. The Association was established through the Bangkok 
Declaration of August 1967 with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand as its founding members. The latter were anti-communist states that 
hoped for regional political stability in order to enable a concentration of resources 
on economic development in the interest of domestic regime security. National 
and regional stability were therefore regarded as indivisible. The Association was 
also a response to an advancing communist threat in Indochina and a related fear 
of domestic communist insurgencies. As indicated in the Bangkok Declaration, 
ASEAN aspired to a regional order based on the managerial role of Southeast 
Asian states. In November 1971, the members registered a call for regional 
autonomy through the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
Declaration. Concluded at the first summit of the ASEAN heads of government in 
Bali in February 1976, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord provided the
2Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia- 
Pacific Way’?,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), p. 322.
3See Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f Regional 
Security, Adelphi Paper No. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 10-16.
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Association with a political identity but excluded formal military cooperation on 
an intra-ASEAN basis. A second document, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation 
(TAC) in Southeast Asia, established a norm-based code of conduct for regulating 
regional inter-state relations.
At the end of the Cold War, some regional specialists and policy-makers 
suggested that traditional bilateral security arrangements would not be sufficient to 
address a rising regional interdependence and cope with the uncertain security 
environment in East Asia. This led to a variety of proposals to promote 
multilateralism. At issue though was the lack of prospect of multilateral security 
cooperation on any other basis than a variant of ASEAN’s model of cooperative 
security. Gorbachev had already called during his Vladivostok speech of July 1986 
for the creation of an Asian-Pacific equivalent to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which had resulted from the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975.4 At the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) held in Jakarta in July 
1990, Gareth Evans and Joe Clark, the foreign ministers of Australia and Canada, 
suggested separately an Asia-Pacific conference on security and cooperation. This 
was opposed by the United States that feared the potential weakening of its 
bilateral security arrangements. In addition, most East Asian leaders felt 
uncomfortable with a European model for cooperation. An overly-structured and 
complex form of multilateralism was not supported by most regional players who 
preferred a flexible and informal manner whereby the level of institutionalisation 
could be kept to a minimum. Post-Cold War multilateral security cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific seemed therefore to be dependent on an extension of the ASEAN 
model to the wider region.
The ASEAN states needed to cope with the uncertain regional strategic 
context in the post-Cold War.5 Their initiative to establish the ARF in July 1993 
resulted from various motivations. Changes in the security environment affected 
the ASEAN members forcing them to question their sub-regional approach to 
security. They had to acknowledge the security interdependence linking their sub- 
region to the rest of the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, in an attempt to preserve its post-
4For a discussion on the Vladivostok speech, please refer to Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and 
Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 60-63.
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Cold War relevance, ASEAN sought to develop, or further define, its stabilising 
role in Southeast Asian relations through the formation of the Forum. Finally, the 
ARF was created in response to the shifting distribution of power in East Asia. 
The Forum was viewed as a diplomatic instrument to promote a continuing 
American involvement in the region, thus avoiding the need for an independent 
Japanese security role, and to encourage China to act with good international 
citizenship in mind.6
In sum, the ASEAN states, led by Singapore as chair of its Standing 
Committee and supported by Japan and Australia, brought about an increase in 
multilateralism in the post-Cold War by forming the ARF. The Association 
succeeded in assuming a position of leadership in the creation of the Forum. The 
latter is based on an ASEAN model of cooperative security that has relied on 
confidence-building, an informal process of dialogue and a mode of conflict 
avoidance. The ARF may be examined as ASEAN’s attempt to expand its 
multilateral approach to the Asia-Pacific and yet also as an abdication to its 
commitment to a regional order based on the managerial role of Southeast Asian 
states. It should be noted that the rise in regional multilateralism was not limited 
to the political-security realm but also included economic cooperation. The 
sustained economic “miracle” in the Asia-Pacific had generated a great source of 
optimism. Driven by market forces, the rise in economic regionalism had been 
linked closely to the growth of regional economies over the last twenty years. The 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was created in 1989 as a 
regional economic dialogue as opposed to a negotiating group.7 The goal from the 
outset was to encourage trade and investment liberalisation. APEC is based on a 
concept of “open regionalism” which means that the outcome of accords on 
liberalisation are applied without discrimination within the regional grouping but 
also to non-APEC economies. The majority of Asian participants have preferred
5See chapter six for a discussion of ASEAN’s security environment at the end of the Cold War.
6Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 19.
7APEC’s current participants are: the ASEAN states (namely Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia) but also the United States, 
China, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Chile, Mexico, Russia and Peru.
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APEC to remain a dialogue on trade and investment rather than an 
institutionalised body.
B. Cooperative Security
Having described the rise in multilateral security cooperation, let us now 
discuss the principle of cooperative security which is the key underlying concept 
behind the new multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. In essence, cooperative 
security is understood as an alternative to balance of power practice. Acharya 
explains that this principle includes the “rejection of ‘deterrence mind-sets’
Q
associated with great power geopolitics of the Cold War.” Rejecting the 
perspective of the security dilemma, it is based on security cooperation “with 
others” as opposed to “against others.”9 Discussing its purpose, Dewitt writes:
The intent has been to replace the Cold War security structure.... with a 
multilateral process and framework with the following attributes: it must be 
geared toward reassurance, rather than deterrence; it must at best replace or at 
least co-exist with bilateral alliances; and it must promote both military and non­
military security.10
Cooperative security may be compared to the concept of collective security as 
embodied in the League of Nations Covenant because it is intended to be 
comprehensive in membership with security arrangements obtaining on an intra­
mural basis. The fundamental difference, however, is that cooperative security, 
unlike collective security, lacks the vehicles of economic and military sanctions.11 
In fact, it deliberately eschews sanctions.
Cooperative security operates through dialogue and seeks to address the 
climate of international relations rather than tackle specific problems. It relies on 
promoting standard international norms among regional partners. The notion of 
cooperative security assumes that states cooperate on the basis of self-interest.
8Amitav Acharya, Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert o f Powers?, IDSS 
Working Paper No. 3 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 1999), p. 8.
9The notion of “security with others” was first developed in the Palme Commission Report. Please 
refer to Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. The Report o f the Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship o f Olof Palme 
(London: Pan Books, 1982).
10David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol.
7, No. 1 (1994), p. 7.
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Adherence to a set of norms and principles is expected to decrease regional 
tensions. The violation of these norms would undermine the premises of trust and 
confidence-building on which any cooperative security arrangement is based. 
Focusing primarily on reassurance, cooperative security approaches, including 
measures of transparency, aim to promote confidence and security building 
measures (CSBM’s) that help to reduce mistrust. As will be discussed in chapter 
two, the ARF has not yet progressed from promoting confidence-building 
measures to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, except in a declaratory 
sense.
The concept of cooperative security was preceded by the term common 
security first developed in the 1982 report of the Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues headed by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof 
Palme. Written during a period of severe East-West tensions, the Palme 
Commission Report called on the adversaries to cooperate in an attempt to 
maintain stability and peace. A key factor in common security is the mutual 
possession of nuclear weapons. Wiseman explains:
...common security offers a basis for a cooperative model of international 
security, in contrast to the competitive model of power politics. While some 
expositors of common security emphasize its ‘defensive’ elements, others argue 
more for a change in the way we think about security focusing primarily on the 
principle of cooperative, reciprocal or mutual security.12
The notion of common security was later introduced by Mikhael Gorbachev and 
others to an Asian-Pacific setting. Several similarities exist between the notions of 
common and cooperative security. These include a common rejection of 
deterrence strategies and balance of power tactics and a broader definition of 
security that includes military and non-military issues.13 Both approaches are also 
based on the principle of inclusiveness, meaning that they do not exclude any 
political or economic systems or adversaries. In contrast to common security, 
cooperative security favours a more gradual approach to the institutionalisation of
"Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1999), p. 27.
12Geofffey Wiseman, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, 
No. 1 (1992), p. 43.
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relations and recognises the necessity of maintaining, at least at first, existing 
bilateral alliances. The notion of cooperative security stresses also the importance 
of flexibility, consensus-building and consultation.
Let us now further discuss the characteristics of “cooperative security” 
when applied to post-Cold War multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. The concept, 
which was first endorsed by the Canadian government in 1990, is based on four 
central principles.14 First, it assumes that the institutionalisation of post-Cold War 
security relations in the Asia-Pacific should be seen as a slow and gradual process. 
Second, the institutionalisation of security relations is at first not aimed at 
replacing existing regional alliances but rather at co-existing and working with 
them in the promotion of security. Indeed, cooperative security arrangements can 
be complementary to an existing security architecture. Ultimately, cooperative 
security is still expected to replace bilateral alliances and their narrow focus on 
military security. Third, cooperative security arrangements are based on the 
principle of inclusiveness as they aim to promote a “habit of dialogue” among all 
regional states. Finally, the principle also includes an informal level of diplomacy, 
referred to as “track-two diplomacy,” which consists of constant communication 
between academics, non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors in 
some dialogue with governments through for example the ASEAN Institutes of 
Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).
This thesis will focus primarily on two multilateral regimes for regional 
cooperative security; namely, ASEAN and the ARF. The Forum may be viewed as 
an institutional manifestation of cooperative security. While introduced as a post- 
Cold War concept, the principle of cooperative security has been applied to 
Southeast Asian security relations for a longer period of time through the activities 
of the Association. Both ASEAN and the ARF will be examined as institutions 
that seek to promote the objectives associated with cooperative security. In 
particular, they may be understood as aiming to move beyond conventional
13Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security,” in 
Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, eds., New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), p. 7.
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balance of power practice by improving the environment in which security 
relations take place. Yet, it should be noted that neither was established with 
academic models in mind of the kind cited above.
II. Neo-liberal Cooperative Theory: A Theoretical Discussion on 
Security Regimes
The rise of Asian-Pacific multilateralism has been discussed so far with 
reference to cooperative security as one of its core underlying principles, though 
more so among academics than policy-makers. The first section has addressed the 
experience of post-Cold War multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. Regional security 
cooperation will now be located in a theoretical discussion. More specifically, 
regional inter-state arrangements for cooperative security, ASEAN and the ARF, 
will be situated within the theoretical framework of a neo-liberal understanding of 
security regimes. The validity of the neo-liberal literature on such regimes will be 
determined by first reviewing its core assumptions and hypotheses before 
complementing it with a realist discussion of security cooperation. It is only in 
chapter two that this theoretical discussion will be applied to the Asia-Pacific 
when both ASEAN and the ARF are interpreted as security regimes. No 
theoretical setting can be expected to describe reality in all of its complexity. 
Though some may disagree with the attempt to define both cooperative security 
arrangements as forms of security regimes, the latter may still be viewed as a 
satisfactory theoretical tool with which to address ASEAN and the ARF in a wider 
theoretical discussion. Moreover, regional cooperation has often been examined in 
International Relations (IR) through a neo-liberal perspective.
This section needs to be positioned within the debate between the realist 
and liberal paradigms that have always been at the centre of the IR discipline. The 
contemporary discussion opposing neo-liberal and (neo-)realist thinkers consists 
of several issues including the nature of anarchy, international cooperation, 
relative versus absolute gains, states objectives, the relevance of institutions and
,4Pierre Lizee, “Securite et integration en Asie-Pacifique: Dynamiques et Implications 
Theoriques,” Etudes Internationales, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Juin 1997), pp. 346-347.
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others.15 The debate is based on a number of underlying assumptions; above all, 
that states, defined as unitary-rational actors, are the major players in world 
politics and that anarchy, defined as the absence of a central governing agency, 
serves as a major constraint that shapes states’ preferences and actions. While 
accepting these assumptions for the sake of the theoretical discussion that follows, 
it is important to keep in mind that they do not represent the only “truth” in the 
discipline. Other approaches, including constructivism which will be briefly 
discussed in this section, have offered different assumptions underlying the 
discussion of JR.
A. Regime Theory and Neo-liberal Institutionalism
Let us start by introducing the concept of a regime. Authors working on 
regimes too often apply definitions that suit the specific area of research they are 
focusing on. Hence, many different meanings have been given to the term which 
has led to vagueness and confusion. Fortunately, Stephen Krasner has put forward 
a generally-accepted definition of a regime. He writes:
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision­
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice.16
Krasner has also discussed additional elements that further distinguish regimes 
from other forms of inter-state cooperation.17 Regimes must be separated from 
temporary arrangements, which are immediately transformed by changes in power 
distribution or interests. Moreover, he points out that regime behaviour cannot be 
based exclusively on interests but needs to include some sense of general
15David A. Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics,” in David Baldwin, ed., 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), pp. 4-8.
l6Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 186.
17Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” pp. 
186-189.
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obligation. The principle of reciprocity is for example an element that 
characterises regime dynamics.
Having defined the notion of a regime, let us briefly relate it to the concept 
of cooperation. The definition of the term is generally rather vague. Lindblom 
wrote in 1965 that cooperation involves states adjusting “their behavior to the 
actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination.”1 8A s explained by Haggard and Simmons, “Regimes are examples 
of cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take place 
in the absence of established regimes.”19 Consequently, security regimes should be 
considered as examples of the process of security cooperation. They may be seen 
as tools developed by states to promote their own interests through mutual 
cooperation. While this represents a state-centric approach to regime dynamics, 
the reader should be reminded that states’ actions; namely, the behaviour of the 
ASEAN and ARF participants, are at the core of this study. Moreover, both the 
Association and the Forum are based on respect for national sovereignty.
When reading the literature available on regimes, one notices quickly that 
differing theories exist. Moreover, most authors do not seem to agree on how to 
divide this vast body of literature into various groups. Krasner refers to three main 
orientations: the conventional structural, the modified structural and the Grotian 
orientation.20 Haggard and Simmons specify, or complicate, the classification 
further by referring to four main theoretical approaches to regimes: structuralism, 
strategic and game-theoretic approaches, functional theories, and cognitive
*71theories. Finally, Rowlands makes reference to three approaches to international 
cooperation: the power-based, the interest-based, and the knowledge-based 
explanation. This section focuses on an interest-based approach to cooperation.
18Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 227, quoted 
in Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). This definition was for example used by the various 
authors in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986).
19Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International 
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 495.
20Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” pp. 190-194.
21Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” pp. 498-513.
22Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics o f Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995), 14-28.
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Let us now introduce one approach to regime formation and dynamics, the neo­
liberal perspective, which offers a satisfactory understanding of security regimes. 
It is often through this theoretical perspective that post-Cold War security 
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has been approached.
Neo-liberalism partly studies inter-state cooperation through regimes. This 
perspective assumes that states are self-interested utility maximisers and claims to 
demonstrate the relevance of regimes for the behaviour of states. Neo-liberals 
focus on efforts realised by states to seek absolute and common gains through 
cooperation. Regimes are studied as instruments for coordinating states’ actions so 
as to promote desired results in specific issue-areas. A state is said to choose 
rationally to participate in a regime in order to promote its long-term interests. 
Game theories are often seen within this perspective as essential tools of analysis.
With the end of the Cold War, Robert Keohane launched a new theoretical 
framework as a reaction to neo-realism, called neo-liberal institutionalism. The 
latter is a rational choice theory that examines states as self-interested actors 
displaying utility-maximising behaviour. This theoretical perspective is part of a 
neo-liberal approach to international cooperation. Though accepting core realist 
assumptions, it claims that cooperation is far from being limited or short-term. 
Institutions are expected to facilitate inter-state cooperation by reducing potential 
costs involved and provide information on the intentions and interests of the 
participants. Thus, Keohane continues to focus on his central hypothesis; namely, 
that “institutionalization in its various degrees exerts impact on governments’ 
behavior in that it helps in defining the meaning and the importance of state 
action.”24 Institutions are defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations.” The terms “regime” and “institution” have often been used 
interchangeably in the recent literature on states cooperation. Neo-liberal
23Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structuralism and Beyond,” in Robert O. 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 159, 
164-165.
24Michael Suhr, “Robert O. Keohane: A Contemporary Classic,” in Iver B. Neumann and Ole 
Waever, eds., The Future o f International Relations (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 106.
25Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 3.
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institutionalism focuses on three forms of institutions: intergovernmental or non­
governmental organizations, international regimes and conventions. This 
theoretical approach is said to be applicable when two requirements are fulfilled. 
First, common interests must exist so that cooperation among states leads to gains. 
The second requirement is that “variations in the degree of institutionalization 
exert substantial effects on state behavior.”26 The lack of common interests is 
expected to lead to the absence of institutions and thus to instability and conflict. 
In contrast, the existence of institutions will facilitate cooperation by limiting 
opportunist behaviour and by creating a network of interaction between states.
The neo-liberal perspective is often applied by those who claim that 
security regimes influence security relations thanks to their impact on the 
behaviour and actions of governments. When studying security regimes, this 
approach makes it possible to pay particular attention to several issues including 
the development of a code of conduct among the participants, the long-term utility 
of security regimes to the individual interests of the member states and the 
importance of the level of institutionalisation when judging the influence of a 
security regime on security questions.
B. A Neo-Liberal Understanding of Security Regimes
The political scientist Robert Jervis bases his definition of a “security 
regime” on Krasner’s account of regimes. Jervis writes: “those principles, rules, 
and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that
others will reciprocate a form of cooperation that is more than the following of
short-run self-interests.”27 He points out that short-term restraints linked with self- 
interest do not characterise a security regime but argues instead that reciprocity 
and long-term interest planning are central to the process. The same approach is 
taken by William T. Tow who writes that a security regime exists “because of a 
convergence of interests shared by its members to pursue common interests and to
26Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp. 2-3.
27Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 
357.
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avoid certain outcomes relative to specific regional security questions.” One 
notes the influence of the neo-liberal approach to cooperation in both analyses. 
Security regimes are said to arise from the existence of some common interests 
regarding specific security issues.
Nevertheless, the existence of a security regime does not necessarily 
involve a situation where no form of competition or conflict between the 
participants is possible. When contrasting a security regime to a security 
community, a concept discussed by Karl Deutsch in 1957,29 Acharya argues that 
the former offers a situation where the interests of the participants are neither 
completely compatible nor competitive.30 In that respect, security regimes differ 
from security communities where one observes a complete and long-term 
convergence of interests between members in the avoidance of war.
One may wonder why security regimes have remained so rare in
international politics when compared with the rapid expansion of regimes dealing
with non-security matters. Neo-liberal theorists argue that regimes are more
difficult to establish and are often unsuccessful when dealing with zero-sum
games. States are less willing to enter cooperative arrangements, as the issues
addressed are more central to their own military security. When contrasting
security and non-security regimes, Lipson explains that “the crucial differences
appear to lie in the costs of betrayal, the difficulties of monitoring, and the
11
tendency to comprehend security issues as strictly competitive struggles.” As a 
result of all these difficulties, the formation of a security regime is often seen as 
unattractive to decision-makers.
Let us now focus on the practical operation of a security regime and 
contrast its modalities to the functioning of a traditional balance of power system. 
Jervis’ influential work needs to be discussed. He considers the Concert of
28William T. Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World (Bouder, Col.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 13.
29Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization 
in the Light o f Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
30Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in South East Asia?,” Journal o f Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sept. 1995), p. 179.
31Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” in David A. 
Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), p. 76.
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Europe, which operated through diplomatic congresses from 1815 to 1823 and 
informally until the Crimean War of 1854, as the most famous historical example 
of a security regime. Rejecting the common approach of comparing the Concert of 
Europe to a sophisticated balance of power system,32 Jervis insists that the 
Concert should be analysed as a security regime. In his view, the Concert “was 
characterized by an unusually high and self-conscious level of cooperation among 
the major European powers. The states did not play the game as hard as they 
could; they did not take advantage of others’ short-run vulnerabilities.” The 
promotion of individual and common long-term interests is identified as essential 
to the operation of a security regime. States are willing to employ restraint in their 
policies and avoid pressing short-term interests in the hope of achieving additional 
gains in the longer run.
By defining the operation of a security regime in interest-based terms, 
Jervis succeeds in introducing a second issue focal in his analysis: the shift from 
the traditional concept of the balance of power to a security regime/Concert 
system. In that respect, the Concert of Europe is described as an historical 
example of a shift beyond the balance of power. Jervis distinguishes the 
operations of a security regime/Concert system and the balance of power by 
indicating the existence of opposing assumptions in each case. He claims:
In the balance of power, the stability of the system is maintained by states 
following narrow, short-run self-interest. Wars may be frequent, but at least the 
imperatives that leaders have to follow are relatively clear and simple. In a 
Concert system,...., states and national leaders must have wider concerns, a 
longer-run perspective, and greater wisdom.34
The idea of a shift from the traditional concept of the balance of power to long­
term security cooperation is central to this thesis. This approach has been followed 
by many authors who consider ASEAN and the ARF as security regimes that may 
be defined alternatively to the balance of power concept. It should be noted that
32As for example applied in Henry Kissinger, World Restored: Mettemich, Castlereagh and the 
Problems o f Peace, 1812-22 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1957) and in Edward Vose 
Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance o f Power (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967).
33Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in 
Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 
p. 59.
34Robert Jervis, “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert,” 
American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), p. 724.
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Jervis’ analysis of a Concert system is centred around great powers, even if 
medium and small states may be included in the cooperative process. In contrast, 
recent institutionalist views focus on security regimes as applicable to all states 
and thus not necessarily limited to the leading presence and role of great powers.
Neo-liberal institutionalists have also concentrated on the influence of 
security regimes. For instance, current institutional theory deals in great length 
with the issue of information sharing, essential to security matters.35 Neo-liberal 
institutionalism has been applied to the creation of post-Cold War security 
regimes, including the ARF and other forms of confidence-building mechanisms 
in Asia, Latin America and other parts of the world. In accordance with Jervis’ 
analysis, institutionalist theorists argue that these security regimes should not be 
considered in terms of the balance of power. Instead, they claim that they have 
been established and will continue to exist as a result of “the benefits they 
provide: by facilitating communication, information, transparency; by reducing 
mutual threat perceptions and worst-case thinking; and by undercutting the self- 
fulfilling prophecies that lie at the heart of the security dilemma.”
One may conclude this discussion on security regimes by emphasising 
several points. Specific variables enjoy a central position within the neo-liberal 
analysis of security regimes. These include the development of norms and 
principles, the establishment of a code of conduct respected by the member states, 
the level of institutionalisation and the existence of common interests. A security 
regime does not make the use of force unthinkable nor does it lead to the existence 
of converging interests only. Instead, bilateral tensions, territorial disputes and 
other forms of potential threats could exist among its participants. That said, the 
purpose of a security regime is primarily to enhance regional security through the 
application of a code of conduct which influences the behaviour of states, and also 
through collective policies aimed at conflict avoidance and/or conflict 
management and resolution. Though mostly influencing intra-mural relations, a 
security regime can promote a stronger sense of self-reliance among its
35Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 43.
36Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” Review of 
International Studies, 21 (1995), p. 352.
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participants which could therefore redefine the influence of external powers and 
even limit their interference in regional affairs. Finally, the promotion of 
confidence-building measures, that could involve the creation of better 
communication networks, the expansion of transparency between participants and 
the promotion of closer relations between decision-makers should be seen as a 
first step to fulfil these different ambitions. Naturally, the utility of a security 
regime will strongly depend on its institutional development.
C. Alternatives to a Neo-liberal Understanding of Security regimes: Realist 
and Constructivist Perspectives
Realists have traditionally advanced the theory of hegemonic stability, first 
developed by Charles Kindleberger,37 to explain the activities of a security regime. 
Yet, neo-liberal theorists also refer to this approach, particularly with reference to 
the formation of regimes.38 The theory of hegemonic stability argues that the 
creation and persistence of a regime is dependent on the influence and 
participation of a single powerful state. Regime dynamics are associated with the 
capacity of an hegemonic player to promote and lead cooperative arrangements 
within the international system. The debate juxtaposing (neo-) realists and neo­
liberals over the question of inter-state cooperation is based on two core 
controversies: the significance of regimes or institutions in international politics 
and the notion of absolute versus relative gains. It would be incorrect to say that 
one school is only concerned with absolute and the other with relative gains when 
analysing international cooperation. Still, the neo-liberal perspective has focused 
on states seeking absolute and common interests while the realists have paid close 
attention to the matter of relative gains. Both issues are strongly inter-linked. As 
noted earlier, it is by stressing that states seek to promote individual and common 
interests that neo-liberals claim that (security) regimes are significant actors in 
international politics. Realists reach the opposite conclusion by concentrating on 
relative gains.
37Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).
38See for example Keohane, After Hegemony.
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Joseph Grieco enters the debate by separating out how neo-liberal 
institutionalists and realists view anarchy. He explains that neo-liberal 
institutionalists analyse states as self-interested utility maximisers, signifying that
'IQ # f
they aim at obtaining the highest possible individual gains. According to this 
perspective, Grieco argues, states see cheating as the main danger associated with 
cooperation. Anarchy is said to be viewed by neo-liberals to imply that “states 
may wish to cooperate, but, aware that cheating is both possible and profitable, 
lack a central agency to enforce promises.”40 In contrast, Grieco asserts that 
anarchy means to realists that “there is no overarching authority to prevent others 
from using violence, or the threat o f violence, to destroy or enslave them.”41 He 
claims that states, rather than being troubled only with cheating, need to face the 
larger question of relative gains when cooperating with others.42 This often limits 
the willingness of states to cooperate. Though Grieco does not dispute that inter­
state cooperation is possible, he indicates that states will cooperate with others as 
long as the cooperation process leads to a balanced achievement of gains.43 In that 
respect, he specifies the need to include a broader set of constraints when 
analysing inter-state cooperation.
This argument is also followed by John J. Mearsheimer who points out 
that states, concerned primarily with the power distribution in the system, need to 
focus first on relative gains when cooperating with others.44 This leads him to 
argue that regimes have a limited influence on governmental behaviour and that 
they should not be seen as security promoters in the post-Cold War.45 He claims 
that “the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, 
and that institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system.”46
39Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: 
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 158-159.
40Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” p. 160.
4lGrieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” p. 160.
42Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” pp. 162-164.
43Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” p. 163.
44John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 12.
45Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” p. 7.
46Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” p. 13.
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Thus, he classifies regimes as limited variables within the larger game of the 
balance of power. Though Mearsheimer is more radical in his analysis, he reaches 
the same conclusion as Grieco: states find it dangerous to cooperate due to the 
issue of relative gains.
Constructivism is a theoretical approach that has developed as a reaction to 
structural realism and neo-liberal theories of cooperation.47 Rejecting the 
assumption that states are unitary and self-interested actors displaying utility- 
maximising behaviour, it takes a sociological approach to the study of IR. It 
focuses on the importance of social structures that include shared knowledge, 
institutions, identities, norms and rules. These normative and social structures are 
believed to determine the behaviour of the social actors involved in international 
politics. Alexander Wendt, the leading figure in constructivism, explains that:
Constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests, and,
as such, take a more sociological than economic approach to systemic theory. On
this basis, they have argued that states are not structurally or exogenously given
48but constructed by historically contingent interactions.
The understanding of these historical interactions is expected to help us analyse 
how interests, identities and values may be emulated or modified over time. 
Constructivism also discusses material factors, for instance the distribution of 
power in the international system, but examines them in the context of the social 
structures mentioned above. The latter are said to give meaning to material factors 
that can only be examined through them. Ringmar explains, for instance, that 
“What matters in the end is not matter, but instead how matter is represented.”*9 
As a result, constructivism questions the way neo-realists interpret anarchy which 
is expected to lead automatically to self-help and insecurity. Instead, 
constructivists assert that the logic of anarchy is socially constructed, as famously 
claimed by Wendt when stating that “anarchy is what states make of it.”50
47Please refer to Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
48Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), p. 385.
49Erik Ringmar, “Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History,” in Iver B. 
Neumann and Ole Waever, eds., The Future o f International Relations (London: Routledge, 1997), 
p. 278.
50Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
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When examining regionalism and the development of institutions, 
constructivism concentrates on regional identity as well as the economic, political 
and cultural conditions that exist in a specific region.51 This approach does not 
focus on material factors and rejects the assumption that states are utility- 
maximising actors with precise and given interests that can be promoted through 
cooperation. Instead, it claims that attention needs to be given to the formation and 
evolution of identities, interests and norms associated with the process of 
institution-building. Hurrell writes that constructivist theories concentrate “on 
regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of belonging to a 
particular regional community, and what has been called ‘cognitive 
regionalism’.”52 The analytic focus of a constructivist approach to the study of 
institutions therefore includes the role of norms, the importance of ideology and 
the socialisation of relations that may induce identity change and result in the 
construction of a collective identity among regional states. Regional cooperation 
may thus lead to the formation of a regional sense of community.53 Constructivists 
view the rise of Asian-Pacific multilateralism in the post-Cold War as promoted 
by the creation of an embryonic collective identity in the region. The latter may 
result from the convergence of economic views, an increased sense of regional 
interdependence and the role played by non-governmental actors. Though it may 
over-emphasise the relevance and strength of regional identities, constructivism 
has a great deal to say on the existence of norms and their influence on security 
regimes.
To conclude this section, let us go back to the realist approach to security 
cooperation and discuss its limits as well as what it can tell us about the centrality 
of power in cooperative processes. The realist perception of (security) regimes is 
too confined in the sense that it analyses cooperative arrangements as restricted
5'Constructivism has been applied, for instance, to the study of ASEAN and Southeast Asian 
security relations. Please refer to Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the 
‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way’?,” pp. 319-346; Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity 
and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia,” in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., 
Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 198-227; and Nikolas 
Busse, “Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1999), 
pp. 39-60.
52Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” p. 352.
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instruments in the power politics game. For instance, Mearsheimer’s analysis is 
conventional as he discredits the relevance of regimes by considering them as 
modest variables in the balance of power. By minimising issues essential to an 
understanding of regimes, including the importance of norms and principles and 
the possibility of a long-term convergence of interests, realism takes a narrow 
view in respect of inter-state cooperation. The latter is, for instance, never seen as 
context-dependent. Hence, the realist perspective seems incapable of offering a 
satisfactory study of security regimes.
That said, realism may still be useful to highlight a limitation of the neo­
liberal perception of inter-state cooperation. As seen before, the neo-liberal 
interpretation assumes, at least in the long run, the gradual lessening of realist 
beliefs among the participating states to a security regime. This is not expected to 
lead to the complete disappearance of these persuasions though as may be 
expected in the case of a security community. By concentrating on states’ 
individual interests and their convergence, neo-liberals may have minimised the 
persisting influence played by relative power on the functioning of regimes as well 
as the incompatibility of some interests. Though offering an acceptable analysis of 
security regimes, neo-liberals may have underestimated the possible persistence of 
realist beliefs among political leaders engaged in these institutions. Close attention 
needs to be given when examining security regimes to the power considerations 
involved. In particular, it is the role played by the constraining of power in 
security regime dynamics that ought to be studied further. In short, rather than 
discrediting the neo-liberal interpretation of security regimes, the realist 
perspective enables us to raise the point that the underlying calculations made by 
the participants include considerations that are alien to neo-liberal cooperative 
theory and which need to be addressed.
53Please refer to the original work of Karl Deutsch on security communities and integration. 
Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.
III. Balance of Power Meets Cooperative Security
A. The Concept of Power in Realism
Balance of power theory rests on the centrality and constant pursuit of 
power in international relations. Its underlying assumptions are based on realist 
suppositions. Hence, before discussing the balance of power, let us briefly 
examine how the concept of power has been defined and addressed by some 
realist theorists. The realist tradition relies on a coercive understanding of power. 
Yet, definitions of the term have traditionally been vague.54 Schwarzenberger has 
succeeded in putting forward a satisfactory definition. He writes:
Power is the mean between influence and force. All three are different ways of 
establishing a social nexus on a footing regarded as desirable by the active agent 
in such relations. Power distinguishes itself, however, from influence by reliance 
on external pressure as a background threat, and from force by preference for 
achieving its ends without the actual use of physical force. Thus, power may be 
defined as capacity to impose one’s will on others by reliance on effective 
sanctions in case of non-compliance.55
National power is the result of the sum of different components that include 
military, economic, political and ideological attributes.56 The notion of power is 
therefore impossible to measure precisely. The concept of power is generally 
examined in a relational context rather than in absolute terms. A state’s 
capabilities are measured in relation to the attributes of one or more other 
countries. Moreover, power is not only the result of aggregate capabilities as it 
also depends on a state’s willingness and intention to implement its will. Though 
rarely defined in their writings, power is implicitly analysed by realist theorists 
through a military dimension.
Power is the most essential concept in realist theory. As a classical realist, 
Hans Morgenthau claims that “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle 
for power.”57 Morgenthau defines political power as a person’s capacity to control
54Hobbes wrote that “The power o f a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain 
some future apparent Good.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edited by R. Tuck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 62.
55Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study o f World Society, Third Edition (London: 
Stevens & Sons Limited, 1964), p. 14.
56For a discussion on the concept of power, please refer to Chris Brown, Understanding 
International Relations (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), pp. 87-97.
57Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, First Edition, 
Revised and Enlarged (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 13.
36
CO
some of another person’s actions through influencing that person’s mind. 
Domestic and international politics manifest universally a struggle for power.59 As 
a result, each political decision tries either to maintain power, being thus a policy 
of the status quo, to increase power at the expense of the status quo, a policy of 
imperialism, or to demonstrate power, a policy of prestige.60 A state wishing to 
preserve a margin of safety, should “aim not at a balance, that is, equality of 
power, but at superiority of power in their own behalf.”61 Hence, a state seeks the 
summit of power available. The notion of a constant struggle for power is 
problematic as states do not limit their actions to a permanent accumulation of 
capabilities. This limitation has been addressed by Kenneth Waltz who remains 
the quintessential neo-realist.62 He explains that “neo-realism sees power as a 
possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too
C O
much of it.” States are not searching to maximise power but security. In 
addition, Waltz insists that structural constraints rather than a pure struggle for 
power characterises international politics.
This short review has introduced a definition of the concept of power and 
mentioned its central position in realist theory. In accordance with realist 
suppositions, the thesis relies on a coercive understanding of the concept and 
focuses mainly on its strategic dimension. While limiting the analysis and nature 
of power for the sake of the theoretical discussion that follows, one should be 
aware of other approaches that have broaden the analysis of the concept.
B. Conventional Understanding of the Balance of Power Theory
No real consensus exists regarding a precise definition of the term 
“balance of power” or on the actual functioning of the power balancing process in
58Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1949), p. 14.
59Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1949), p. 21.
60Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1949), pp. 21-22.
6lMorgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1949), p. 155.
62Please refer to Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).
63Kenneth N. Watlz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in R.I. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb, 
eds., The Origins and Prevention o f Major Wars (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p. 40.
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the international system. The various meanings and modes of operation of the 
balance of power will be discussed in chapter three. The term is often used 
loosely, which leads to vagueness and confusion. Yet, despite the imprecisions, 
most theorists agree on some central principles. In its most conventional form, the 
balance of power theory assumes that as soon as a state’s position within the 
anarchical state system becomes a threat to the survival of others, a countervailing 
initiative, based on one or more actors, is created to restrain the rising state and 
ensure the preservation of the states system. States need to counterbalance any 
potential hegemon to ensure their survival and to prevent their being dictated to. 
Security is approached in unilateral, competitive and zero-sum terms. Security is 
only possible in the system when states attempt to achieve a balanced distribution 
of power amongst themselves between periods of tension and conflict.
Thanks to its core simplicity and explanatory qualities, the balance of 
power remains one of the greatest and most valuable tools of analysis in the study 
of international politics attracting constant academic interest. As a theory, it has 
been at the core of classical and modem realism, the most dominant school of IR. 
Historically linked with the notions of Realpolitik and raison d ’etat, the balance of 
power received a central position in the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes and other 
classical realists. In modem IR theory, the concept has remained at the core of the 
realist paradigm and introduced by Waltz as the central principle of neo-realism.64 
Yet, it would be incorrect to assume that the balance of power should exclusively 
be associated with realism. The existence of a second tradition of thought has been 
emphasised for instance by Richard Little. He refers to an "adversarial" and an 
"associative" balance of power tradition. The former, namely the realist 
perspective, remains the most well-known interpretation of the concept. In 
contrast, the associative tradition is based on the idea that rather than using power 
competitively to enhance narrow self-interests, it may be used "communally to 
sustain a just equilibrium which would reflect the interests of all the members of
64For example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948) and further editions. Also Waltz, Theory o f International 
Politics.
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the system."65 In modem IR literature, the associative approach to the balance of 
power is mainly represented in the "English School," particularly in the works of 
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull.66
As any theoretical concept employed to the study of social sciences, the 
balance of power contains shortcomings that complicate its analysis. Let us 
mention some of its limitations aware that others exist as well. The theory has 
been the target of several criticisms that include its unsophisticated analysis of the 
concept of power, its narrow understanding of the term security and its failure to 
include domestic issues. Security has primarily been limited to conventional inter­
state military relations while economic, social and technological matters have 
been mostly ignored. Regarding its level of analysis, the traditional balance of 
power theory does not take into consideration domestic aspects including internal 
threats, political systems and economic matters. The balance of power perspective 
also exaggerates the potential danger resulting from emerging hegemons. This 
view often limits the intentions of rising states to aggressive and expanding 
policies and fails to consider great powers as possible benign states which 
contribute to regional stability. In addition, the theory focuses excessively on 
relative gains, underestimating the existence of common interests and the prospect 
of long-term cooperation. Finally, it is also essential to question how war is 
analysed within the balance of power theory. Many factors, including the costs of 
modem warfare and the importance of domestic matters in the formulation of 
foreign policies, explain why most states are no longer ready or capable to use war 
as an instrument of the balance.
C. Balance of Power as a Factor within and Beyond Regimes For 
Cooperative Security
In discussing the shortcomings inherent in a neo-liberal analysis of security 
regimes, it has been argued that this perspective may be too limited on its own to 
explain their operation. Regional security cooperation may not lead to a lessening
65Richard Little, “Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought,” Review of  
International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), p. 95.
66Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Leicester University Press, 1978) and Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977).
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of realist convictions among policy-makers. On the contrary, it can be suggested 
that these views, resulting from military competition, latent conflicts and feelings 
of mistrust, remain influential within cooperative security regimes. Hence, it has 
been pointed out that further attention ought to be given to the constraining of 
power in security regime dynamics. While inter-state arrangements for cooperative 
security are often said to have been conceived as alternatives to the traditional 
concept of the balance of power, this thesis aims to determine how its central 
principles could still be relevant to ASEAN and the ARF. Thus, it is suspected 
that both these regimes for cooperative security may have been informed with 
some reference to balance of power practice.
The interpretation of the balance of power factor is based on the general 
principles and assumptions found in the conventional understanding of the 
concept. In accordance with balance of power theories, its purpose is to keep a 
cooperative security arrangement and its participants secure from intra- or extra­
mural hegemony. The participants of a security regime are expected to continue 
playing close attention to the power distribution within and beyond the associative 
arrangement and to react in cases of rising inequilibria. The term hegemony 
should be analysed as involving more than a traditional understanding of military 
expansion and domination by including political forms of hegemonic disposition 
as well. By preserving its central logic, the notion of a balance of power factor 
within cooperative security thus holds the core simplicity and explanatory 
qualities of the traditional concept.
Yet, attention needs to be given to the differences between balance of 
power in its conventional interpretation and practice and the balance of power 
factor within cooperative security regimes. This factor may be defined as the 
disposition to promote countervailing arrangements to deny hegemony within and 
beyond cooperative security even if devoid of direct military content. The balance 
of power is analysed in this thesis as a policy consideration, rather than as a 
system, that influences the modalities of regimes for cooperative security. The 
interpretation of the balance of power factor within cooperative security is defined 
by two specific assumptions. First, the constraining of power is seen as one
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element in the operation of a larger security arrangement. Other features pointed 
out by the interest-based approach to cooperation include: the presence of norms 
and principles, the promotion of a code of conduct, the level of institutionalisation 
and the existence of common interests. The balance of power factor may therefore 
co-exist with or even complement other aspects involved in the cooperative 
process.
Second, the constraining of power within a cooperative security regime 
should be seen as dependent on political rather than military means. The necessity 
to focus on the restraining of power through political channels results from the 
fact that security regimes usually remain diplomatic associations lacking any form 
of common military power. Thus, the method by which power is constrained 
within cooperative security distinguishes the balance of power factor from a more 
conventional application of the concept. As members of a cooperative security 
arrangement, ASEAN participants may be expected to depend on political 
mechanisms to contain hegemonic dispositions. These practices could involve 
institutional processes, namely specific agreements and treaties or other forms of 
institutional checks and balances applied among the member states. In particular, 
the balance of power factor within cooperative security may be examined in the 
context of norms and principles promoted by an associative arrangement. A 
common code of conduct based on standard international norms and respected by 
all the member states may constrain the larger participants and ensure that they do 
not threaten their smaller cooperative partners. Any act of hegemony could 
undermine these norms and rebound adversely on the political cohesion of a 
security regime. As a result, one may refer to the institutionalisation of a power 
balancing strategy that restrains politically potential hegemons through their 
participation in rule-based arrangements.
In sum, the interpretation of the balance of power factor within cooperative 
security may be contrasted with the views of the advocates of neo-realism who 
examine the balance of power concept entirely in terms of adversarial relations 
and self-help. Regimes for cooperative security are not expected to embrace 
conventional balance of power politics to contain an intra-mural rising power but 
rather to restrain its potential hegemonic dispositions through diplomatic and 
institutional means. In contrast, the constraining of power beyond cooperative
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security may be dependent on a conventional practice of countervailing power 
rather than on a denial of hegemony through political means. Indeed, external 
actors may be expected to have no stake in the norms promoted by a cooperative 
security arrangement that operates exclusively on an intra-mural basis. The 
participants to a regime for cooperative security may tacitly join an external power 
through diplomatic alignment to respond to a rising threat. This may differentiate 
an intra- and extra-mural application of the balance of power factor. In short, the 
interpretation of this factor may be associated with both an adversarial and 
associative understanding of the balance of power concept. The use of both 
traditions has often characterised the works of traditional realists, including 
Morgenthau, and exponents of the English School of International Relations.
Having compared and contrasted the balance of power factor within and 
beyond cooperative security to a conventional application of the concept, let us 
conclude this first chapter by repeating the central question to be addressed in this 
thesis. It concerns the extent to which the balance of power factor plays a part in 
the operation of cooperative security regimes and in the calculations of their 
participants. The hypothesis will be tested that the balance of power factor 
operates within and beyond regimes for cooperative security. The membership and 
external links of such groupings may be constructed with the denial of hegemony 
in mind. It is in that respect that the balance of power factor may co-exist with or 
even complement the cooperative security process.
67Little, “Deconstructing The Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought,” p. 98.
42
Chapter Two
Regimes for Cooperative Security:
The Formation and Institutional Evolution of 
ASEAN and the ARF
Introduction
The development of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold 
War was located in the last chapter within a theoretical framework; namely, a neo­
liberal approach to regimes for cooperative security. This theoretical discussion 
will now be applied to the institutional experience of ASEAN and the ARF, which 
may be regarded as regimes exemplifying cooperative security. The purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate the relevance of cooperative theory in analysing the 
associative experience of both cooperative security arrangements.
In discussing multilateralism in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, 
ASEAN and the ARF will be referred to as inter-state arrangements that seek to 
address the climate of international relations through the vehicle of dialogue as 
opposed to problem-solving. As examples of cooperative security, both 
institutions should be seen as promoting the notion of security cooperation “with 
others” as opposed to “against others.”1 ASEAN may be defined as a diplomatic 
association for political and security cooperation that concentrates on conflict 
avoidance and management driven initially by the goal of regional reconciliation. 
The ARF is a more extensive inter-governmental grouping, which focuses on 
dialogue, and confidence-building measures as a first step in promoting 
cooperative security. As examples of the latter, both cooperative security regimes 
may be viewed as regional attempts to move beyond the traditional concept of the 
balance of power despite the fact that cooperative security was developed with the 
object of complementing existing bilateral alliances of Cold War provenance.
ASEAN and the ARF will be examined separately despite the leading role 
of the Association in the creation and institutional evolution of the Forum. This 
chapter will consist of two sections. ASEAN will first be analysed as a
Please refer to Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. The Report o f the Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship o f Olof Palme 
(London: Pan Books, 1982).
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cooperative security arrangement by reviewing its origins and institutional 
experience and considering its allegedly distinctive process of interaction, the so- 
called “ASEAN Way”. This first section will also discuss the weakening of the 
Association since 1997 and its achievements and limitations as a regime for 
cooperative security. The second section will analyse the ARE with special 
reference to its establishment and institutional evolution. Furthermore, the Forum 
will be compared and contrasted to the Association and its principal achievements 
and weaknesses will be pointed out.
I. ASEAN’s Institutional Evolution as a Regime for Cooperative Security
A. ASEAN’s Origins: Confrontation and Regional Reconciliation
The few years that preceded the creation of ASEAN were distinguished by 
regional conflict and disrupted regional relationships. The main source of inter­
state antagonism resulted from the formation in September 1963 of the Federation 
of Malaysia, which consisted of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. Sukarno, 
the first president of Indonesia, opposed the establishment of Malaysia, which he 
viewed as a British neo-colonial design. Sukarno started a campaign of 
Confrontation to oppose the new federation. A similar policy over West Irian, 
which had remained under Dutch authority since Indonesia’s independence in 
December 1949, had led to a diplomatic settlement in August 1962 by which 
Jakarta gained control over the territory. Indonesia’s new policy of Confrontation 
challenged the legitimacy of the newly-established Federation of Malaysia. 
Confrontation was based on coercive diplomacy that made use of small-scale 
armed activities and “which was designed to create a sense of international crisis 
in order to provoke diplomatic intervention in Indonesia’s interests.” This 
military and ideological campaign reinforced an outburst of Indonesian
*3
nationalism. The history of Confrontation need not be rehearsed here in detail. It
2Michael Leifer, Dictionary o f the Modem Politics o f South-East Asia, New Edition (London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 89.
3For a full historical account of Konfrontasi, please refer to J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The 
Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); Michael Leifer, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), chapter four; and J.M. 
Gullick, Malaysia and its Neighbours (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967). For the reasons 
that led to the onset of Confrontation, please refer to Donald Hindley, “Indonesia’s Confrontation 
with Malaysia: A Search for Motives,” Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 6 (June 1964), pp. 904-913.
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suffices to say that its onset amplified sub-regional tensions, making any kind of 
neighbourly amity impossible.
A second source of regional antagonism resulted from the Philippines’ 
claim to the British colony of North Borneo (Sabah). In June 1962, the Philippines 
indicated to the British government that it disputed Britain’s control and 
sovereignty over the territory.4 Though the Philippine government had initially 
supported the proposal by Malaya’s Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to 
establish Malaysia, the integration of Sabah in the new federation strained 
diplomatic relations between Manila and Kuala Lumpur. Diasdado Macapagal, 
who served as president of the Philippines from 1961 until 1965, pressed the 
Philippines’ territorial claim to Sabah and challenged with Sukarno the legitimacy 
of Malaysia. The election of Ferdinand Marcos as president of the Philippines in 
November 1965 led to the normalisation of bilateral relations in June 1966. This 
started a new phase that improved Philippine-Malaysian relations but only up to a 
point. Indeed, Manila never abandoned but only decreased the vigour with which 
it would pursue its claim to Sabah.
The eventual establishment of the Association first required a 
transformation in the regional political environment. Specifically, it was 
dependent on an Indonesian-Malaysian reconciliation. The regional alteration 
resulted from a change in political leadership in Indonesia. An abortive coup in 
October 1965, mounted allegedly by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), was 
followed by Sukarno’s gradual political downfall and the massacre of suspected 
PKI members. Lt. General Suharto assumed executive powers on 11 March 1966, 
which initiated a new era in Indonesian politics known as the New Order. This 
transformation arose partly from the regional and domestic costs involved over 
Confrontation.5 Similar to the neighbouring conservative governments, the new 
military leadership in Indonesia preferred to focus on domestic stability and 
economic development and to adopt a more pro-western and anti-communist 
political orientation.
4For a discussion on the Philippines’ claim to the territory of Sabah, please refer to Lela Gamer 
Noble, Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1977).
5Please refer to Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 27-29.
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Suharto saw the end of Confrontation as a first necessity.6 The new 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik tried to reach reconciliation with 
Malaysia and to gain access to external assistance, which the country desperately 
needed in order to stabilise and consolidate its economy. To attain international 
rehabilitation, particularly with regard to the United States, Indonesia had first to 
be accepted by its neighbours and to be viewed as a responsible regional actor. A 
starting process of reconciliation between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur made 
regional cooperation possible and desirable as a means to avoid future 
confrontation. Regional cooperation was first discussed in the Spring of 1966 
when Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, Malik and the Thai 
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, held talks in Bangkok on the normalisation of 
Indonesian-Malaysian relations. Though not directly involved, Suharto decisively 
influenced the negotiations by supporting a pragmatic foreign policy based on 
regional cooperation and domestic economic development.
Regional attempts had already been made in the early 1960’s to establish 
inter-state cooperation. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) had been 
created in Bangkok in July 1961 as an instrument to advance dialogue between
Q
Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines. Indonesia had refused to take part because 
it viewed ASA as a Western-aligned organisation. Although officially focusing on 
economic and cultural cooperation, ASA had been primarily designed to promote 
regional consultation and intra-mural stability in the interest of domestic regime 
security. Abdul Rahman had declared at the foreign ministers’ meeting of April 
1963 that “We are determined to make a success of this organization because we 
believe sincerely that the best possible way of preventing the Communists from 
trying to destroy the lives and souls of our nations is by improving the lot of our
6For a discussion on the end of Confrontation please refer to Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesia 
Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions o f Indonesian Foreign Policy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1969); and Nawaz B. Mody, Indonesia under Suharto (London: Oriental 
University Press, 1987), chapter three.
7This point was made by Sabam Siagian, former Chief Editor of the Jakarta Post and former 
Ambassador of Indonesia to Australia (1991-1995). The interview was held in Jakarta on 20 March 
2000.
8Please refer to ASA, Report of the First Meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASA on Economic and 
Cultural Co-operation Among Southeast Asian Countries and Statement of Policy, Bangkok, 1 
August 1961.
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people.”9 ASA’s structure had included an annual meeting of foreign ministers, a 
Joint Working Party that preceded the ministerial session and a Standing 
Committee led by the foreign minister of the host country and attended by the 
Ambassadors of the other member states.10 ASA had been severely affected by the 
steady deterioration of Malayan-Philippine relations over Sabah and its operations 
were interrupted in mid-1963. A second sub-regional attempt was even more 
short-lived. Consisting of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, Maphilindo was 
a loose confederation based ostensibly on Malay brotherhood, which had been 
created through the Manila Agreements of 1963. Maphilindo was a device for 
both undermining Malaysia and reconciling Indonesia, Malaya and the 
Philippines. Its viability was destroyed due to Confrontation.
As the primary regional actor and keen to avoid domestic political 
embarrassment, Indonesia refused to join ASA that had renewed its activities 
through its third foreign ministers’ meeting held in Bangkok in August 1966.11 
Despite Malaysia’s reluctance to abandon the already-existing arrangement, 
Jakarta proposed a new project for regional cooperation. Diplomatic talks 
continued supported by a close collaboration between Malik and Khoman who 
favoured the formation of a new and wider regional grouping. Indonesia affirmed 
its willingness to engage with its neighbours through regional cooperation based 
on the notion of equality.12 It was keen to launch a new start in regional 
cooperation in order to reconcile national pride and international rehabilitation. 
Discussing ASEAN, Gordon writes that “the new group was created for Indonesia, 
since leaders in Djakarta have preferred to view ASA as a ‘Western-inspired’ 
organization with which they could not associate.”13 That said, ASEAN adopted in 
1967 the inherent cooperative security premises and structure of ASA. ASA’s 
operations and purposes were incorporated into the new diplomatic association. 
During the inaugural meeting of ASEAN, Tun Abdul Razak declared that “We, in
federation of Malaya, ASA, Report o f the Second Meeting o f Foreign Ministers (Kuala Lumpur, 
1963), p. 30. Quoted in Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for 
American Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 109.
l0ASA, Report of the First Meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASA, Bangkok, Thailand, 1 August 
1961.
llASA, Report of the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of ASA, Bangkok, Thailand, 3-5 
August 1966.
l2This point was made by Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia (1988-1999). The 
interview was held in Jakarta on 21 March 2000.
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Malaysia, are extremely happy that the ideals and aspirations which led to the 
establishment of ASA six years ago have now grown and have gathered another 
form and wider import in the birth of ASEAN today.”14 It may therefore be argued 
that rather than being abandoned, ASA had “simply been enlarged and given a 
new name.”15
The motivation for ASEAN was based not only on regional reconciliation. 
The Association may also be viewed as a response to an advancing communist 
threat in Indochina and a related fear of internal communist insurgencies. 
Concerns also existed regarding the consequences of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution and the future political direction that Beijing might adopt. 
Nevertheless, it can be suggested that the origins of ASEAN were primarily intra­
mural. It was created to locate regional reconciliation within an institutionalised 
structure of dialogue permitting a concentration of resources on economic 
development in the interest of domestic regime security.16 This priority is essential 
as it helps us define and analyse ASEAN as a regime for cooperative security 
pivoting on domestic regime security. The process of reconciliation between 
Indonesia and Malaysia and the need to prevent the recurrence of confrontation 
through regional cooperation are at the heart of the origins of ASEAN. It should 
be noted for example that the full restoration of relations between Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur occurred only after the organisation of elections in Sabah and the 
creation of ASEAN though bilateral contacts had previously been re-established 
through the Bangkok Agreement of August 1966.
B. ASEAN*s Early Years: The Emergence of an Embryonic Regime for 
Cooperative Security
ASEAN was established through the Bangkok Declaration of August 
1967. Its original members; Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
17Thailand, came together in the interest of regional cooperation. The emphasis
13Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 111.
14Deputy Prime Minister o f Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, at the Inaugural Meeting of ASEAN held 
on 8 August 1967 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand.
15Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 98.
16Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle 
East? (Canberra: Research School o f Pacific and Asian Studies, 1998), p. 6.
17The offer to participate had previously been declined by Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos.
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was put on boosting intra-mural stability and peace. Among its declared purposes, 
the Association would aim “To accelerate the economic growth, social progress 
and cultural development in the region” and “To promote regional peace and 
stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship 
among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United
1 ftNations Charter.” The Bangkok Declaration was a modest and abstract 
document, as it did not include a programme for transforming objectives into 
realities. Concrete steps to regional cooperation were absent from the 1967 
Declaration. Moreover, the issue of political cooperation was not mentioned 
officially in Bangkok as it was considered too soon to address openly such a 
difficult matter. Instead, the founding document emphasised unexceptional and 
non-sensitive issues, including social and economic cooperation.
Nevertheless, regional security was the first preoccupation of the founders 
of the Association. As Malik would later point out, “considerations of national and 
regional security have (...) figured largely in the minds of the founders of the 
ASEAN.”19 The Association was given an undeclared political and security role as 
it was expected to provide a framework for negotiation through which 
troublesome issues could be approached. Significantly, the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM), consisting of an annual gathering of the five foreign ministers, 
was introduced as the highest authority. Over the years, the AMM would become 
the key instrument of dialogue where security matters could commonly be 
discussed. It was agreed in Bangkok that a Standing Committee would also be 
established. It would be led by the foreign minister of the host country and 
attended by the Ambassadors of the other member states. In short, ASEAN’s 
structure demonstrated the attention given to regional relations. This focus had 
been inherited from ASA.
Military cooperation was rejected at the outset due to several factors. The 
Association hoped to avoid hostile Vietnamese and Chinese reactions by denying 
an official anti-communist position. During the inaugural meeting, Singapore’s 
Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam affirmed that “those who are outside the grouping
I8The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok, Thailand, 8 August 1967.
l9See Adam Malik, “Regional Cooperation in International Politics,” Regionalism in Southeast
Asia (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 162.
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90should not regard this as a grouping against anything, against anybody.” Besides, 
the participants did not possess the necessary resources to engage in collective
91defence. That reluctance also resulted from deep intra-mural differences. 
Feelings of mistrust and territorial disputes affected most bilateral relations and 
the members did not share a common security perspective or threat perception. 
Differences existed with regards to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
Vietnam and they disagreed on the role of external powers. With the exception of 
Indonesia, the member states relied on defence cooperation with foreign actors to 
preserve their security. Jakarta favoured an autonomous order in which regional 
players would be responsible for their own defence.
As with most organisations, ASEAN resulted from the fact that it served
99its members’ narrowly-defined interests. The new Indonesian leadership wanted 
to attain rehabilitation at the regional and international level. Jakarta was keen to 
restore its credibility and persuade its neighbours that it should no longer be 
viewed as a source of threat. Moreover, Indonesia sought to ensure access to 
Western capital and wished to see the establishment of a stable environment that
9*5 t
would enhance domestic political stability and economic development. Finally, 
Jakarta hoped that the Association could operate as an autonomous security 
foundation free from external intervention. During the inaugural meeting, Malik 
declared that “Indonesia always wants to see South East Asia developed into a 
region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend against any 
negative influence from outside the region.”24 By no longer acting as an 
aggressive power, Indonesia may also have expected its neighbouring states to 
become less reliant on external actors to ensure their security.
To cooperate with a former aggressor to its newly-obtained sovereignty 
was a calculated risk for Malaysia. ASEAN was viewed in Kuala Lumpur as an
20The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, S. Rajaratnam, at the Inaugural Meeting of 
ASEAN held on 8 August 1967 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand.
21Estrella D. Solidum, “Security Perspectives in ASEAN,” in Werner Pfennig and Mark Suh, eds., 
Aspects o f ASEAN (Munchen: Weltforum Verlag, 1984), pp. 115-116.
22Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International 
Leadership (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), p. 68.
23This point was made by Wiijono Sastro Handujo, Fellow Researcher at the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) and former Ambassador of Indonesia to Austria, France and 
Australia. The interview was held at CSIS on 23 March 2000.
24Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Adam Malik, at the Inaugural Meeting of ASEAN held 
on 8 August 1967 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand.
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opportunity to institutionalise the end of confrontation with Indonesia and 
improve relations with other neighbouring states. During the inaugural meeting, 
Tun Abdul Razak also referred to the regional order. He affirmed that “The 
vacuum left by the retreat of colonial rule must be filled by the growth and 
consideration of indigenous powers - otherwise our future, individually and 
jointly, will remain dangerously threatened.”25 Singapore wanted to enhance its 
Southeast Asian identity as well as to register its sovereignty, though intensely 
suspicious of Indonesia/Malaysia’s motives. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew would later write in his memoirs that “Singapore sought the understanding 
and support of its neighbours in enhancing stability and security in the region.” 
An amelioration of regional relations was also important for Malaysia and 
Singapore in light of the British policy of military withdrawal East of Suez first 
announced in 1967. Thailand expected ASEAN to evolve into an additional 
defence assurance against its communist neighbours and thus complement its 
reliance on extra-regional powers. Finally, the Philippines wanted to reaffirm its 
Southeast Asian identity and build better relations with its neighbours in an effort 
to manage its territorial disputes as well as its ties with the United States.
These national objectives led to the convergence of shared interests. This 
resulted primarily from a common emphasis on domestic sources of insecurity. 
The ASEAN states were being challenged domestically by insurgencies, including 
irredentist and separatist movements. The Association united a group of 
conservative political regimes that suffered domestically from weak institutions 
and socio-economic problems. The non-communist and developing members 
hoped for regional political stability in order to attain individual economic
9 7progress. Moreover, they wished to cope with the seeds of revolutionary 
challenge. The Bangkok Declaration stated that “the countries of South-East Asia 
share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability
951of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development”. 
By participating in a regional organisation, the members expected to gain from
25Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, at the inaugural Meeting of ASEAN held 
on 8 August 1967 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand.
26Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (Singapore: Times 
Editions, 2000), p. 369.
27Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto, p. 68.
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increased sub-regional stability, enabling them to pay closer attention to domestic 
development. These expectations will be further discussed when the principles of 
national and regional resilience are introduced.
The convergence of interests also resulted from similar regional concerns 
that originated from the fear of the long-term consequences of the American 
intervention in Vietnam and China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia.29 Most 
participants were apprehensive of the declining US power in the region. The 
Bangkok Declaration announced the determination of the member states “to 
ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the 
ideals and aspirations of their people”.30 Yet, ASEAN did not obtain an extra­
mural dimension during its early years due to the absence of the necessary means, 
common political will and consensus to confront regional matters collectively. 
Besides, Acharya writes that “The ruling regimes perceived the security
implications of major geopolitical events in the wider region in terms of the
 ^1
latter’s possible or actual impact on their own domestic vulnerability.” In sum, 
attention was primarily given to an intra-mural approach to security cooperation 
that aimed to increase regional consultation and domestic regime security and 
consolidation.
ASEAN’s early years were characterised by troubled bilateral relations and 
tensions that demonstrated the weakness of the embryonic security regime. For 
instance, Singapore-Malaysian relations were affected by the prior separation of 
Singapore from the Federation in 1965.32 The newly-established city-state, often 
defined as a Chinese enclave in a Malay world, was left with a great feeling of
28The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration).
29Frank Frost, “Introduction: ASEAN Since 1967- Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments,” 
in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN Into the 1990’s (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp. 4-5.
30The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration).
31Amitav Acharya, “Domestic and External Strategies to Attain Security: Comparing the Origins of 
the ASEAN and the GCC,” in Brian L. Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of 
Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 161.
32For information on the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia and the later separation of 
Singapore from the Federation, please refer to J.M. Gullick, Malaysia (London: Ernst Benn 
Limited, 1969); Stanley S. Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore: The Building o f New States 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in International 
Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968). For a 
discussion on the independence of Singapore and its early years as a sovereign state, please refer to 
C. Mary Turnbull, A History o f  Singapore, 1819-1975 (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
chapters VIII and IX.
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vulnerability. To it was added a sense of bitterness and ethnic antagonism that 
would continuously complicate bilateral relations with Malaysia. In addition, 
two crises occurred in 1968, one in Indonesian-Singapore relations and the 
Corregidor Affair, that affected ASEAN’s early institutional experience. While the 
former will be examined in detail in chapter four, let us briefly focus on the latter 
as a basis of analysis.
Malaysia’s discovery in March 1968 that Manila was training Muslim 
fighters in Corregidor to infiltrate Sabah caused a severe deterioration in bilateral 
relations.34 Relations had previously improved as a result of an official visit by 
President Marcos to Kuala Lumpur in January 1968. The Corregidor Affair gave 
rise to ASEAN’s only example of preventive diplomacy at an intra-mural level. 
Suharto intervened during the second AMM held in Jakarta in August 1968 and 
suggested a private meeting that led to the implementation of a cooling-off period 
between Kuala Lumpur and Manila. These efforts were shattered by a 
Congressional decision, later endorsed by President Marcos in September 1968, to 
include Sabah within Philippine territory. Bilateral relations had improved by the 
time of the ministerial meeting organised in Malaysia in December 1969. Yet, the 
crisis demonstrated the ongoing significance of the Sabah issue and ASEAN’s 
inability to act as an effective conflict resolver. The territorial dispute has 
continued to affect Philippine-Malaysian relations and therefore the cohesion of 
the Association.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s early years led to the formulation of a declaratory 
principle for regional order. In November 1971, the member states signed in Kuala 
Lumpur the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration. In 
essence, it registered a call for regional autonomy. The ZOPFAN document stated 
that the participants “are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure 
the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom
33For an account o f these bilateral relations, please refer to Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 
257-291.
34For a detailed account of the Corregidor Affair, please refer to Noble, Philippine Policy Toward 
Sabah, pp. 165-175; Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f Accommodation (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1990), pp. 69-76; Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South- 
East Asia, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 31-37; Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Mechanisms of 
Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1 
(April 1998), pp. 53-56.
53
• 36and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers.”
It repeated a determination, previously announced in the Bangkok Declaration, to 
avoid external intervention. Yet, it also denoted deep divisions. ZOPFAN was a 
reaction to a Malaysian proposal to neutralise Southeast Asia through great power 
guarantees. This notion had not been well-received in Indonesia, which opposed 
allocating such a role to external powers. ZOPFAN was introduced as a 
compromise. The principle excluded a specific role for external powers in 
Southeast Asia and avoided the legal obligations associated with the traditional
'xn • » *concept of neutralisation. Moreover, lacking any kind of operational relevance, it 
did not make specific demands on the member states.
Arising from an historical experience of colonialism and Japanese 
occupation, ZOPFAN has symbolised a suspicion of external intervention and 
domination. Yet, it has continued to be controversial among the ASEAN members 
as no consensus has ever been reached on its specific meaning or possible 
application. This derives from the co-existence of contrasting views on the 
regional role of external powers. Indonesia has traditionally favoured a regional 
order determined primarily by the Southeast Asian states. The other members have 
relied on ties with the United States and other actors to ensure their security. The 
Association has thus not been perceived by most participants as a security 
arrangement that could replace existing bilateral links with external players. 
Though ZOPFAN’s realisation will probably never become possible or uniformly 
desirable, it still expresses a regional ambition to maintain some form of 
independence from external interference. The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon- 
Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, which was introduced in December 1995 in the 
final declaration of the fifth ASEAN summit, was represented as a building-block 
to ZOPFAN.38 That said, the creation of the ARF has violated in the post-Cold 
War the underlying tenet of ZOPFAN.
35Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1999), p. 26.
36Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Declaration), Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 27 November 1971.
37Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 7.
38Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, Thailand, 15 December 
1995.
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In sum, the early years of the Association may be examined in the context 
of cooperative security. Based on an inclusive approach to security cooperation, 
the creation of ASEAN was an attempt to address the climate of regional relations 
through a mode of conflict avoidance rather than preventive diplomacy or dispute 
resolution. When referring to the end of Confrontation, Leifer explains that 
ASEAN “was established as the institutional fruit of conflict resolution rather than
'XQ t  •as a vehicle for promoting such resolution in any direct sense.” The Association 
relied on dialogue and aimed to form a web of bilateral and regional relations.40 
Efforts were made to institutionalise a process of consultation rather than concrete 
confidence-building measures between states that still held stronger ties with their 
former colonial masters than with their direct neighbours.41 Diplomatic interaction 
was expected to help manage inter-state relations and reduce feelings of suspicion. 
The 1967 Declaration reaffirmed the sovereignty of the member states and 
demanded respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. In short, 
ASEAN was during these early years an “informal exercise in confidence- 
building.”42
It can easily be argued that ASEAN reached no tangible achievements 
during its first decade of existence. It was based only on a modest declaration that 
lacked concrete and formal steps to regional cooperation. The newly-established 
arrangement missed cohesion and direction. It is interesting to note that at the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of May 1974, Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. 
Rajaratnam said to his colleagues:
You might recollect at the very first meeting in 1967, when we had to draft our 
communique, it was a very difficult problem of trying to say nothing in about ten 
pages, which we did. Because at the time, we ourselves, having launched 
ASEAN, were not quite sure where it was going or whether it was going 
anywhere at all.43
39Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” p. 26
40For a discussion on the different bilateral visits made during these early years that helped 
consolidating the Association, please refer to Estrella D. Solidum, Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN 
(Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1982), pp. 20-24.
4lThis point was made by Barry Desker, Chief Executive Officer of the Singapore Trade 
Development Board (TDB) and former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
and former Ambassador
of Singapore to Indonesia (1986-1991). The interview was held at the TDB on 17 February 2000.
42This point was made by Barry Desker.
43Closing Statement of Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Rajaratnam, at the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, May 1974.
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Regional consultation was primarily limited to an annual gathering of foreign 
ministers and did not lead to the organisation of a meeting of the ASEAN heads of 
state/government until 1976. Despite the rhetoric, the early years were defined by 
inter-state tensions and disputes. Still, this early period was important for the 
institutional experience of the Association. In particular, credit needs to be given 
to the development of dialogue that gradually led to a “habit of cooperation.” The 
latter later enabled the member states to react collectively and with some 
confidence to the communist victories in Indochina in 1975 and Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia in December 1978.44
C. The 1976 Bali Summit of ASEAN Heads of Government
The first summit of ASEAN heads of government came in the wake of the 
new political environment that emanated from the US withdrawal from South 
Vietnam in 1973 and the communist take-over of Phnom Penh and Saigon in 
April 1975 and Laos by the end of the same year. The rapid success of 
revolutionary communism surprised the ASEAN states and shattered hopes of 
enlarging the Association to all Southeast Asian nations. Jorgensen-Dahl points 
out, however, that “the communist victory injected an altogether more compelling 
sense of urgency into the activities of ASEAN.”45 As a collective response to 
external shocks and a sign of unity and cohesion, the Bali Summit of February 
1976 led to two statements: the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of 
Amity and Co-operation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. Previously prepared by senior 
officials, both documents consolidated the commitment made by each member 
state to the Association and its principles.
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord provided ASEAN with a political 
identity and acknowledged the indivisibility of security within the Association. It 
affirmed that “The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an 
essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state 
resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening
^Points made by Barry Desker.
45Amfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982), p. 84.
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national and ASEAN resilience.”46 The ASEAN Concord provided the 
cooperative security arrangement with a political influence. It formalised political 
cooperation within the ASEAN framework and called for a “strengthening of 
political solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of views, coordinating 
positions and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.”47 The 
ASEAN Concord also referred to the issue of regional order by endorsing 
ZOPFAN. The latter was not put forward as a tangible corporate objective but 
rather as an aspiration dependent on a common approach to socio-economic 
development and political stability48 Finally, the Concord excluded military 
cooperation on an intra-ASEAN basis, thus denying a move beyond existing extra- 
ASEAN bilateral collaboration between national defence forces. In short, the 
ASEAN Concord demonstrated a willingness to move beyond the initial ambition 
to institutionalise a process of reconciliation.
The ASEAN Concord formally proposed the principle of resilience as a 
common approach to domestic and regional security. At the opening of the Bali 
Summit, President Suharto had already declared that “Our concept of security is 
inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful and stable condition 
within each territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltration, where- 
ever their origins may be.”49 The concept of national resilience had previously 
entered the ASEAN vocabulary as a translation of an Indonesian term, Ketahanan 
Nasional.50 Influenced by Indonesia’s struggle for independence and socio­
economic vulnerability, the term had been advanced by the new military 
leadership when it came to power and had been officially endorsed as a national 
security doctrine in 1973.51 At a seminar organised in Jakarta in October 1974, 
Suharto had stated that national resilience “covers the strengthening of all the 
component elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting
46Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976.
47Declaration of ASEAN Concord.
48Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 67.
49President Suharto at the opening of the Summit of the ASEAN Heads of Government, Bali, 
Indonesia, 23 February 1976. Quoted in Solidum, Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN, p. 31.
50See for example Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, 
Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata, Australia-Asia Papers No. 75, May 1996.
5 Please refer to Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN 
Countries,” in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi and Han Sung-joo, eds., Asian 
Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, 1988), pp. 50-62.
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of resilience in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military 
fields.”52 Rather than focusing on external military threats, the principle of 
national resilience favoured a non-traditional and inward-looking approach to 
security. It registered an ambition to underpin domestic and regional stability 
through the use of economic and social development. By improving the living 
conditions of local populations, the ASEAN leaders expected to check subversive 
influences.53
It was also anticipated that resilient states would lead to regional 
resilience, which would constitute in the longer run a collective security 
foundation against internal 2nd external threats.54 Indeed, Suharto had also argued 
in October 1974 that “If each member-country develops its own ‘national 
resilience’, gradually a ‘regional resilience’ may emerge, i.e. the ability of 
member-countries to settle jointly their common problems and look after their 
future and well-being together.”55 This bottom-up approach was believed to 
decrease intra-regional tensions and vulnerabilities that had facilitated external 
intervention in the past. One should note therefore the underlying premise of the 
synergy between national and regional resilience; namely, the indivisibility of 
national and regional political stability enhancing economic development. In 
short, the principle of resilience represented a consensual approach to security 
shared by the ASEAN participants. Such a consensus has been central to 
ASEAN’s experience as a regime for cooperative security.
In addition to its focus on intra-mural security and political stability, the 
Concord also set out means to promote cooperation in economic, cultural and 
social fields. It mentioned the signing of an agreement to create a central ASEAN 
Secretariat in Jakarta.56 Eslablished after the Bali Summit, the Secretariat has 
remained the central organ of the Association. Yet, it has never been granted
52President Suharto, “Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia,” Regionalism in 
Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Centre fo? Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 8.
53Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation, p. 98.
54Tim Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence Studies, 1993), p. 4.
55President Suharto, “Address by tie President of the Republic of Indonesia,” p. 8.
56A third document was introduced in Bali; the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
Secretariat, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976. It dealt with various administrative matters 
including the functions of the Secietariat-General, the members of staff and other issues.
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executive power and has only played a limited role in the ASEAN cooperative 
process.
The TAC sought to establish a norm-based code of conduct for regional 
inter-state relations.57 Among others, it enunciated the following principles: 
“Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all nations”; “the right of every state to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion”; “Non­
interference in the internal affairs of one another”; “Settlement of differences or
co
disputes by peaceful means”; and “Renunciation of the threat or use of force.” 
Based on the United Nations Charter, most of these principles are well-known in 
the study of International Relations as they represent the underlying foundations of 
the traditional European states system constructed on the sovereignty of nation­
states. Nonetheless, the adherence to a common set of norms and principles should 
be viewed as vital to the operation of a regime for cooperative security. As a 
result, the TAC played a crucial role in the institutional experience of the 
Association. The Treaty also included provision for a dispute resolution 
mechanism, a High Council for establishing techniques of mediation and 
consultation. Yet, it stipulated that “The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall 
not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application 
to that dispute.”59 The provision for a High Council, which is at odds with 
ASEAN’s basic norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, has 
never been invoked by the members. Instead, the latter have continued to rely on 
the code of conduct discussed above. Simon suggests, however, that the provision 
“created an expectation, evolving into a norm, that ASEAN members would not 
resort to force in resolving conflicts among themselves.”60
The Treaty was open to accession by all other Southeast Asian nations. 
ASEAN hoped that this regional code of conduct, based primarily on respect for 
national sovereignty, would promote peaceful co-existence in Southeast Asia. By
57The TAC mentioned the principles of the United Nations Charter and the principles endorsed at 
the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. The Treaty also referred to 
the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration.
58Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976.
59Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia.
60Sheldon W. Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1998), p. 196.
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adhering to the TAC, the Indochinese states would have accepted the norms and 
principles promoted by the Association. Indeed, the TAC was an implicit attempt 
to reach some kind of accommodation with Hanoi and to include Vietnam in a 
stable regional order. In addition, the Treaty was expected to consolidate a 
common ASEAN identity when dealing with extra-mural relations. Yet, the 
Indochinese states remained suspicious viewing ASEAN as an anti-communist 
arrangement. While wishing to develop good bilateral relations with the different 
members, Vietnam refused to treat with the Association as a distinct diplomatic 
grouping. By rejecting the TAC, Hanoi thwarted ASEAN’s attempt to promote a 
new regional order in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, the 1976 Bali Summit represents a cornerstone in the 
institutional evolution of the Association. It provided ASEAN with a political 
identity, a shared approach to security and a code of conduct for regulating intra­
mural relations and managing existing or potential disputes. Codified within the 
TAC, the code of conduct relied on a modest set of international norms and 
principles that characterised the lowest common denominator among the regional 
partners. As in the case of the Bangkok Declaration, respect for national 
sovereignty, in contrast to the notion of political integration, was set forward as 
the core ASEAN principle. The Association was also explicitly portrayed as a 
political and security arrangement, though characterised by a low level of 
institutionalisation and lacking mechanisms for concrete confidence-building 
measures or preventive diplomacy. ASEAN continued to rely on dialogue and to 
operate through a mode of conflict avoidance and management. The Bali Summit 
emphasised the need for a peaceful and non-confrontational approach to 
cooperation and made clear that ASEAN would deal with security matters through 
political and economic means rather than by conventional military methods. 
Originally emphasising domestic regime consolidation and regional consultation, 
the Association also gained an extra-mural relevance as a response to the events in 
Indochina. Finally, the Bali Summit strengthened a sense of regionalism amongst 
the members that further defined the Association as a regional entity. In sum, the 
Bali Summit was essential for the development of ASEAN as a regime for 
cooperative security.
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That said, one should note the disappointment of the second summit of the 
ASEAN heads of government held in Kuala Lumpur in August 1977. The Kuala 
Lumpur Summit celebrated ASEAN’s tenth anniversary but failed to contribute to 
the institutional evolution of the Association. Attempts to develop peaceful 
relations with the Indochinese states were repeated. The final communique stated 
that “The Heads of Government emphasized the desire of ASEAN countries to 
develop peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with all countries in the region, 
including Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam.”61 The summit led also to the 
development of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). Indeed, it was 
followed by a series of bilateral meetings with the heads of government of 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
D. ASEAN and the Third Indochina Conflict (1978-1991)
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 represented a major 
challenge to the Association and its institutional norms. The aggression violated 
ASEAN’s central principle; namely, respect for national sovereignty, and 
endangered the security interests of some of its members, particularly Thailand 
which became a front line state, by affecting the Southeast Asian distribution of 
power. The Third Indochina Conflict dominated the activities of the organisation 
for the following twelve years during which it showed its capacity to speak with 
one voice. It also indicated its limitations and weaknesses.
The collective response adopted by the Association in relation to the 
Cambodian issue raised the level of political and security cooperation among its 
member states. Playing an effective diplomatic role, especially at the United 
Nations (UN), the Association enhanced its reputation as a regional organisation. 
During a special meeting of the foreign ministers held on 12 January 1979, the 
members recalled “the pledge given by Vietnam to the ASEAN member countries 
to strictly respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 
country and to cooperate with those countries in maintaining and strengthening
61Joint Press Communique of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 4-5 August 1977.
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regional peace and stability.”62 ASEAN sponsored in September 1979 a resolution 
in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that confirmed the legitimacy of 
the ousted government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and one in November that 
demanded a cease-fire in Cambodia, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and 
called for the right of self-determination for the Cambodian people. Afterwards, 
ASEAN lobbied yearly at the UN to ensure the annual condemnation of Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia. It also helped create in June 1982 the coalition 
government of Democratic Kampuchea which brought together the three Khmer 
resistance factions as a way of keeping the UN seat.63 In sum, ASEAN prevented 
Vietnam’s puppet regime in Phnom Penh from gaining international recognition.64
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s reaction to the Third Indochina Conflict was 
limited to collective diplomacy due to its lack of military capabilities and an 
aversion to intra-ASEAN military cooperation. ASEAN was unable to offer 
Thailand the means necessary to counter Vietnamese power.65 This limitation 
forced Bangkok to rely increasingly on its strategic alignment with the PRC to 
pressure Vietnam militarily.66 Besides upholding its legalistic position, the 
Association was obliged to take part in a tacit alliance with China and the United 
States to prevent Vietnam from dominating Indochina. The Association fulfilled a 
diplomatic role within this coalition. Divergent security perspectives also 
distinguished the member states. Thailand and Singapore followed a strong anti- 
Vietnamese position while supporting China’s active involvement in the conflict. 
In contrast, Indonesia and Malaysia considered the PRC as their prime security 
concern and remained suspicious of its regional ambitions. Vietnam was thus 
viewed as a useful buffer against potential Northern threats. Evans and Rowley 
point out that “These divergences were in part a reflection of differing attitudes
62Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political 
Development in the Southeast Asia Region, Bangkok, Thailand, 12 January 1979. This common 
ASEAN position was later repeated in the AMM Joint Communique of July 1979.
63These factions were the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, the Khmer 
People’s National Liberation Front led by the former Prime Minister Son Sann and the royal party, 
the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, led 
by King Norodom Sihanouk. Please refer to Michael Leifer, Dictionary o f the Modem Politics o f 
South-East Asia, pp. 96-97.
^Lam Lai Sing, “A Short Note on ASEAN-Great Power Interaction,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol. 15, No. 4 (March 1994), p. 452.
65Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 91.
66See Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1986).
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towards China. The old fears of the Southward expansion of Chinese Communism 
had been allayed by Beijing’s courting of the ASEAN countries in the 1970’s, but 
they were not extinct.”67
The limitations of ASEAN’s diplomacy over Cambodia indicate the 
constraints associated with cooperative security. They display the minimal 
influence of a cooperative security regime when dealing with military and/or 
external matters. ASEAN can in such cases only be expected to operate as an 
instrument for collective diplomacy. Significantly, the Association played only a 
secondary role in the final diplomatic stages that led to the resolution of the Third 
Indochina Conflict. As argued before, cooperative security is intended to be 
comprehensive in membership with security arrangements obtaining on an intra­
mural basis. It promotes a preventive approach to security and lacks any kind of 
cooperative military dimension. In short, a regime for cooperative security is 
strictly speaking unable to assist beyond collective diplomacy any of its 
participants when faced with an external security threat. Moreover, cooperative 
security does not preclude the divergence of security perspectives and interests 
among the member countries.
E. The “ASEAN Wav”: A Process of Interaction for Intra-Mural Relations
The associative dimension of ASEAN has been discussed so far by paying 
attention to formal agreements. Yet, its institutional experience has also been 
influenced by an informal process of interaction, the so-called “ASEAN Way.” In 
this part, some of its characteristics will be reviewed before analysing its 
distinctiveness when compared to other diplomatic networks and the extent to 
which it has been a function of the relative homogeneity of the Association up to 
1995. At issue is whether the “ASEAN Way” is more than a piece of rhetoric 
designed to register a brand identity.
The “ASEAN Way” may be defined as an allegedly distinctive and 
informal process of interaction within the ASEAN framework through which the 
members relate to each other and reach but also avoid common decisions. Leifer 
explains that the “ASEAN Way” was “facilitated at the outset by the limited scale
67Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War (London: Verso, 1984), p. 184.
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of the initial regional enterprise, the intensity of personal contacts during the 
formative post-Conffontation period reinforced by a relative homogeneity of 
political outlooks.”68 It has existed as an abstract and ill-defined concept. It 
consists of various features that include: a high level of informality, the practice of 
quiet diplomacy, a continuing process of dialogue, a willingness to exercise self- 
restraint, solidarity, the practice of consensus-building and the art of conflict 
avoidance. The standard norms and principles mentioned earlier, including respect 
for national sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of member 
states, are also integrated into this process of interaction of a quasi-familial kind.
ASEAN negotiations are characterised by informality. At the highest level, 
private talks, held during golf games, meals or other forms of social gatherings at 
the periphery of official meetings, are often seen as more appropriate by the 
participants than formal sessions or multilateral conferences. Thanks to a high 
level of informality, the members are expected to feel more comfortable when 
dealing with each other. In addition to the AMM’s and the summits of heads of 
government, ASEAN’s institutional process is distinguished by a series of ad hoc 
sessions, including sub-committees and working groups. These additional 
meetings are an essential part of the framework of cooperation as they advance a 
sense of security and trust between the member countries.
The “ASEAN Way” is also defined by a practice of consensus-building 
and conflict avoidance that ensures the sovereign equality of the member states. 
During the process of consultation, the consensus is said to be slowly built up 
between all the actors involved through the avoidance of stated disagreements.69 
This practice of negotiation is supposed to require a willingness by the various 
parties involved to compromise on their own self-interests for the sake of the 
larger group.70 ASEAN states practice conflict avoidance by not addressing 
specific problems and disputes. Thus, the Association does not aim to solve 
differences but rather to promote a peaceful security environment. This approach 
to conflict management has long been seen as the only way available for weak
68Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(1999), p. 28.
69For further information please refer to Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN 
Negotiations: Two Insights (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 3-25.
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states to consolidate their domestic legitimacy and promote regional stability. It 
has been an essential part of the process of regional reconciliation started in 1967.
The “ASEAN Way” represents an informal style of diplomacy for 
cooperation and conflict avoidance. It is a process-orientated and network-based 
model of cooperation that avoids bureaucratic arrangements found in some other 
organisations such as the European Union (EU). In that respect, ASEAN’s process 
of interaction has often been contrasted to the European model of political and 
economic integration and is said to have established a kind of familiar and
71personal atmosphere that offers the Association a particular quality. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the “ASEAN Way” offers a distinctive model relying on 
specific cultural attributes.
This assertion remains questionable. Beyond the rhetoric, the “ASEAN 
Way” may be analysed as a traditional inter-governmental approach to cooperation 
dependent on the narrowly-defined interests of the participating states. This 
process of interaction is based on a decentralised and loosely coordinated 
framework of cooperation which is supervised by foreign ministers and heads of 
state.72 In addition to the influence of cultural attributes, the “ASEAN Way” 
seems primarily dominated by national interests which take complete precedence 
in case of disagreements.73 As a result, the constant search for consensus and 
solidarity may be observed as a sign of weakness as it prevents discussions on 
more tangible or sensitive issues. Acharya explains that “A great deal of what 
passes for the ‘ASEAN way’.... is simply a pragmatic and practical response to 
situations in which multilateralism is being constrained by individual state 
interests.”74 The distinctiveness of this process of interaction may be refuted when
70Hussin Mutalib, “At Thirty, ASEAN looks to Challenges in the New Millennium,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1 (June 1997), pp. 78-79.
7’This point was made by Sabam Siagian.
72William T. Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1990), pp. 23-25.
73Thambipillai and Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights, p. 15.
74Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia- 
Pacific Way’?,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), p. 343.
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compared to other sub-regional cooperative groupings equally constrained by 
national interests and inter-governmental features.75
As will be seen in the next section, the applicability of the “ASEAN Way” 
has recently been affected by the expansion of ASEAN’s membership and a series 
of crises that have decreased the cohesion of the arrangement. In addition to 
questioning some of its core principles, these events have weakened the 
Association by enhancing the divergence of interests and identities among the 
member states. In light of what was said above, it may therefore be asserted that 
the relevance of the “ASEAN Way” depends on specific circumstances; namely, 
the relative homogeneity of the sub-regional association and the national interests 
involved.
F. The Weakenine of the Association since 1997
The identity of the Association and its quasi-familial approach to 
cooperation have been altered since 1997 by a series of difficulties. First and 
foremost, ASEAN has been affected by an expansion process. The end of the Cold 
War and the Cambodian settlement made possible the original hope of uniting the 
entire sub-region under ASEAN auspices. Confidence existed in ASEAN’s ability 
to increase regional peace and stability. Though not a direct participant to the 
eventual resolution of the war, the Association had been transformed by its 
involvement in the Third Indochina Conflict into a respected and well-known 
diplomatic arrangement. The Association was first enlarged to include Brunei in 
January 1984. Its Post-Cold War expansion started with Vietnam in July 1995 that 
symbolised the institutionalisation of a process of reconciliation between Hanoi 
and the ASEAN states.76 By then, ASEAN had established the ARF and taken the 
initiative over the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) which was later inaugurated in 
Bangkok in March 1996. Myanmar was the last Southeast Asian state to adhere to 
the TAC in July 1995. At the fifth ASEAN summit held in Bangkok in December 
1995, which was attended for the first time by the ten Southeast Asian heads of 
government, a commitment was made to bring all the Southeast Asian states into
75An interesting comparison can be made for instance with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
established in 1981 and which includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and Oman.
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7 7  •the group by the year 2000. Enlargement was expected to lead to an increase m 
influence at the regional level to counter major powers in the ARF and to a better 
assimilation of traditionally isolated and isolationist countries. Yet, the entry of
70
Myanmar and Cambodia damaged ASEAN.
Washington and the European Union (EU) pressured ASEAN to delay 
Myanmar’s adherence to the Association due to its brutal military regime and 
human rights record. Western pressure was unpersuasive and even counter­
productive. ASEAN had declared its desire to engage Myanmar rather than to 
isolate it through economic and political sanctions. Having been committed to a
7Qpolicy of “constructive engagement,” the member states could not give m 
without prejudicing their own independence. Moreover, excluding Myanmar on 
grounds of domestic considerations would have been at odds with ASEAN’s basic 
norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other members. Differences still 
existed among the member states. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia supported 
Myanmar’s entry into the Association and criticised Western intervention. 
Thailand and the Philippines wbre more concerned about the military regime and 
its lack of domestic reforms. Partly to avoid an hazardous precedent, the decision 
was taken to accept Myanmar with Laos and Cambodia in July 1997. Myanmar’s 
admission was also influenced by geo-political calculations; namely, the need to 
reduce China’s growing influence on Yangon.
In the case of Cambodia, antagonism between its two Prime Ministers, 
Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, resulted in the latter seizing power in Phnom 
Penh on 5 July 1997. The outbreak of violence occurred just weeks prior to the 
AMM expected to celebrate a united Southeast Asia on the occasion of ASEAN’s 
thirtieth anniversary. An ASEAN delegation, led by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister 
Ali Alatas and consisting also of the foreign ministers of Thailand and the
7<sLeifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East?, p. 6.
77Bangkok Declaration of 1995, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Bangkok, Thailand, 14- 
15 December 1995.
78For a full account of Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN and the postponement of Cambodia’s 
membership, please refer to Donald E. Weatherbee, “ASEAN and the Political Challenges of 
Expansion,” Growing Pains: ASEAN’s Economic and Political Challenges (New York: Asia 
Society, December 1997), pp. 27-32.
79For a description of the constructive policy approach, please refer to Leszek Buszynski, 
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No. 2 (1998), pp. 290-305.
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Philippines, met Hun Sen, Ranariddh and King Norodom Sihanouk but failed to 
mediate in the internal conflict. The member states reluctantly decided to delay the 
Cambodian membership at a special meeting of the foreign ministers held in 
Kuala Lumpur on 10 July 1997. The joint statement declared that “in the light of 
unfortunate circumstances which have resulted from the use of force, the wisest 
course of action is to delay the admission of Cambodia into ASEAN until a later 
date.”80 At the AMM organised in Subang Jaya on 24-25 July 1997, the ASEAN 
foreign ministers “expressed regret that Cambodia could not be admitted into 
ASEAN due to the present circumstances in the country”.81 They later called for
o<j
the organisation of elections in Cambodia in May 1998 as previously scheduled. 
Hun Sen’s action caused embarrassment and led to discussions on the problems of 
enlargement and the applicability of the principle of non-intervention. ASEAN’s 
reaction to the Cambodian coup was a direct violation of its non-interference 
principle as it made Cambodia’s entry conditional upon the domestic situation. 
This contrasted the case of Cambodia to ASEAN’s handling of Myanmar’s 
membership.
In response to the events in Cambodia, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim proposed in July 1997 the notion of “constructive intervention” 
and argued that “ASEAN must now move from being a largely reactive 
organization to one that is proactive. We need to ‘intervene’ before simmering 
problems erupt into full-blown crises”.84 Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin 
Pitsuwan suggested in June 1998 the need to amend the basic principle of non­
interference which caused disagreement between the member states at the annual 
ministerial meeting of July 1998. Only supported by Thailand and the Philippines, 
the notion of “flexible engagement” was strongly rejected by the other members 
that feared interference in their domestic affairs. Singapore’s Foreign Minister 
Prof. S. Jayakumar referred to ASEAN’s basic principles, including the concept of
80Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 10 July 1997.
81Joint Communique of the Thirtieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Subang Jaya, Malaysia, 24-25 
July 1997.
82Joint Press Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Singapore, 11 
August 1997.
83John Funston, “ASEAN: Out of its Depth,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 
1998), pp. 25-27.
84Anwar Ibrahim, “Crisis Prevention,” Newsweek, 21 July 1997.
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non-interference, in his opening statement. He declared that they “have 
contributed to ASEAN’s success in the past, and will continue to do so in the 
future. Discarding them will not make ASEAN stronger. To the contrary, to do so 
may imperil ASEAN’s future.”85 The notion of “flexible engagement” was 
eventually softened to the euphemistic compromise of “enhanced interaction.” The 
admission of Cambodia was again discussed during the sixth ASEAN summit 
organised in Hanoi in December 1998. Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines 
wanted to delay its membership while Vietnam and Indonesia in particular but 
also Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar favoured its early participation. After its future 
admission had been announced in Hanoi, Cambodia joined the Association in 
April 1999.
In addition to the problems of expansion, ASEAN was incapable of 
avoiding and later dealing with the ecological disaster that followed the forest fires 
in Sumatra and Kalimantan in 1997. The haze, that reached Malaysia, Singapore 
and Brunei and parts of Thailand and the Philippines, marked a significant failure 
in environmental management and intra-mural cooperation that discredited 
ASEAN as a sub-regional diplomatic player. Subsequently, the member 
countries experienced an acute economic adversity that started with the collapse of 
the Thai Baht in July 1997. The Association was unable to make a substantial 
contribution to a potential economic recovery and the member states had to rely on 
international help, especially from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, and domestic initiatives. The East Asian economic crisis thus 
confirmed the under-development of ASEAN as an economic institution. 
Indonesia was most affected by the crisis that severely worsened its socio­
economic problems and student-led protests provoked the unexpected downfall of 
Suharto in May 1998. These events influenced the status and political condition of 
the Association. The loss of Indonesian leadership, that followed the fall of 
Suharto and the collapse of Indonesia’s economy, has further weakened the regime
850pening Statement by Singapore’s Foreign Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar, at the Thirty-First 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, the Philippines, 24 July 1998.
86Please refer to James Cotton, “The ‘Haze’ over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode 
of Regional Engagement,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 331-351.
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for cooperative security. The Association cannot be expected to significantly move 
forward when its leading member is absorbed by domestic difficulties.
In sum, the enlargement has questioned the application of ASEAN 
principles and complicated relations with Western partners. Moreover, it has 
seriously weakened the effectiveness of the Association by complicating the 
process of consultation and the achievement of consensus which governs decision­
making. This has resulted in a decline in unity and harmony among the 
participants. Finally, it has damaged intra-mural relations due to the incorporation 
within the cooperative process of additional bilateral rivalries and tensions. When 
set in the wider context of the economic crisis, the haze and the loss of Indonesian 
leadership, it can be said that ASEAN has since 1997 developed into a less 
influential and cohesive institution. The economic crisis has also demonstrated 
that the ASEAN process of interaction is more fruitful in a buoyant regional 
economic climate and that it loses most of its appeal during a period of harsh 
recession.
G. ASEAN’s Achievements and Limitations as a Regime for Cooperative 
Security
ASEAN’s greatest accomplishment as a regime for cooperative security is 
related to its contribution to conflict avoidance and management. The Association 
has operated as an instrument to avoid the recurrence of conflict. For example, 
Singapore’s Foreign Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar affirmed in 1998 that ASEAN’s 
primary role is “to manage relationships which have been and could otherwise 
still, all too easily turn conflictual.” The likelihood of regional states using force 
to resolve disputes has decreased.88 ASEAN has improved the climate of regional 
relations and has generally succeeded in containing peacefully, rather than 
addressing or solving, differences between its members. Its approach to conflict 
avoidance and management has been defined by the absence of concrete 
confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. Rejecting formal or legal 
mechanisms, ASEAN has relied on dialogue and consultation, the practices of 
self-restraint and consensus-building and on the principles of national sovereignty
870pening Statement by Singapore’s Foreign Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar, 24 July 1998.
88Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia, p. 234.
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and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. External intervention 
may also have been prevented by the reduction of intra-mural tensions. That said, 
one needs to bear in mind that the post-Confrontation period has been identified 
by an absence of substantial casus belli among its members.89
ASEAN’s shortcomings as a diplomatic tool to manage intra-regional 
disputes should be noted. The Association is unable to solve sources of conflict 
and is ill-equipped to deal with pressing matters or with controversial issues where 
clashing interests cannot be avoided. The member states have never used their 
own dispute resolution mechanism, the High Council, to settle tensions or latent 
conflicts. Their mode of conflict avoidance has been restricted to the management 
of inter-state tensions. At the domestic level, the Association has been paralysed 
by its non-interference principle as demonstrated by the crisis in East Timor in 
1999. Due to these limitations, regional relations have continued to be influenced 
by feelings of suspicion, competition and a series of territorial disputes.90 The 
members maintain separate national security policies in which other participants 
are still perceived as potential enemies.91 This is particularly the case of 
Singapore. Persisting bilateral disputes have affected ASEAN’s contribution to 
conflict management and are a key factor undermining the stability of the 
cooperative security regime.92 Yet, it is important to note that the Association has 
not been defined as a security community due to these disputes. Bilateral relations 
have also continued to be troubled by minor matters that can lead to larger 
diplomatic incidents. For example, the execution of a Filipino maid by the 
Singaporean authorities in March 1995 led to a surge of nationalism in the 
Philippines and strained bilateral relations. Singapore-Malaysian ties have recently 
been affected by political comments, including remarks by the Singaporean Senior
89Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” p. 29.
90See Hans Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among 
ASEAN Member States (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), and Harald David, 
Tensions within ASEAN: Malaysia and its Neighbours (Hull: Monographs on Southeast Asian 
Politics and International Relations, 1996).
91See Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia,” pp. 198-199.
92See Narayanan Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, Pacific Strategic Papers 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 1-81.
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Minister Lee Kuan Yew on the crime rate in Johor, that demonstrated the 
continuing complexity and vulnerability of these relations.
The Association has integrated within its structure a set of norms and 
principles and introduced a code of conduct regulating intra-mural relations. Since 
its creation, ASEAN has constituted a normative foundation that seeks to persuade 
its participants to “pursue ‘self-inhibiting’ and peaceful behaviour in inter-state 
relations.”94 This represents an achievement when considering the kind of regional 
interactions that preceded the establishment of the Association. Hence, ASEAN 
has been successful in fulfilling some of the objectives associated with security 
regimes. These include the enhancement of regional security through the 
application of norms and principles. Relevant to this process has been the TAC 
which formally introduced a norm-based code of conduct in the ASEAN 
framework. The adherence to the TAC has in the post-Cold War gradually been 
extended to all Southeast Asian states.
Furthermore, ASEAN’s inter-state relations have been highly 
institutionalised, though not in a European sense, by the holding of a considerable 
amount of yearly meetings at formal and informal levels. Relying on an inter­
governmental approach to cooperation, the ASEAN states also agreed during the 
1992 summit of heads of government held in Singapore to “meet formally every 
three years with informal meetings in between”.95 ASEAN has developed 
according to an inter-governmental approach to cooperation. Its Secretariat cannot 
be compared to the supra-national institutions developed by the European Union 
(EU). For instance, the Secretary-General is only head of the Secretariat rather 
than a head representative of the Association. This results from the fact that 
ASEAN has constantly reaffirmed the principles of national sovereignty and non­
interference in the domestic affairs of other states and has remained an 
arrangement with no supra-national power or character. Indeed, it has never 
promoted political or economic integration.
93Please refer to Narayanan Ganesan, “Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Some Recent
Developments,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 29-33.
94Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sept. 1995), p. 185.
95Singapore Declaration of 1992, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore, 27-28 
January 1992.
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Finally, the Association has succeeded in partly re-defining sub-regional 
relations with external powers by becoming a diplomatic player of some relevance 
in the international system. This factor should not be exaggerated though as the 
participants have neither established an autonomous order nor has ASEAN 
become an economic or trading grouping of real significance. Still, the 
Association gave a sense of diplomatic confidence to its members up to 1997.96 
For instance, the AMM has since 1978 been followed by a PMC with ASEAN’s 
dialogue partners. As such, the Association has gained diplomatic influence by 
establishing regular diplomatic contacts with essential actors including the United 
States, Japan and the EU. Moreover, the Third Indochina Conflict transformed 
temporarily the Association into a well-known and respected international 
diplomatic community.
Yet, it is at the extra-mural level that the Association has shown its 
greatest limitations. The management of regional order is beyond its influence 
which is reduced to collective diplomacy. The Third Indochina Conflict has 
demonstrated that ASEAN’s approach to cooperation rapidly becomes 
inappropriate when applied to external matters and where military coercion is 
required. Its diplomatic relevance in this case was dependent on special 
circumstances; namely, its close cooperation with China and the United States. 
When lacking the support of great powers, as is currently the case with regard to 
its involvement in the South China Sea dispute, ASEAN’s diplomatic influence on 
external matters becomes much more limited indeed. These shortcomings may be 
associated with cooperative security which excludes military cooperation and 
relies on an intra-mural basis.
ASEAN’s credibility and contribution to regional stability have recently 
been undermined due to the loss of Indonesian leadership, the expansion process 
and regional difficulties. The clash between the Association and some of its 
dialogue partners, mainly the US and the EU, over Myanmar has been interpreted 
as a reflection of a loss of ASEAN’s international standing. Though in no position
96Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister Dato Musa Hitam argues for example that “ASEAN 
has given each of its members the self-confidence to assert that they are not the objects of 
international politics--not pawns on a chessboard—but the subjects o f international relations, fully 
fit to participate in the affairs of our region and the wider world.” Dato Musa Hitam, “ASEAN and
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to address the economic adversity, ASEAN’s regional and international credibility 
has also been affected by the economic crisis. The enlargement process has 
diminished ASEAN’s capacity to speak with one voice and has cast doubt upon its 
informal process of interaction and the applicability of its basic principle of non­
intervention. The Association has recently been characterised by its inability to 
act, a lack of common vision and the absence of substantial developments. The 
post-Cold War revival of bilateral disputes has also been worsened by the 
expansion process due to the integration of additional bilateral contentions. In 
short, the current condition of the Association may be compared in many respects 
to its early years which were dominated by territorial disputes and tensions.
II. The Creation and Development of the ARF
A. The Establishment of the Forum
The idea of using the PMC as a forum for a regional security dialogue was 
officially discussed during the 1991 AMM and confirmed at the highest level 
during the fourth summit of heads of government held in Singapore in January 
1992.97 The first discussions on regional security were held at the ASEAN-PMC 
in Manila in July 1992. Encouraged by Tokyo and Washington, a first ASEAN- 
PMC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was organised in Singapore in May 1993. 
The foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries and of the seven dialogue partners; 
namely, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada 
and the EU, decided at the meeting to invite the foreign ministers of China, 
Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea to a special session in Singapore in 
July 1993 that would coincide with the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign 
ministers. The founding dinner of the ARF was held in Singapore on 25 July 1993 
and it was agreed that the first working session would take place in Bangkok one 
year later. An informal process of dialogue was also developed by several research 
institutes through the establishment in June 1993 of the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as a “track-two” instrument to
the Pacific Basin,” in Linda G. Martin, ed., The ASEAN Success Story: Social, Economic, and 
Political Dimensions (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 9.
97Singapore Declaration of 1992.
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complement the governmental activities and promote security cooperation through 
non-governmental efforts.
ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF resulted from several motivations. 
First, changes in the regional strategic environment forced the ASEAN countries 
to question their sub-regional approach to security. This primarily resulted from 
the external origins of post-Cold War security challenges and the strategic and 
economic interdependence linking their sub-region to the rest of the Asia- 
Pacific.98 Rather than expanding the PMC, the Association decided to form a new 
multilateral security dialogue. Second, the ARF was seen by the ASEAN states as 
an instrument to “engage Beijing in a comprehensive fashion in a stable regional 
international system.”99 Finally, ASEAN hoped to consolidate its diplomatic 
position in the post-Cold War, particularly since the 1991 International 
Conference on Cambodia that concluded the Third Indochina Conflict. The 
member states needed to avoid being excluded from a new strategic architecture 
that was chiefly dependent on a Sino-Japanese-US triangle. It should be noted that 
the creation of the Forum illustrated that ASEAN’s sub-regional approach to 
security had lost some of its significance in the new regional environment. The 
ARF undermined a regional ambition to maintain a form of independence from 
external intervention and contradicted ZOPFAN, one of ASEAN’s most important 
declaratory principles. The Association had previously ignored ZOPF AN during 
the Third Indochina Conflict, claiming that its application would only become 
possible after the end of the war.100
Most regional actors supported the position of leadership adopted by the 
Association. Its primary role in the formation of the ARF resulted from the fact 
that no other regional player was in a position to propose the development of a 
multilateral security dialogue. In addition, Acharya explains that “ASEAN’s own 
norms and institutional style provided a ready-made foundation upon which the 
ARF could build itself.”101 Still, the Forum would never have been realised
98Kusuma Snitwongse, “Achievements through Political Cooperation,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 
11, No. 2 (1998), p. 189.
"Weatherbee, “ASEAN and the Political Challenges of Expansion,” p. 33.
100Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Adelphi Paper No. 279 (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1993), p. 55.
10lAmitav Acharya, Reordering Asia: 'Cooperative Security’ or Concert o f Powers?, IDSS 
Working Paper No. 3 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 1999), p. 9.
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without the support and participation of the United States, Japan and China. As 
declared in a speech to the South Korean National Assembly in July 1993, US 
President Bill Clinton supported the notion of cooperation through a multilateral 
security dialogue. Japan also played an important role in the ARF by being an 
instrument in pioneering its formation. Finally, leaders in Beijing, who generally 
perceive multilateralism as an attempt to contain Chinese rising power or to 
interfere in the Taiwan issue, were reassured by the fact that ASEAN was leading 
the new cooperative process.
B. The Institutional Evolution of the ARF: The Annual Ministerial Meetings
The first ARF meeting took place in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 and had 
been preceded by the first ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Bangkok in 
May of the same year which had contributed to its organisation. The gathering of 
eighteen foreign ministers to discuss Asian-Pacific security matters was a 
symbolic achievement. The chairman’s statement declared that “the ARF had 
enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific to foster the habit of constructive 
dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and 
concern.”102 The first meeting led to several tangible successes. It was agreed that 
the Forum would meet annually and the different participants accepted ASEAN’s 
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation as a code of conduct for regulating regional 
relations.103 By extending the geographical ambit of its treaty, the Association 
hoped that other ARF participants would reject the use of force as a means to 
solve disputes with ASEAN states. It had in mind Beijing and its territorial claims 
in the South China Sea.104 Reports on security matters, including nuclear non­
proliferation, were commissioned for the next ARF session.
The second annual ministerial meeting, which welcomed Cambodia as a 
participant, took place in Brunei on 1 August 1995 and led to the acceptance of a 
Concept Paper that outlined the future evolution of the Forum. It stated that the 
ARF would progress through three stages of security cooperation: confidence- 
building, preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution mechanisms. As a result of
102Chairman’s Statement, the First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, Thailand, 25 
July 1994.
103Chairman’s Statement, the First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum
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China’s demands, the third stage was amended to “elaboration of approaches to 
conflicts” in the chairman’s statement.105 This manifested China’s influence on 
the cooperative process. The ARF was said to be in its first stage of development. 
The Concept Paper affirmed that “In its initial phase, the ARF should (...) 
concentrate on enhancing the trust and confidence amongst participants and 
thereby foster a regional environment conductive to maintaining the peace and 
prosperity of the region.”106 It also suggested two complementary approaches to 
security cooperation: one based on ASEAN’s experience and practice of 
cooperation and the other on “the implementation of concrete confidence-building
1 r y j
measures”. Two lists of measures (Annexes A and B) were set out, the first to 
be implemented in the immediate future and the second in the longer run. Finally, 
the Concept Paper introduced “Track Two activities” aimed at discussing sensitive 
security questions, including proposals mentioned in Annex B, through non­
governmental institutes and organisations.
Furthermore, the Concept Paper consolidated ASEAN’s leading role in the 
organisational activities of the ARF. It was agreed that all major meetings would 
be held in ASEAN capitals and hosted by the members of the Association. The 
Concept Paper also declared that ASEAN would provide the bureaucratic 
framework to support ARF activities. Finally, it stipulated that the Forum’s 
procedures had to be based “on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices. Decisions 
should be made by consensus and after careful and extensive consultations. No 
voting will take place.”108 The Concept Paper provoked resentment among some 
participants, including South Korea which felt annoyed by ASEAN’s managerial 
position and its inability to introduce a Northeast Asian security dialogue.
The second ARF meeting led to the establishment of Inter-Sessional 
Support Groups, to be co-chaired by an ASEAN and non-ASEAN participant, 
which would meet between the annual ministerial sessions. It was agreed to 
organise an Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures
104Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia,” p. 204.
105Chairman’s Statement, the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
Darussalam, 1 August 1995.
106The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 
August 1995.
107The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper.
108The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper.
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(CBMs) to be chaired for the first year by Indonesia and Japan. A series of Inter- 
Sessional Meetings were also set up to deal with cooperative activities; including, 
peacekeeping operations, confidence-building measures, disaster relief and search 
and rescue missions. These two structures were created to recommend ways of 
implementing proposals set out in Annex A of the Concept Paper. As explained by 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Using two different names for 
two evidently similar bodies was again intended to accommodate China’s 
objections, in this case to any impression of continuous institutionalised 
activities.”109
The third session was held in Jakarta in July 1996 and led to continuing 
efforts for regional cooperative security. It was decided to organise a new Inter- 
Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief and the Philippines and China proposed 
chairing the following Inter-Sessional Support Group on CBMs in Beijing in 
March 1997. The idea of “track-two” sessions on preventive diplomacy and non­
proliferation through CSCAP was also introduced. One should note the Singapore 
conference of September 1997 that followed the initiative. A set of criteria’s for 
membership was adopted in Jakarta.110 Among others, ARF participants needed to 
be sovereign states which excluded Taiwan’s future involvement. Moreover, the 
annual session led to the admission of Myanmar and India. India’s participation 
complicated the dialogue by introducing a new set of security matters within the 
Forum. The ASEAN initiative to enlarge the geographical scope of the ARF was 
not well-received by some participants, including the United States and Japan, 
which would have preferred a deepening, rather than an enlargement, of the 
diplomatic process. In contrast, China supported India’s involvement which was 
considered as an additional means to avoid a US domination of the Forum.111
The more recent annual ministerial meetings have yielded almost no 
progress or significant developments. The fourth meeting organised in Subang 
Jaya in July 1997 was dominated by the entry of Myanmar into ASEAN and the
109Intemational Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey: 1995/1996 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 191.
U0See the Chairman’s Statement, the Third Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 
Indonesia, 23 July 1996.
1 "international Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey: 1996/1997 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, April 1997), p. 193. It should be noted that the PRC also supported the 
participation of Mongolia in 1998.
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coup in Cambodia. Western criticism over the issue of human rights in Myanmar 
was brought into the Forum. First agreed at the second ARF meeting, the 
chairman’s statement of 1997 reiterated that the ARF would attempt to move 
towards the second stage of development in cases where preventive diplomacy
1 1 0overlapped with confidence-building. Yet, no progress towards a transition was 
made during the 1998 and 1999 ministerial meetings held respectively in Manila 
and Singapore. Although acknowledging the need to discuss the concept of 
preventive diplomacy, the chairman’s statement of 1999 declared that “The 
Ministers emphasised the importance of confidence building to the success of the 
ARF and encouraged the further development of confidence building measures 
(CBMs).”113
C. The ARF as an Inter-govemmental Discussion Group for Cooperative 
Security
Founded on the principle of inclusiveness, the ARF is a multilateral 
discussion group focusing on dialogue and confidence-building measures as a first 
step to cooperative security. Leifer explains that “To question whether the ARF is 
actually capable of solving problems and conflicts would be to make a category 
mistake.”114 The Forum is based on a multilateral perspective that aims to 
complement a bilateral approach which has traditionally relied on military 
deterrence to preserve a stable security environment. As will be later explained, 
these views are not shared by all participants, including China. Simon argues that 
though the ARF will not become a peacekeeping arrangement, it could grow into a 
successful forum for dialogue, agenda-setting, and an instrument to pressure states 
to respect commitments.115 Moreover, it may lessen feelings of suspicion and 
build-up mutual trust. Thus, it could help regional states to concentrate on long­
term interests by reducing their fear that others will seek short-term gains.
U2Chairman’s Statement, the Fourth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Subang Jaya, 
Malaysia, 27 July 1997.
113Chairman’s Statement, the Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July 
1999.
114Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f Regional Security, 
Adelphi Paper No. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 59.
ll5Seldon W. Simon, “Realism and Neoliberalism: International Relations Theory and Southeast 
Asian Security,” The Pacific Review Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995), p. 19.
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Having described the ARF as a multilateral discussion group for 
cooperative security, let us now analyse it further by comparing it to the 
Association. The Forum is based on an ASEAN model of cooperative security. 
This has involved transmitting to the Asia-Pacific norms and principles, an 
informal process of dialogue and consultation but also a mode of conflict 
avoidance and management developed since 1967. The Association has promoted 
within the ARF its own practices of self-restraint and consensus-building and 
favoured an informal security dialogue over legally-binding confidence measures. 
Rolls explains that this tendency has resulted from ASEAN’s traditional 
avoidance of “institutionalized arrangement” in the political and military fields 
and the fact that this established attitude matches with US and Japanese 
preferences.116 This should not be exaggerated though as ASEAN’s political 
evolution has been dependent on formal agreements, including the TAC and the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord. Finally, the ARF rejects any form of collective 
defence. Hence, it has been suggested that the Association has tried to extend its 
“ASEAN Way” to the rest of the region.117
Nevertheless, the ARF is also defined by other characteristics that can be 
contrasted with an ASEAN approach to cooperative security. Though the Forum is 
a recent institution, it is already well-developed in some ways given its inter- 
sessional activity. It has achieved through the Concept Paper of 1995 a level of 
institutionalisation never attained by the Association. Hence, while an extension 
of the “ASEAN Way,” the ARF is linked to a more structured approach to 
cooperative security. That said, progress has been slow and limited. For instance, 
the ARF has so far led to the implementation of few concrete confidence-building 
measures. The activities of the Inter-Sessional Support Groups and Inter-Sessional 
Meetings on CBMs have included so far the publication of defence white papers 
on a voluntary basis, the promotion of dialogue on security perceptions, the 
exchange of views on defence policies, and the organisation of meetings of heads 
of defence colleges and institutions.
ll6Mark G. Rolls, “Security Co-operation in Southeast Asia: An Evolving Process,” in C. Mclnnes
and M. Rolls, eds., Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: Frank 
Cass, 1994), pp. 70-71.
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The Concept Paper emphasises a gradual approach to security cooperation 
and conflict management. The ambition to move beyond confidence-building by 
aiming, at least in the longer run, to prevent and/or solve specific disputes has 
been introduced through the three stages of development. As mentioned above, the 
participants reiterated in 1997 that the ARF would attempt to move towards 
preventive diplomacy where it overlapped with confidence-building. That said, the 
notion of preventive diplomacy has never been clearly defined in the context of 
the ARF beyond the imprecise definition given by the UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992.118 Discussions on the definition of the concept 
have been characterised by controversy and disagreement.119 For instance, the 
overlap between preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures has 
been debated. A working definition of preventive diplomacy was agreed upon at a 
workshop held by the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence and Security 
Building Measures (CSBMs) in Bangkok in early 1999 and discussed at the 
following meeting of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on CBMs.120
Moreover, the initiative to move beyond the promotion of confidence- 
building measures has not been well-received by some participants, especially 
China. In contrast to confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy focuses 
on specific security issues and it may be understood by some as a more threatening 
form of cooperative security. The PRC rejects constraining measures and wants 
the ARF to remain a diplomatic instrument focusing on dialogue and consultation. 
Refusing to discuss the question of Taiwan, it is also unlikely that Beijing will
,17See for example Jose T. Almonte, “Ensuring Security the ‘ASEAN Way’,” Survival, Vol. 39, 
No. 4 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 80-92.
118The former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines the notion of preventive 
diplomacy as an “action to prevent disputes from arising between two parties, to prevent existing 
disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace- 
Keeping (New York: The United Nations, 1992), p. 5. The notion of preventive diplomacy was 
initially developed and used by the former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.
119Please refer to the statements of three ARF track-two seminars on preventive diplomacy 
organised respectively in Seoul on 8-10 May 1995, in Paris on 7-8 November 1996, and in 
Singapore on 9-11 September 1997. See also Desmond Ball, “Introduction: Towards Better 
Understanding of Preventive Diplomacy,” in D. Ball and A. Acharya, eds., The Next Stage: 
Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (Canberra: Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1999), pp. 1-14; and CSCAP 
Singapore, “Review of Preventive Diplomacy Activities in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Paper 
prepared for the CSCAP Working Group on CSBMs, Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 28 February-2 March 1999.
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ever accept the implementation of preventive diplomacy measures for the South 
China Sea. In addition, such measures are in contradiction with ASEAN’s 
preference for conflict avoidance which further complicates their application 
within an ARF framework.121 Though the Forum should be viewed as a long-term 
project, it is still legitimate to question if it will ever succeed to move towards its 
next stage of development.
The ARF is also defined by attributes that weaken its influence as a 
cooperative security arrangement. It was created despite the persistence of several 
security issues resulting from the Cold War, including the Korean Peninsula and 
the Taiwan question. Hence, the Forum sought to establish a security dialogue 
despite the presence of regional flashpoints and can therefore be contrasted to the 
Association which was created after the resolution of Confrontation and left with 
no substantial casus bellum among its members.122 Indeed, ASEAN post-dated 
conflict and conflict resolution as there were no significant problems left to 
address. This point distinguishes both arrangements in their approach to 
cooperative security and questions the applicability of the “ASEAN Way” to an 
Asian-Pacific security environment.
Finally, no consensual approach to security exists among the most 
influential ARF participants. The joint US-Japanese Declaration of April 1996 on 
regional security, which revised but also reconfirmed their strategic alliance in the 
Post-Cold War, demonstrated the persisting American reliance on bilateral 
security structures. In comparison, Beijing supports a multipolar perspective and 
has criticised bilateralism as hiding a form of US unilateralism in the Asia-Pacific 
and an attempt to encircle the PRC as a threatening rising power. In contrast to the 
ARF, the ASEAN states adopted informally the principle of national and regional 
resilience as a common security doctrine. This shared approach to security was a 
function of the relative homogeneity that existed within the sub-regional 
association up to 1997.
l20Chairman’s Summary: CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy, Bangkok, Thailand, 28 
February-2 March 1999.
121The subject matter of the ASEAN model as a weakness within the ARF is discussed by Kim 
Sung-Han, “The Role of the ARF and the Korean Peninsula,” The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs, 
Vol. XII, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1998), pp. 510-511.
82
D. The ARF’s Achievements and Limitations as an Embryonic Regime for 
Cooperative Security
East Asia has remained in the post-Cold War characterised by suspicion, 
latent conflicts and unresolved disputes. Yet, the creation of the Forum led to 
some regional optimism. The ARF is the first inclusive security arrangement at the 
level of the Asia-Pacific. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar later 
declared that it is “a means of encouraging the evolution of a more predictable and 
constructive pattern of relations between major powers with interests in the 
region.”123 The ASEAN states have succeeded in engaging the PRC and the US in 
a multilateral security dialogue that also includes Japan and Russia. The Forum 
was established despite America’s preference for bilateral structures and China’s 
suspicion of multilateralism. Khong rightly asserts that “The institutionalization of 
a security dialogue among Asia Pacific’s most significant actors is probably its 
most significant achievement.”124 Multilateral discussions have for the first time 
been held on regional problems and security matters. The ARF is now an 
instrument to share information, promote trust-building measures and enhance the 
practice of transparency. Finally, it provides a regional opportunity to discuss 
different views on security and integrate isolated countries into the regional
125security system.
Despite its short existence, the Forum has been a helpful tool to tackle the 
climate of regional security relations. In addition to reports commissioned on 
confidence-building measures, the ARF has provided useful opportunities to 
defuse tensions resulting from specific crises. For instance, the second annual 
ARF session was influenced by two matters that had affected regional stability in 
the first part of the year. The Philippines had discovered in February 1995 the 
Chinese-occupation of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef, located in the
122Michael Leifer, “Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?” in David S. Goodman and Gerald 
Segal, eds., Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 115.
123Opening Statement by Singapore’s Foreign Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar, 24 July 1998.
124Khong Yuen Foong, “Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia Pacific?,” The Pacific Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 2 (1997), p. 291.
125Trevor Findlay, “Disarmament, Arms Control and the Regional Security Dialogue” in Gary 
Klintworth, ed., Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities? (New York: 
Longman, 1996), pp. 238-9.
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Spratly Islands. The 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, which 
calls for a peaceful resolution of the dispute, was mentioned in the chairman’s 
statement of 1995. Regional security had also been influenced by a deterioration in 
Sino-US relations after Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui had been offered a visa 
for a private visit to the United States in June 1995. The ARF meeting provided an 
avenue for Washington and Beijing to initiate a new process of diplomatic 
rapprochement.
The shortcomings of the Forum in respect of the main regional security 
concerns, which are the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the South China Sea 
dispute, should be kept in mind. The ARF is in no position to tackle these issues. 
The minimal involvement of the ARF in the South China Sea dispute will be 
examined in chapter six. North Korea first joined the Forum at the seventh 
ministerial meeting held in Bangkok in July 2000. The Korean question had until 
then been addressed bilaterally and through the organisation of multilateral talks 
involving the United States, the PRC and the two Korea’s. General statements on 
the Korean Peninsula had also been made by the ARF. Opposing Taipei’s 
participation, the PRC refuses to discuss the Taiwan issue which it considers as a 
domestic matter. The 1996 events in the Taiwan Straits were also a reminder of 
the inability of the ARF to confront a major crisis.126 China’s military exercises in 
March 1996 to intimidate Taiwan and influence its coming presidential election 
led to a US deployment of two carrier squadrons to deter further Chinese actions. 
Except for Singapore and Japan, the East Asian states did not respond publicly to 
China’s military exercises. The events demonstrated that the Asia-Pacific security 
environment has remained dependent on a series of bilateral power relationships, 
above all that between Washington and Beijing. That said, the annual ARF 
meeting succeeded in offering a vehicle for dialogue for the United States and 
China. In short, the influence of the Forum on inter-state relations is restrained to 
the promotion of dialogue and consultation, the implementation of some
l26James Clad, “Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge too Far?,” Southeast Asian Affairs 1997 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 6.
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confidence-building measures and attempts to foster international norms,
1 77including the non-use of force.
Furthermore, the ARF suffers from various structural limitations that may 
affect its future development. It has a large membership which can confine its 
capacity to maintain internal coherence and develop a code of conduct. The 
Concept Paper stipulates that the Forum will progress based on consensus and “at 
a pace comfortable to all participants.”128 Yet, finding a general agreement on 
common objectives is a troubling matter as deep divisions exist between the 
participants. While China and the ASEAN members favour general discussions as 
a way to avoid disagreements, other states, including the US and Japan, prefer a 
more rapid implementation of CBMs.129 Moreover, Canada and Australia, which 
are commonly viewed as external players with a limited stake in East Asia, have 
been pressing actively for the implementation of preventive diplomacy measures. 
The latter are strongly opposed by China, partly due to the fear of external 
interference in its domestic affairs, and perceived with some ambivalence by the 
US which prefers its regional policy and bilateral ties not to be constrained by 
formal measures.
The applicability of the ASEAN approach to regional security relations is 
another central issue. The US, Japan, and China have different expectations and 
strategic perspectives which cannot implicitly be ignored in an “ASEAN Way”.130 
While Washington and Tokyo see the Forum as a means of complementing 
existing bilateral security structures, Beijing wishes to promote multipolarity 
which can be regarded as a code for constraining US unilateralism. In addition, 
ASEAN’s mode of conflict avoidance is not applicable to the Taiwan question and 
the Korean peninsula which require tangible solutions. Crucial differences also 
contrast North from Southeast Asian security relations. With the exception of the 
South China Sea, the territorial disputes in Southeast Asia cannot be compared to 
the complex security problems that persist in the Northeast. Moreover, the two
127Rosemary Foot, “What Happened to the Asia-Pacific Century?” Presentation given at the 
Seminar on Asia and the Pacific in International Relations, London School of Economics (LSE), 
18 March 1999.
128The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 1 August 1995.
I29Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia,” p. 207.
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sub-regions can be differentiated with regards to the role and involvement of the 
1^1great powers. Northeast Asian relations are dominated by the security interests 
of the US, China, Japan and to a lesser extent Russia. In contrast, external 
intervention has been reduced in post-Cold War Southeast Asia, particularly since 
the end of the Third Indochina Conflict.
Finally, some participants may not appreciate ASEAN’s leading position 
in the longer run. The diplomatic centrality and managerial role of the Association 
was essential to ensure an initial Chinese participation and is still supported by the 
PRC, Russia and India as a way to avoid a US domination of the arrangement. 
Yet, ASEAN’s leadership has led to a concentration on Southeast Asian issues. 
The significance of the North Korean participation at the seventh gathering of the 
ARF should be noted though. The 2000 ministerial session included a meeting 
between US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and North Korean Foreign 
Minister Paek Nam-Sun, representing the highest-level bilateral talks since the 
Korean War (1950-53). Paek Nam-Sun also held separate discussions with the 
foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan. A continued ASEAN sponsorship 
may still cast doubt upon the relevance of the ARF with reference to Northeast 
Asian security issues. While these limitations do not question the usefulness of the 
Forum as an instrument for regional dialogue, they force us to remain realistic 
regarding its actual potential. No dramatic achievements should be expected to 
result from its activities.
Conclusion
Neo-liberal cooperative theory has been applied in this chapter to the 
institutional experience of ASEAN and the ARF. Participants to a security regime 
are expected to avoid pressing for short-term interests in the hope of achieving 
individual and shared gains in the longer run. Several attributes enjoy a central 
position within a neo-liberal analysis of security regimes. These include the 
development of norms and principles, the level of institutionalisation and the
130Yoichi Funabashi, “Bridging Asia’s Economics-Security Gap,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 
1996/97), p. 106.
131This point was made by Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono, former member of the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) and frequent columnist for the Jakarta Post. The interview was 
held in Jakarta on 17 March 2000.
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existence of common interests. ASEAN should be regarded as a regime for 
cooperative security due to several factors. It has promoted norms and principles 
leading to an intra-mural code of conduct and established a mechanism for 
conflict management based on conflict avoidance rather than resolution. 
Additionally, ASEAN has set up an institutional framework consisting of: a 
structure for multilateral discussions that relies on summits of heads of 
government, ministerial meetings and ad hoc sessions; institutional arrangements, 
including the ASEAN Concord, the TAC and the ZOPF AN declaration; and an 
informal process of interaction, the so-called “ASEAN Way”. That said, it is 
important to define the kind of security regime which has been evolving in 
Southeast Asia since 1967. In light of the limitations addressed throughout the 
chapter, it may be argued that ASEAN has remained a weak security regime. For 
example, it should be noted that its approach to cooperative security has not 
substantially evolved since the Bali Summit of 1976.
Despite its limitations, the ARF presents most of the characteristics of an 
embryonic security regime. While an extension of the “ASEAN Way”, the Forum 
is linked to a more structured approach of cooperative security. It has achieved a 
level of institutionalisation through inter-sessional activity never attained by the 
Association. Moreover, the ARF already provides to its participants some of the 
advantages mentioned by a neo-liberal perspective; namely, the establishment of a 
multilateral dialogue, an increase in transparency and the implementation of 
confidence-building measures. Yet, it is still uncertain if the Forum will succeed 
in developing a set of norms and principles respected by its many participants.
87
Chapter Three
The Role of the Balance of Power Factor 
within and beyond Regimes for Cooperative Security
Introduction
ASEAN and the ARF may be considered as regional attempts to provide 
for security by moving beyond conventional balance of power politics. Through 
their underlying premises and functions as well as their focus on long-term 
cooperation, both associative arrangements exclude the balance of power in 
principle. Nonetheless, it is argued in this thesis that the institutional experience of 
ASEAN and the ARF was informed with some reference to the balance of power. 
The purpose of this chapter is to further discuss this traditional concept and to 
analyse how it could be relevant to such inter-state arrangements, which have been 
conceived primarily as alternatives to its core assumptions. To that end, it will 
address the balance of power factor within the study of regional regimes for 
cooperative security.
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first will examine the 
conventional understanding of the balance of power by reviewing its meanings, 
premises, objectives and modes of operation. The second section will describe 
how the balance of power has operated as a policy over time with special 
reference to its military dimension. It will also point out the shortcomings of 
balance of power politics and different alternatives that have been advocated by 
theorists and practitioners. The final section will discuss the balance of power as a 
factor within cooperative security. Its possible relevance will be considered before 
analysing how this factor will be observed in different case studies.
I. Conventional Understanding of the Balance of Power Theory
The term balance of power is often used loosely, which leads to confusion 
and vagueness. Martin Wight has argued, for example, that it could have nine 
different meanings.1 Among many others, Inis Claude has largely contributed to a
‘Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, eds., Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968), p. 151. The nine different meanings are:
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better comprehension of the term by giving it four definitions. These are: a 
situation, referring to the distribution of power; a policy, associated with policies 
taking the power situation into account and seeking to revise its pattern; a symbol, 
seen as a sign of realistic concern with the power issue; and as a system. As a 
system, the phrase refers to “a certain kind of arrangement for the operation of 
international relations in a world of many states.”3
Michael Sheehan has further described the distinction between balance of 
power as a policy and as a system.4 As a policy, it involves “the creation and 
preservation of equilibrium, the confrontation of power with countervailing power 
to prevent a single power laying down the law to all others.”5 As a system, the 
balance of power has often been used as a point of reference for studying the 
working of the states system. As pointed out by Sheehan, the central element 
regarding “the systemic approach to the balance of power is that it posits a direct 
structure of the state system and the behavior of states within the system.”6 
Therefore, one focuses on the interdependence and interaction existing between 
the states part of the system. In this thesis, the balance of power will be analysed 
and expressed as a policy rather than as a system.
The balance of power theory rests on the centrality and constant pursuit of 
power, implicitly understood as military power, in international relations. Its 
underlying assumptions are based on realist suppositions. Since the late 1930’s, 
realism has been the most dominant school of International Relations (IR). 
Modem realists start with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which they see as 
creating an international states system. Realists depict the latter as based on 
anarchy where states, the only relevant actors, focus on their survival and security.
“1. An even distribution of power. 2. The principle that power ought to be evenly distributed. 3. 
The existing distribution of power. Hence, any possible distribution o f power. 4. The principle of 
equal aggrandizement of the Great Powers at the expense of the weak. 5. The principle that our 
side ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert the danger o f power becoming unevenly 
distributed. 6. (When governed by the verb ‘to hold’) a special role in maintaining an even 
distribution of power. 7. A special advantage in the existing distribution of power. 8. 
Predominance. 9. An inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of 
power.”
2Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 13-39.
3Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 20.
4Michael Sheehan, The Balance o f Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 53.
5Sheehan, The Balance o f Power: History and Theory, p. 20.
6Sheehan, The Balance o f Power: History and Theory, pp. 42-51.
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Cooperation is limited and temporary and the emphasis is put on the distribution 
of power. War plays a natural role within the system as the instrument of the 
balance. Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (1948) is widely considered to be the first cohesive text on realism as both 
an explanatory and prescriptive theory. Morgenthau characterised later in his 
career six basic principles which are said to summarise the realist approach to 
international relations. These are: politics is administered by objective laws; state 
interests are defined in terms of power; the forms and nature of that power may 
vary over time and place, but the interest remains objective and fixed; moral 
principles do not guide state behaviour; there is no universal set of moral 
principles; the political sphere is autonomous from all other spheres of human 
concern, including that of morality.7
Having discussed the various meanings and theoretical foundations of the 
balance of power, let us now introduce its objectives. In essence, the fundamental 
purpose of balance of power is to deny hegemony either regionally or globally. It 
aims at ensuring the survival of individual states by preventing the dominance of 
any one state. By providing such countervailing measures, the balance of power is 
indirectly expected to provide stability and peace in the international system. 
Claude writes:
If there is an orthodox position among theorists, it is that the stability and order 
of a multistate system, and the security of its constituent parts, are endangered by 
the rise of any state to preponderance, and that the essential task of the balance of 
power system is therefore to maintain or restore a situation of approximate 
equilibrium8
Many theorists have discussed the objectives of the balance of power. Let us 
introduce some of these arguments by considering two realist thinkers, namely 
Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, and a neo-Grotian approach through the 
writings of Hedley Bull.
7Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 4-15.
8Inis L. Claude, “The Balance of Power Revisited,” Review o f International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 
(April 1989), p. 79.
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When dealing with the balance of power, Morgenthau refers to a 
“stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations”9 necessary to preserve the 
stability of the system and the independence of states from the domination of one 
hegemon. Yet, he points out that the balance of power offers dangers linked to the 
uncertainty of power calculations. He suggests that a state wishing to preserve a 
margin of safety needs to “aim not at a balance, that is, equality of power, but at 
superiority of power in their own behalf.”10 To that end, a state needs to seek the 
summit of power available. In a recent book, Diplomacy, Kissinger explains that 
the term “balance of power” refers to a system which rarely occurs in history. He 
indicates that such a system does not aim to avoid war but to “limit the ability of 
states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts.”11
Hedley Bull was a leading theorist of the English School of International 
Relations, which is associated with the international society perspective. Bull 
asserts that an international society “exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with
1 0one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” Bull focuses on 
the balance of power as part of the larger context of international order defined as 
“a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of 
states, or international society.”13 The institutions which sustain international 
order are the states themselves, as well as other rules and mechanisms such as the 
balance of power, international law, diplomacy, a system of great powers, and 
war. In an institutionalised sense, the balance of power presents three essential 
objectives.14 First, a balance of power in the international system aids in 
preventing the states system from becoming a universal empire. Second, local 
balances of power help in preserving the independence of states that may 
otherwise be absorbed or dominated by regional hegemonic states. Third, the
9Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, First Edition, 
Revised and Enlarged (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 125.
10Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1949), p. 155.
uHenry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: A Touchstone Book 1994), p. 21.
l2Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, Second Edition
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), p. 13.
13Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 8.
14Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 102.
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existence of balances of power, at the global and local level, makes the operation 
of other institutions feasible.
Let us conclude this review of the balance of power theory by stating its 
various forms and modes of operation. Regarding the former, Organski argued in 
1968 that two types of balances could be distinguished. A simple balance involves 
two groups, each consisting of one or more states, opposing each other with a 
roughly equal amount of power while a multiple balance includes several groups 
balancing each other on a unilateral and multilateral basis.15 In more recent 
literature, the same distinction has been made and referred to as bipolar and 
multipolar balances of power. While most theorists agree on the complex forms 
taken by the balance of power, no consensus exists regarding the functioning of 
the balancing process within the system. This is said to be automatic, comparable 
to physical laws, semi-automatic, through a balancer, or manual, through states’ 
actions.16 Let us clarify this point further by comparing how Kissinger and Waltz 
discuss the operation of the balance of power.
Kissinger considers the balance of power to be dependent on states’ 
actions. Stability, an underlying objective of balance of power, is examined as a 
product of legitimacy, which needs to be created by statesmen. He defines 
“legitimacy” as an “international arrangement about the nature of workable
* * 17arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.” 
Kissinger refers to two models which have maintained the operation of a balance 
of power system: the British and the Bismarck model.18 The former consists of 
waiting for the balance of power to be under direct threat before joining the 
weaker side to restore the balance. This position of balancer, which was 
traditionally followed by Britain vis-a-vis the European distribution of power, is 
often understood as involving a semi-automatic balancing process. The Bismarck 
model avoids the creation of challenges to the balance by maintaining “close 
relations with as many parties as possible, by building overlapping alliance
15A. Organski, World Politics, Second Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 274.
16Claude, Power and International Relations, pp. 42-51.
17Henry Kissinger, World Restored: Mettemich, Castlereagh and the Problems o f Peace, 1812-22 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1957), p. 1.
18Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 835.
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systems, and by using the resulting influence to moderate the claims of the 
contenders.”19 Hence, its operation maybe seen as primarily manual.
Opposing most traditional realists, Waltz rejects the belief that a balance of 
power needs to be promoted by states’ policies, thus implying that its operation is 
automatic. He argues that “Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and 
only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated 
by units wishing to survive.”20 Through a systemic interpretation of the balance of
7 1power theory, Waltz makes predictions about states’ actions. First, he foresees 
states as practicing balancing behaviour even when balancing power is not the 
objective of their policies. Second, he expects the existence of a balanced power 
distribution within the system. Finally, Waltz does not predict that a balance of 
power will be held over time. Rather, he believes that once a balance is disturbed, 
it will be re-established.
There is a degree of consensus in the prevailing literature that the balance 
of power remains one of the most valuable tools of analysis in the study of 
international politics. Schroeder writes that “the concept of balance of power 
seems indispensable. There is hardly a discussion of current international politics 
in serious journals or newspapers which does not use it or rest on it....” At the 
same time, students of International Relations in general and balance of power 
theorists in particular are aware of its limitations. Beyond its numerous 
definitions, the balance of power concept is based on a narrow comprehension of 
the notions of power and security and fails to take into account domestic issues. Its 
shortcomings also include its tendency to exaggerate the potential danger resulting 
from emerging hegemons and its distorted understanding of war as a political 
instrument.
II. The Balance of Power as a Policy
A. Its Military Dimension
19Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 835.
20KennethN. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979), p. 121.
21Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 128.
22Paul W. Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political 
Equilibrium?,” Review o f International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), p. 135.
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While the balance of power has mainly been discussed so far in a 
descriptive fashion, the concept has also been applied as a policy prescription. As 
a policy, the balance of power has most commonly been expressed through a 
military dimension. The distinguishing feature of the policy of balance is a 
disposition to mobilise and employ military force, often in coalition, in order to 
affect the distribution of power. It may be observed in history as an old-fashioned 
exercise of military power. Though the principle was already applied as a military 
doctrine in Renaissance Italy, the Eighteenth Century was the golden age for 
balance of power politics. It became legitimate to prevent a state from expanding 
its territory and power excessively to maintain stability and peace. The Nineteenth 
Century experienced a long period of stability resulting from the Vienna 
settlement of 1814-15 and the Concert of Europe. Thinkers and practitioners of the 
balance of power concurred that the aims of the principle had been achieved.
Yet, the outbreak of the First World War symbolised the failure of balance 
of power strategy in the attempt to preserve stability and peace in the international 
system. Critics later argued that the system of alliances, which had dominated 
European security relations, had fuelled antagonism and rivalries and provoked an 
arms race between the opposing camps. Thus, the balance of power was said to 
have made war on the continent unavoidable. Wilsonian liberalism was introduced 
as an alternative approach to security. It originated from US President Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to the US Senate on 8 January 1918 in which he 
described a European peace based on moral, legal and economic principles and 
interests. In contrast to the origins of the First World War, it was argued that 
World War II was caused by a policy of appeasement adopted by Britain and 
France, as for instance at the Munich Conference held on 29 September 1938, and 
that it could have been prevented by balance of power politics. Osgood asserts that 
the “ascent of Hitler’s Germany showed that a peacetime deterrent coalition, 
whatever its effects in other circumstances might be, was essential to peace and 
order m the face of the most dangerous bid for hegemony since Napoleon.” In 
partial consequence, the Cold War was again a period of balance of power 
arrangements whereby states committed themselves to undertake military
23Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 
1971), p. 30.
95
obligations to one another against an external threat. Moreover, some military 
obligations concluded at its height still obtain, especially in the Asia-Pacific.
Based on the simple notion that unbalanced power may be dangerous to 
the security of individual states and that it needs to be confronted through 
countervailing measures, the balance of power has often been considered as an 
attractive concept to foreign policy-makers. States have traditionally followed 
three fundamental strategies, which may be characterised as a balancing 
perspective. First, a state pays close attention to the power distribution; that is, it 
measures its own capacities in relation to those of other significant players. This 
may force a state to regard even current friends as potential enemies. Second, a 
state can follow a strategy of unilateral balancing which includes actions to 
strengthen its own capabilities. This strategy is characterised by a relative and 
competitive understanding of power. Finally, a state may consider unilateral 
balancing as insufficient to fulfil its sense of relative security. Consequently, it 
may follow a policy of balancing through external association which involves 
strengthening its own relative position through diplomatic or military alignments 
or even formal alliance.
More specifically, states possess a variety of methods through which to 
affect the distribution of power, which are aimed at expanding their absolute 
power and/or affecting negatively the power of their enemies. Morgenthau refers 
to five tactics: to divide and rule, to offer compensations based on territories, to 
arm, to enter alliances with other states and to hold the balance.24 Organski 
introduces some additional methods including the creation of buffer zones and 
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. Of course, these various 
military approaches may also be used to establish hegemonies or other military 
objectives. The balance of power as a military policy has most often been 
expressed through an alliance, taking either a formal or tacit form.26
24Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Second 
Edition, Revised and Enlarged (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 166-176.
250rganski, World Politics, pp. 276-279.
26For a discussion on the study of alliances, please refer to Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and 
American Foreign Policy’, and Julian R. Friedman, “Alliance in International Politics,” in J. 
Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen, eds., Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, Inc., 1970), pp. 3-32.
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Governments enter alliances so as to enhance their power positions and to 
react to rising hegemonies in the international system. Alliances may affect the 
distribution of power by maintaining the territorial status quo in a specific region. 
States will conventionally align themselves with the weaker side in order to 
restrain the rising power. Such alliances present a defensive character. States may 
also enter offensive alliances in the interest of hegemony, as was the case for 
example of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939 and the Tripartite 
Pact signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940. Wight explains that 
“Political alliances are always contracted with third parties in view; unlike 
friendships, they are necessarily, so to speak, self-conscious; their purpose is to 
enhance the security of the allies or to advance their interests, against the outer 
world.”27 To maximise their function, alliances should operate as flexible and 
temporary security arrangements; implying that their participants must be willing 
to enter rapidly new alliances to preserve a balanced distribution of power. 
However, alliances can be influenced by ideological factors which limit the 
flexibility of alliance formation. As a classical example of balance of power 
politics, the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded during the Cold War intended to 
preserve the territorial status quo in Europe in an attempt to defend Western 
European security from Soviet Communism. One should note also the French 
unease with the “benign” hegemony of the United States, which was expressed in 
France’s withdrawal from the military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO).28
The study of alliances, as an expression of balance of power politics, has 
recently been influenced by the work of Stephen Walt. In the Origins o f Alliances 
(1987), he examines their formation as a reaction to threats rather than power. 
Walt points out that instead of studying balancing or “bandwagoning” as reactions 
to rising external threats defined exclusively in terms of capabilities (aggregate 
power), it is “more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the 
foreign power that poses the greatest threat.”29 He argues that the level of threat
27Martin Wight, Power Politics, Reprinted (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), p. 122.
28For a discussion on the establishment and early development of NATO, please refer to Robert E. 
Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
29Stephen Walt, The Origins o f Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 21.
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needs to be determined not only by considering aggregate power but also by 
including three other essential factors: geographic proximity, offensive power, and 
aggressive intentions. As a result, he manages to separate the traditional balance 
of power theory from his own balance of threat perspective. Walt deals with some 
limitations of the traditional balance of power theory by refining to a large extent 
the notion of a threatening state. Walt therefore transforms the balance of power 
into a more context-dependent concept. For instance, his approach makes it 
possible to distinguish benign from hostile hegemons. This will benefit our 
analysis of the ARF that may be viewed as a tool to deal with a rising China. The 
PRC is seen regionally as a menacing actor while the United States, which 
remains the regional hegemonic power, inspires confidence among most regional 
players.31
B. Shortcomings and Alternatives to Balance of Power Politics
a. Weaknesses
As seen above, balance of power is theoretically ill-defined which 
seriously affects its application to international politics and diplomacy. The 
balance of power does not only suffer from deficiencies when analysed in a 
descriptive form as similar weaknesses arise when applied as a policy prescription. 
Due to its ambiguities and inconsistencies, the concept is often less serviceable 
than anticipated by policy-makers who might expect too much from its 
predictability and appealing simplicity.32 For instance, how should aggregate 
power and changes in the power distribution be predicted or analysed? While a 
strong supporter of the balance of power principle, Morgenthau refers to its main 
weaknesses as being “its uncertainty, its unreality, and its inadequacy.” In 
particular, he considers the uncertainty associated with balance of power policies 
as mainly responsible for their failure to prevent the First World War.34 Wight 
also argues that balance of power is “inherently unstable, because powers are not
30Walt, The Origins o f Alliances, pp. 22-26.
31Khong Yuen Foong, “Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia Pacific?,” The Pacific Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 2 (1997), p. 297.
32Ralph Pettman, International Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 69.
33Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1955), p. 185.
34Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1955), p. 189.
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static societies, but are constantly growing or declining in relation to one 
another.”35
Yet, the most serious shortcoming of the balance of power relates to its 
relationship with war and conflict. As a military doctrine, it accepts war implicitly 
as a means to pursue other objectives. Moreover, it has often been described as 
promoting rather than limiting the chances of conflict. In his book, The 
Transformation o f European Politics, 1763-1848, Paul W. Schroeder asserts that 
the balance of power “blocked the peaceful resolution of conflicts.... directly 
prompted conflict, and made the periodic escalation of particular conflicts into 
general systemic wars more likely.” The same conclusions are reached by John 
Vasquez who points out that war is more likely to occur among states concerned 
with territorial disputes and following balance of power tactics. States relying on 
the latter are left in a competitive security environment where no real attention is 
given to the possible existence of long-term compatible objectives. As such, 
seeking a power equilibrium may not naturally lead, as often argued, to stability 
and peace. Wight writes that the balance of power “is essentially competitive: it 
leads to rivalry of power, which leads to war, as a consequence of which one side 
is temporarily eliminated and the other has a temporary monopoly of power.” 
Considering these limitations, it is not surprising that alternatives have been 
developed and applied in foreign policy.
*
b. Alternatives to Balance o f Power
Schroeder has discussed various strategies followed by states to ensure 
their security in the international system. In his article “Historical Reality vs. Neo­
realist Theory,” the historian opposes Waltz’s assumption that states automatically 
rely on self-help when confronted with a threat and that this strategy 
systematically evolves into a balance of power situation.39 Instead, he examines 
other strategies which were in his view more often adopted by states in European
35Wight, Power Politics, p. 200.
36Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation o f European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 10.
37See chapter five in John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994).
38Wight, Power Politics, p. 200.
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history. These include: “hiding” from threats by for instance declaring neutrality; 
“transcending” which consists of states reaching consensus on norms, values and 
objectives as a means to defend themselves from conflictual threats; and 
“bandwagoning” which involves states joining the strongest nation or group of
i ' 4 0nations to ensure their security.
In addition to these tactics, various conceptual ideas on security have also 
been developed as alternatives to the balance of power and its shortcomings. Let 
us mention four specific perspectives; namely, collective, comprehensive, 
common and cooperative security. The tragedy of World War I led to the 
emergence of the first. Charles and Clifford Kupchan explain that “Under 
collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain 
stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression.”41 As its strongest 
supporter, Wilson was convinced that this approach to security would provide the 
means to prevent future conflicts. Collective security was formally integrated in 
the League of Nations as one of its underlying principles.42 The League resulted 
from the Versailles Peace Conference and was conceived as a collective security 
arrangement to enhance cooperation and maintain peace and security. In the event, 
its operative premises were shown to be flawed, hence the post-World War II 
interest in balance of power.
Many theorists and practitioners have commented on the similarities 
between balance of power and collective security. For instance, Vose Gulick 
explains that collective security, “far from being alien to the ‘age-old tradition of 
the balance of power,’ not only derives from the latter, but also must be regarded 
as the logical end of the balance-of-power system”.43 Differences should be 
indicated though. In the case of balance of power, the balancing policies occur in 
an anarchical system where states are responsible for their own security. The 
balancing under collective security is regulated by moral and legal justifications
39Paul W. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 19, 
No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 116.
40Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” pp. 116-117.
41Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-53.
42For a critical assessment of the concept of collective security and its application to the League of 
Nations, please refer to Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of 
International Organization, Fourth Edition (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 245-265.
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and is “predicated upon the notion of all against one”.44 An institutionalised 
balance of power is still based on anarchy but one in which there is a sense of 
international governance as opposed to world government. Thus, rather than 
dependent on individual political and military considerations, it leads, in principle 
after the violation of international obligations, to an immediate and common 
response by all the participants of a collective security arrangement.45 This 
security perspective offers two main advantages, in principle, vis-a-vis the balance 
of power: “it provides for more effective balancing against aggressors, and it 
promotes trust and cooperation.”46 In practice though, governments have generally 
opposed or abdicated the obligations associated with the principle of collective 
security. In effect, examples of operational collective security are limited and 
require the active role of a hegemon. The experience of the League of Nations and 
the US role during the Gulf War of 1991 should for instance be noted.
The notion of comprehensive security was first formulated in Japan in the 
1970’s. It focuses on political, economic and social problems at different levels of 
analysis and offers therefore an alternative to traditional concepts of security that 
concentrate exclusively on national defence and external military threats. It 
assumes that security can be enhanced by broadening the definition of the term 
itself beyond military issues. Comprehensive security has also been recognised by 
some ASEAN states, primarily Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and included 
in their security doctrines47 In contrast to the Japanese interpretation of the 
concept, the approach taken by the ASEAN states has primarily been inward- 
looking. When discussing ASEAN’s comprehensive approach, Lizee and Peou 
explain that it “is based on the proposition that national security does not only 
reside in the absence of external military hostility but also in the presence of
43Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance o f Power (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1967), p. 307.
44 Kupchan and Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” p. 53.
45Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1955), p. 175.
46Kupchan and Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” p. 54.
47For a discussion on the relevance of the concept of comprehensive security to the security 
doctrines of these three ASEAN states, please refer to Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive 
Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries,” in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf 
Wanandi and Han Sung-joo, eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: Institute 
of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 50-78.
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socio-economic development within national boundaries.”48 The inward-looking 
approach to domestic regime security and regional stability has been illustrated 
through the principles of national and regional resilience. The principles, advanced 
by the New Order in Indonesia, register an ambition to underpin domestic and 
regional stability through the use of economic and social development. At issue is 
domestic regime security and consolidation.
Contrary to collective security, which is based on a collective reaction to 
aggression, common security seeks primarily to offer an alternative to the use of 
force.49 This principle, as defined by the Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues under the leadership of Olof Palme, needs to be 
located in the context of the Cold War. It should primarily be seen as an attempt to 
move beyond the strategy of nuclear deterrence. A key factor in common security 
is the mutual possession of nuclear weapons and expectation of mutually assured 
destruction. Leading to a balance of terror, the Palme Report stressed that the 
nuclear deterrence doctrine could no longer be seen as appropriate to avoid an 
East-West nuclear conflict. Offering common security as an alternative, it argued 
that the two nuclear sides “must achieve security not against the adversary but 
together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint 
survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.”50 The Report proposed 
various criteria’s for security policies including that they “should be in the interest 
of both opponents”; that they “should be pursued by both opponents together”; 
and that they “favour activities where the possibilities for and advantages of 
deception are limited.”51
As the concept of cooperative security was already discussed in chapter 
one, let us now compare and contrast it with two other alternatives to the balance
48Pierre Lizee and Sorpong Peou, Cooperative Security and the Emerging Security Agenda in 
Southeast Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities o f Peace in Cambodia, YCISS Occasional 
Paper No. 21 (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, November 
1993), p. 2.
49Stanley Hoffmann, “Thoughts on the Concept of Common Security,” Policies for Common 
Security (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p.54.
50Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. The Report o f the Independent Commission 
on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship o f Olof Palme (London: Pan Books, 
1982). Quoted in Radmila Nakarada and Jan Oberg, “We can survive- But Only Together,” in R. 
Nakarada and J. Oberg, eds., Surviving Together: The Olof Palme Lectures.on Common Security 
1988 (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1989), p. 12.
5lCommon Security: A Programme for Disarmament, quoted in E. Rothschild, “Common Security 
and Deterrence,” Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 92-93.
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of power. It may be identified with the concept of collective security, as embodied 
in the League of Nations Covenant, because it is intended to be comprehensive in 
membership with security arrangements functioning on an intra-mural basis. The 
fundamental difference, however, is that cooperative security, unlike collective 
security, lacks the vehicle of economic or military sanctions. It operates, at least in 
the Asia-Pacific, through dialogue and seeks to address the climate of 
international relations rather than tackle specific problems. Cooperative security 
relies on the promotion of standard international norms and principles to be 
adhered to by the various participants. Focusing on reassurance, cooperative 
security arrangements aim to develop a “habit of dialogue” amongst the 
participants and to promote confidence-building and possibly preventive 
diplomacy measures. Therefore, it may be argued that while collective security 
primarily takes a reactive approach to rising sources of unrest, cooperative security 
focuses on confidence-building and a preventive dimension, albeit not through 
problem-solving.
Cooperative security is even more similar to the principle of common 
security. Rejecting the perspective of the security dilemma, cooperative security 
supports the notion developed in the Palme Commission Report that security 
should be promoted “with others” as opposed to “against others.” Both concepts 
are inclusive in their understanding of security, implying that they aim to engage 
all regional players without excluding political and economic systems or 
adversaries. Moreover, they seek to offer alternatives to the strategy of deterrence 
and focus on broadening the analysis of security by integrating non-military 
factors. Yet, predicting a more gradual institutionalisation of relations in the Asia- 
Pacific, cooperative security is a more adaptable notion. It acknowledges the 
importance of current “bilateral and balance-of-power arrangements in 
contributing to regional security and retaining them- indeed, for working with and 
through them- allowing multilateralism to develop from more ad hoc, and flexible 
processes until the conditions for institutionalized multilateralism become more 
favourable.”52 Moreover, while common security is a notion that was developed in 
a context of nuclear weapons, this has not been the case with cooperative security.
52David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 
7, No. 1 (1994), p. 7.
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III. The Relevance of the Balance of Power Factor to Regimes for 
Cooperative Security
Bearing in mind its weaknesses and alternatives, this section discusses the 
balance of power as a factor within and beyond cooperative security. The 
conventional logic and objectives of the balance of power; namely, the denial of 
regional and global hegemony through containing any hegemonic disposition, 
were described at the end of the first chapter. The balance of power factor was 
then defined as the disposition to promote countervailing measures to deny 
hegemony within and beyond cooperative security even if devoid of direct military 
content. The term was thus understood as a policy consideration that influences 
the modalities of cooperative security regimes. Some basic assumptions associated 
with the balance of power factor were introduced. It was assumed that this factor 
represents one feature, among others, working upon the functioning of security 
regimes and that it operates within cooperative security through political rather 
than military means.
We shall now discuss two additional issues, which are directly linked to 
the role that the balance of power factor plays in cooperative security 
arrangements and in the calculations of the participants. First, the possible 
relevance of balance of power politics to security regimes, which have been 
conceived as alternatives to that traditional concept, needs to be examined. 
Second, how this relevance may be observed in empirical terms. To address these 
matters, the part played by the balance of power factor during the founding 
moments of ASEAN will be analysed before introducing how this consideration is 
expected to be identified in different case studies.
A. The Relevance of Balance of Power
It is essential to keep in mind the likely divergence of security interests 
among the participants when analysing the possible relevance of balance of power 
politics to regimes for cooperative security. Whereas one expects a shared 
strategic perspective within an alliance or collective defence arrangement, the 
same is not necessarily true in the case of security regimes. Instead, contradictory 
strategic perspectives and competing security interests are likely to obtain among
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the member states. It is in that context that balance of power practice becomes 
particularly relevant.
Having said that, let us focus on two specific aspects. First, the balance of 
power factor within cooperative security involves a denial of intra-mural 
hegemony. This consideration aims to contain a disposition to hegemony on the 
part of a rising power by integrating it within a rule-based regime which includes 
sufficient incentive to constrain any hegemonic ambitions. The premises of 
confidence-building and trust on which a cooperative security regime is based 
could serve as a constraint on larger member states. Through their stake in the 
associative arrangement, these participants can be expected to restrain their 
actions. The modalities of ASEAN and the ARF, that depend on the extent to 
which participants have a stake in these institutions, could serve as a system of 
checks and balances.
Second, the balance of power factor involves the promotion of 
countervailing arrangements beyond the walls of a diplomatic association. For 
example, the participants to a cooperative security regime may join an external 
power through tacit diplomatic alignment to respond to a rising threat. The 
specific role adopted by a regime for cooperative security and its participants 
within a countervailing arrangement would be limited to a diplomatic dimension 
due to the lack of collective military power. However, because of contending 
strategic perspectives, the promotion of countervailing arrangements beyond the 
walls of a regime can be expected to impact adversely on intra-mural cooperation. 
It is in that respect that extra-mural balance of power tactics could play a part 
within regimes for cooperative security and influence intra-mural relations.
The two aspects mentioned, a denial of intra-mural hegemony and the 
promotion of countervailing responses to external threats, are not innovative to the 
study of security regimes. They are part of a realist perspective on cooperation in 
which regimes are discussed as instruments available to states to engage in the 
play of power politics. As such, a security regime should be judged as an attempt 
to restrain a possible hegemon from dominating a region and/or as a reaction to an 
external challenge.53 Thus, realists compare regime dynamics with the formation
53Please refer to Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” 
Review o f International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), pp. 339-344.
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of other security alignments, including alliances. In contrast, this approach will be 
associated in the dissertation with one consideration only, namely the balance of 
power factor, that influences, together with the associative dimension discussed in 
the first two chapters, the operation of a cooperative security regime.
If one assumes that the balance of power factor is relevant to regimes for 
cooperative security, it is important to determine the means by which it may be 
employed in fulfilling its role. As argued in chapter one, one can expect the 
constraining of power within cooperative security to occur through political means 
due to the fact that such security regimes remain by definition diplomatic 
associations lacking any form of military power. These countervailing 
arrangements may therefore involve institutional processes, namely agreements, 
treaties and other forms of institutional checks and balances applied among the 
member states. In particular, the balance of power factor within cooperative 
security should be identified in the context of norms and principles promoted by a 
regime. A collective code of conduct based on standard international norms and 
principles and respected by all the member states could constrain the larger 
participants and ensure that they do not threaten their smaller cooperative partners. 
Any aggressive action or act of hegemony would undermine these norms and 
rebound adversely on the political cohesion of a cooperative security regime as 
well as on the interest of larger participants with a stake in the viability of the 
arrangement. In short, the restraint from political association can be expected to 
have a power balancing relevance.
Serving as a means to constrain hegemonic dispositions, the norms and 
principles promoted by a regime should not be viewed as an attempt to move 
beyond balance of power considerations. They may be seen as a step beyond 
conventional balance of power tactics but not as an effort to move beyond the core 
objective of the balance of power; namely, the denial of hegemony through 
containing hegemonic dispositions. Moreover, one could argue that these norms 
and principles only codify and formalise the kind of bilateral and regional power 
relationships that exist. In short, one may refer to the institutionalisation of a 
power balancing strategy that restrains potential hegemons through their 
participation within a rule-based security arrangement.
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In conclusion, regimes for cooperative security are not expected to 
embrace conventional balance of power politics to contain a regional rising power 
but rather to restrain its potential hegemonic dispositions through diplomatic and 
institutional means. At an intra-mural level, traditional realist motivations could 
thus be fulfilled through the use of non-military restraints on hegemony. That said, 
the constraining of power within cooperative security may still have a military 
dimension. The denial of hegemony need not be limited to intra-mural restraints as 
it could also depend on security links with outside actors. In that sense, externally 
supported distributions of power should be expected to influence intra-mural 
relations. Furthermore, the containing of power beyond cooperative security 
should be expected to be reliant on a conventional practice of countervailing 
power; namely, the formation of a tacit alliance with external states, rather than on 
a denial of hegemony through political means. Outside of cooperative security, the 
restraining of power through political and institutional channels seems to have no 
relevance because external players have only a limited stake in the norms 
promoted by a cooperative security regime.
B. Balance of Power and the Founding Moments of ASEAN
The objective of this part is to illustrate one specific aspect of the founding 
moments of ASEAN; namely, the possible influence of the balance of power 
factor on the calculations of the member states. As explained in chapter two, the 
Association was established to locate regional reconciliation within an 
institutionalised structure of dialogue. It is in that respect that ASEAN was 
defined as a regime for cooperative security. The object now is not to question 
how these founding moments were described previously but rather to complement 
this analysis by examining a consideration not mentioned so far. It is suspected 
that these events may best be understood by acknowledging the influence of 
different, and possibly contradictory, factors. In addition to the associative 
principles included in the creation of the Association, let us emphasise how 
balance of power practice was relevant to its founding moments by involving an 
intra-mural denial of hegemony.
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Though the establishment of the Association symbolised the end of the 
period of Confrontation between some of its participants, intra-mural relations 
were characterised by mistrust and sources of tension. Despite the political 
reconciliation between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, Malaysia remained fearful of 
Indonesia. In addition to these apprehensions, which were a direct result of the 
policy of Confrontation, the intra-mural security environment was distinguished 
by a multitude of bilateral issues. The latter included the Philippine claim to 
Sabah, Thai-Malaysian tensions over the Muslim-Malay community within 
Thailand and Singapore’s mistrust of Malaysia and Indonesia, which arose from 
the sense of vulnerability of a newly created ethnic-Chinese state surrounded by 
Malay neighbours. Singapore’s traumatic separation from the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1965 would also continue to affect its bilateral relations with Kuala 
Lumpur. In short, regardless of the shared cooperative efforts, persistent inter-state 
distrust led to the maintenance of contradictory strategic perspectives and security 
interests.
The primary relevance of balance of power politics within cooperative 
security resulted from Malaysia and Singapore needing to address a concern 
essential to their individual security; namely, Indonesian power and influence. It 
can be argued that ASEAN was partly and implicitly about coping with Indonesia 
just as the original European Economic Community (EEC) had been about 
managing German power. Hurrell has pointed out that “Many would see the 
position of Germany within the European Community as the classic illustration of 
this ‘regionalist entrapment’, designed to mitigate and manage the unavoidable 
impact of German preponderance.”54 A corresponding analogy can be made with 
Indonesia and its position within ASEAN when it was first established. As in the 
European example, how to deal with the largest regional actor was a core question 
to be addressed in maritime Southeast Asia. Various members of the Association 
were anxious in 1967 to constrain any disposition towards hegemony by Indonesia 
but were in no position to contain their neighbouring state through conventional 
methods.55 Instead, they were forced to rely on institutional and political channels.
54Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” p. 342.
55This point was made by Dr. Narayanan Ganesan, Department of Political Science at the National 
University of Singapore (NUS). The interview was held at NUS on 18 February 2000.
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Hence, it can be claimed that ASEAN was perceived by most participants as a 
form of political defence for constraining a potential menacing neighbour.
Indonesia should be seen as a natural hegemon in Southeast Asia because 
of its scale and population. Indonesia’s foreign policy has been defined by both a 
feeling of vulnerability, due to domestic weaknesses and fragmentation, and also 
one of regional entitlement that has emanated from its military struggle for 
independence, geographical dimensions, large population, strategic position and 
natural resources.56 Indonesia in 1967 had not yet shaken off a reputation for being 
volatile and unpredictable, previously demonstrated through Confrontation over 
West Irian and Malaysia. Regional leaders remembered the Sukarno period, with 
its flamboyant, expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. Moreover, Suharto was 
only acting-president in 1967 and Sukarno was not yet completely toppled. Mainly 
due to domestic politics, Sukarno had opposed the formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia through the threat of force.57 Having experienced Confrontation, 
Malaysia and Singapore were conscious of a potential Indonesian threat. Most 
participants perceived ASEAN as an instrument through which to “domesticate” 
Indonesia, so ensuring that it would adopt a responsible and peaceful foreign 
policy.58
The new leaders in Jakarta were aware of the mistrust that persisted in 
other ASEAN capitals in respect of Indonesia’s position in Southeast Asia. 
Though actively involved in the creation of the Association, Suharto’s approach to 
ASEAN during its formative period was characterised by self-restraint, thus 
distinguishing his policies from those of the Sukarno regime.59 Indonesia did 
refuse to join ASA, which was Malaysia’s initial preference, and insisted on a new 
start in regional cooperation to avoid domestic political embarrassment. Suharto 
was willing to follow a policy of self-constraint in order to promote domestic 
economic development within a framework of regional stability. By eschewing
56Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 173.
57This point was made by Dr. Leonard Sebastian, Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS). The interview was held at ISEAS on 25 February 2000.
58This point was made by Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono, former member of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and frequent columnist for the Jakarta Post. The interview was held 
in Jakarta on 17 March 2000.
59Amfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p. 228.
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any position of assertive leadership, the new Indonesian president sought to 
reassure his partners and build trust. His policy decisively influenced the 
formation and later success of the Association. Indonesia’s change in approach 
was a self-conscious choice required because of urgent domestic needs.60 For 
instance, Luhulima refers to “the domestication of Indonesia” as arising from 
internal transformations and problems and the coming to power of General 
Suharto.61
There was an awareness in Jakarta that ASEAN would operate as a 
constraining factor on Indonesia’s foreign policy. The willingness to follow a 
policy of self-restraint may be contrasted to the Sukarno period that had led to the 
failure of Maphilindo, and also to the position adopted by India within the South
Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) which has been
• • • (\) distinguished by some form of regional dominance. In short, it can be asserted
that while the different ASEAN leaders acknowledged Indonesia’s natural
primacy in the region, Jakarta embraced a policy of political self-abnegation and
up to a point self-imposed containment. Leifer claims that “regional cooperation
with Indonesia’s enthusiastic participation.... was envisaged both as a means to
satisfy its natural ambition and also to contain its more objectionable hegemonic
disposition.” This aspect suggests that ASEAN was informed with some
reference to balance of power practice. A potential disposition towards hegemony
by Indonesia was constrained politically through its integration within an
embryonic regime for cooperative security.
Nonetheless, Indonesia felt that it was entitled to a position of natural
leadership within the Association. It was commonly accepted that the ASEAN
states would have to respect Indonesia’s interests and natural regional ambitions.
Djiwandono explains that Indonesia’s “membership in ASEAN may accord it,
implicitly, the status of first among equals without resort to an aggressive
60This point was made by Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor at the Habibie Centre and 
former spokesperson of President B.J. Habibie. The interview was held at the Habibie Centre, 
Jakarta, on 24 March 2000.
61Professor Cornelius Luhulima, Research Associate at the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) and former ASEAN Secretariat Official. The interview was held at CSIS on 21 
March 2000.
62See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (Singapore: 
Times Editions, 2000), pp. 369-370.
63Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, pp. 120-121.
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confrontation policy. This may be regarded as something in return for its 
‘domestication’ within ASEAN...”64 Indonesia’s regional vision had not changed, 
in principle. The traditional ambitions central to Sukarno’s regional policies 
influenced the Suharto regime when it, for instance, requested that specific 
security matters and interests, as expressed in the Manila Agreements of 1963 and 
formally integrated in Maphilindo, be included in the ASEAN Declaration.65 
These demands, that questioned the future of foreign military bases in Southeast 
Asia, had been called for by Sukarno himself. After long and tedious negotiations, 
a paragraph was added in the Declaration that read:
Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the 
expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be 
used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of 
States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national 
development;66
Hoping for an autonomous regional order unaffected by external 
intervention, Indonesia emphasised in Bangkok that regional security could only 
be obtained through full independence and the avoidance of external domination. 
Jakarta’s preference for a regional order based on the exclusive managerial role of 
Southeast Asian states was therefore registered in the ASEAN Declaration. Jakarta 
hoped that the Association could operate as an autonomous security foundation 
free from external intervention. Central to that vision was Indonesia’s ambition to 
play a managerial role in regional relations.67 In addition, its expectations were 
later further incorporated in the associative framework through ZOPFAN and the 
principles of national and regional resilience. Yet, this does not imply that Jakarta 
ignored the associative principles contained in the cooperative process. On the 
contrary, rather than revert to former military tactics, Suharto’s New Order 
expected to attain its natural regional position through membership of the 
Association. Indonesia hoped to demonstrate its significance and influence as a
^Soedjati J. Dijwandono, “South-East Asia and the South Pacific: The Role of ASEAN,” Security 
in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific: Challenges o f the 1990’s (New York: International 
Peace Academy, 1989), p. 160.
65Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, p. 175.
66The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 8 August 1967.
67Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-east Asia, p. 40.
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regional actor. Jakarta’s claim to a natural position of regional leadership, 
despite its policy of self-containment, was perceived by some participants as a 
persistent threat. This was for example the case of Singapore.
In 1971, the city-state was disturbed by the common Indonesian and 
Malaysian policy over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Singapore had issued a statement in November 1971 on their exclusive 
responsibility over the safety of navigation in the straits. However, the city-state 
did not agree with a section of the declaration introduced by the two other 
governments that asserted that “the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not 
international straits, while fully recognising their use for international shipping in 
accordance with the principle of innocent passage”.69 Indonesia and Malaysia 
therefore challenged the right of free passage through the straits. Yet, the collusion 
disappeared with differences over Malaysia’s proposal to neutralise Southeast 
Asia and Indonesia’s archipelago policy, from which Singapore benefited. It was 
only in 1973 after a private meeting with President Suharto that Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew saw security in ASEAN. Anxious to preserve the newly- 
obtained sovereignty and independence of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew became 
aware that the Association could function as an effective instrument for 
constraining its threatening neighbours. In addition to the obvious advantages 
linked to regional consultation and cooperation, the city-state came to appreciate 
ASEAN’s potential in unconventional power balancing terms. The fear of the 
effect of acting in a hegemonic fashion may have partly persuaded Malaysia and 
Indonesia to constrain their conduct in their dealings with the ethnic-Chinese state. 
The formation of a diplomatic association could be expected to encourage its 
members to contain contentious ambitions or claims. It is in that context of 
suspicion that the constraining of power by political means would continue to be 
relevant.
It has been asserted so far that ASEAN was constructed partly with the 
constraint of Indonesia’s power and influence in mind. It is also interesting to
68This point was made by Dr. Bantarto Bandoro, Head of the Department o f International Relations 
at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The interview was held at CSIS on 22 
March 2000.
69Quoted in Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, p. 144.
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question if extra-mural power balancing calculations, primarily vis-a-vis China 
and Vietnam, were taken into consideration by the participants. Communist 
ideology was feared at domestic and international levels. The advancing 
communist threat in Indochina, the problem of internal insurgencies but also the 
potential consequences of the Chinese Cultural Revolution were matters that 
influenced the security and defence agendas of most ASEAN states. To claim that 
the Association was established to contain China and Vietnam would be in accord 
with a realist interpretation of security cooperation. Yet, the balance of power 
factor had no extra-mural dimension. The Association was not formed as a direct 
response to an external adversary and has never evolved into a formal or a tacit 
alliance. In the absence of joint military capabilities and a common threat 
perception, ASEAN could not act as a source of countervailing power to contain 
extra-mural threats. In short, the cooperative security regime precluded the 
conventional practice of the balance of power. Not a collective security 
arrangement and lacking the same kind of ideological underpinnings, ASEAN was 
thus no substitute for the South-East Collective Defence Treaty, or Manila Pact, of 
September 1954 which was a classical example of a Cold War alliance. Ironically, 
Beijing still viewed the Association as part of a US policy of containment against 
the PRC.
Most ASEAN members relied on external guarantees to ensure their 
individual security. In 1967, Thailand and the Philippines were signatories to the 
Manila Treaty and members of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 
and the US had military bases in both states. Malaysia and Singapore were part of 
the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement that included also Australia and New 
Zealand, which was replaced in 1971 by consultative Five Power Defence 
Arrangements. With the exception of Indonesia, that proclaimed a non-aligned 
policy, member governments rejected the notion of a regional order based 
exclusively on the managerial role of regional states and perceived the US as the 
primary source of countervailing power to contain external aggression. Smith and 
Jones write that “The US role as an external guarantor was considered vital to the 
security of a part of the world where the non-communist countries alone did not 
possess the resources or collective will to ensure the defence of either themselves
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or the region.”70 In addition, the majority of the ASEAN states supported the US 
commitment in Indochina, with Thailand and the Philippines directly involved in 
the conflict. Only Indonesia maintained diplomatic relations with the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV).
Even so, the establishment of the Association was influenced by a 
combination of intra- and extra-mural considerations that varied from one member 
state to another.71 The need to constrain intra-mural hegemonic dispositions 
strongly influenced the calculations of Malaysia, Singapore and later Brunei. 
Indonesia wished to promote a stable regional environment that would benefit its 
own domestic regime consolidation and socio-economic development. ASEAN 
had for these members primarily an intra-mural significance. Due to their 
geographic location, Thailand and the Philippines had less to fear from Indonesia. 
Thailand was concerned about the communist threat in continental Southeast Asia. 
The conventional practice of countervailing power had always been a core 
ingredient in its foreign policy and it only viewed ASEAN as supplementary to its 
alliance with the United States. Bangkok wanted to organise a regional 
arrangement with an anti-communist threat in mind. Hence, Thailand, but also 
Indonesia, perceived the Association as a collective political defence against 
Chinese infiltration and influence. That said, ASEAN only obtained an extra­
mural dimension after the communist victories in Indochina. This was indicated 
by ASEAN’s attempt, which was thwarted by Vietnam, to promote a new regional 
order in Southeast Asia through the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation.72 Even 
then, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord explicitly excluded military cooperation 
on a formal intra-ASEAN basis.
The founding moments of ASEAN have until now been examined through 
an associative and balance of power perspective. In the previous chapter, it was 
argued that the associative dimension was symbolised by the institutionalisation of 
a process of reconciliation within a structure of dialogue. In this section, it has
70M.L. Smith and D.M. Jones, “ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New 
World Order,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3 (December 1997), p. 131.
71This point was made by Dr. John Funston, Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS). The interview was held at ISEAS on 2 March 2000.
72This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes at the Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and former member o f the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs of Singapore. The interview was held at IDSS on 3 March 2000.
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been claimed that ASEAN was partly about coping with Indonesia’s power and 
influence in Southeast Asia. Rather than entering an associative arrangement with 
Indonesia based on a strategy of bandwagoning, some members viewed ASEAN 
as a form of political defence for constraining hegemonic dispositions. The 
participants thus agreed to cooperate because of narrowly-defined interests and the 
convergence of shared benefits but some also to restrain a potential menacing 
neighbour. In short, the co-existence of associative and balance of power 
dimensions has been noted.
Yet, this thesis aims also to analyse how each perspective may have 
interacted with the other. The cooperative principles and the constraining of power 
were closely intermingled in the formation of ASEAN. The cooperative security 
regime was partly constructed with the denial of hegemony in mind but not in a 
conventional sense. Hence, the membership in cooperative security was not an 
attempt to move beyond balance of power considerations as such calculations 
were part of the initial framework. The constraining of power should also be seen 
in the context of the associative dimension. The political constraint imposed on 
the larger members was dependent importantly on their stake in the new 
diplomatic association. Any act of hegemony would have undermined ASEAN’s 
emerging norms; primarily the respect for national sovereignty, and the premises 
of confidence-building and trust on which ASEAN was based. This consideration 
served as a source of constraint on Indonesian power. It may be too soon to 
discuss further the connection that links the associative and balance of power 
perspectives. Moreover, the objective is not to determine which aspect was more 
influential in the founding moments as it impossible to quantify the importance of 
these dimensions. On the contrary, the focus has been to demonstrate the presence 
of co-existing factors influencing the calculations of member states. At this point, 
it can be asserted that the constraining of Indonesian power was a primary and 
implicit aspect of the creation of ASEAN and that this consideration was 
intermingled with the associative principles.
C. The Observation of the Balance of Power Factor: Four Case Studies
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The possible relevance of the balance of power on regimes for cooperative 
security has been examined by analysing the founding moments of ASEAN. Neo­
liberal institutionalists may agree that realist persuasions can dominate the early 
years of a security regime but they would expect these considerations to diminish 
or even disappear once the institution reaches a level of maturity. For example, 
Hurrell proposes a “stage-theory” course for the study of regionalism whereby the 
use of realism would be limited to its initial phase, while other approaches, 
including the institutionalist one, would be seen as more appropriate to the 
analysis of its later developments.73 The aim of this dissertation, however, is to 
investigate the balance of power as a factor within and beyond cooperative 
security that outlasts the actual creation of a security regime. Hence, the case 
studies will also deal with events that took place after the formation of ASEAN 
and the ARF, including the South China Sea issue that has become, in the post- 
Cold War, central to the security interests of some members of the Association.
The first case study will deal with ASEAN’s early years from 1967 until 
1975 and with its enlargement to include Brunei in 1984. The motivations that led 
the Sultanate to enter a regime for cooperative security will be analysed. In 
particular, it will be interesting to determine why Brunei expected to increase its 
security by joining the Association. In addition to the security advantages 
associated with the cooperative process, Brunei’s decision may have resulted from 
the benefits linked to an intra-mural balance of power factor, which denies 
hegemonic actions. ASEAN may have been perceived as a form of political 
defence for constraining threatening neighbours. At issue was a common 
understanding of the benefit of Brunei’s membership by Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister Hussein Onn and Suharto neither of whom saw profit in threatening the 
Sultanate. It will also be important to focus on the role of Singapore in convincing 
Brunei to take part in the Association. Lee Kuan Yew may have persuaded the 
Sultan that membership would enhance Brunei’s security because any threat to a 
member would rebound adversely on the cohesion of the Association. This case 
study may thus offer an illustration of the balance of power factor within
73Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” p. 358.
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cooperative security and its interaction with the more well-known associative 
aspect of ASEAN.
The balance of power factor beyond cooperative security will be examined 
in the second case study by focusing on ASEAN’s response to the Third Indochina 
Conflict (1978-1991). We shall begin with ASEAN’s corporate stand and analyse 
what was at issue. The member states cooperated closely to isolate Vietnam 
effectively on the international scene and deny legitimacy to its puppet 
government in Phnom Penh. Yet, the associative principles may have been by­
passed by the source of threat, which was extra- rather than intra-mural. The study 
of the balance of power factor will consist of a conventional analysis of the term 
as the constraining of power occurred through military rather than political means. 
Hence, the concept will be interpreted differently than in the former case study. 
Thailand, as a front line state to the conflict, required external geopolitical 
partners to oppose a Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. Endorsing a strategy of 
attrition, the ASEAN states may have played a diplomatic role in a countervailing 
arrangement against Vietnam. Yet, the security interests of the member states were 
influenced differently by the Vietnamese invasion leading to divergent strategic 
perspectives on how to tackle the Cambodian issue. The practice of traditional 
balance of power tactics may therefore have affected intra-mural cooperation.
The third case study will analyse the role of the balance of power factor in 
the formation of the ARF. While the Forum can be seen as an ASEAN attempt to 
expand to the wider region its approach to cooperative security, it will be argued 
that its establishment also involved power balancing considerations. ASEAN’s 
changing security environment at the end of the Cold War will first be discussed. 
It will then be asserted that the Association took into account the distribution of 
power when creating the ARF. Indeed, the latter may have been conceived as an 
instrument for ensuring a continued American involvement in the region and for 
including China in a rule-based arrangement. Beyond the founding moments of 
the Forum, the relevance of the balance of power factor will also be examined 
through the workings of the ARF and the existence among some participants of 
alternative views on the role of the institution.
The final case study will evaluate ASEAN’s involvement in the South 
China Sea dispute. The nature of the conflict will first be reviewed by discussing
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the relevance of International Law, the conflicting territorial claims and the 
economic and geo-strategic interests involved. ASEAN’s part will then be 
analysed through an associative and balance of power dimension. It will be 
indicated that ASEAN’s involvement may be characterised by the absence of 
associative principles and an inability to promote countervailing arrangements. It 
will be argued that the member states have failed in an attempt to establish a code 
of conduct for the South China Sea and have adopted contrasting positions vis-a- 
vis the PRC. The study of the balance of power will concentrate on ASEAN’s 
incapacity to practice conventional balance of power politics due to the limitations 
associated with cooperative security and the lack of access to an external source of 
countervailing power. It will also be pointed out that China’s participation in the 
ARF may not contain sufficient incentive to constrain its hegemonic dispositions 
in the South China Sea.
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Chapter Four
The Balance of Power Factor and the Denial of Intra-Mural 
Hegemony: ASEAN’s Early Years 
and its Enlargement to Include Brunei in 1984
Introduction
The balance of power factor within cooperative security regimes will be 
analysed in this first case study by examining ASEAN’s early years from 1967 
until 1975 and its expansion of membership in the case of Brunei. It was 
previously argued that the concept of the balance of power may be relevant in two 
respects in explaining the modalities of a regime for cooperative security. It could 
contribute to a denial of intra-mural hegemony. It may also include the promotion 
of countervailing arrangements beyond the walls of the diplomatic association in 
response to a rising threat. It is the first potential relevance of the balance of power 
factor which will mainly be addressed in this chapter. Beyond the associative 
benefits associated with cooperative security, an enlargement process may also 
have had a geo-strategic significance. It will be asserted that Brunei’s decision to 
join ASEAN was influenced by calculations about the balance of power factor. At 
issue was the constraint imposed on larger member states through their stake in 
the Association from which Brunei could benefit to promote its own security. To 
that extent, the intra-mural distribution of power may have been held in check by 
the regime for cooperative security.
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first will examine the 
influence of the balance of power factor and of a conventional understanding of 
the concept on the early years of the Association. The second will focus on 
ASEAN’s initial enlargement process by first emphasising Brunei’s strained 
relations with Malaysia and Indonesia during the 1960’s and 70’s. The expansion 
of membership will then be discussed by noting the co-existence of associative 
and balance of power perspectives. The final section will analyse how the balance 
of power factor may have complemented the associative dimension involved in 
ASEAN’s early years and its enlargement to include Brunei.
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I. The Influence of Balance of Power on ASEAN’s Early Years, 1967-1975
This first section follows on the hypothesis that ASEAN was established 
with some reference to balance of power practice. It suggests that the balance of 
power factor played a part in the initial period of the Association. The influence of 
power balancing considerations is discussed through the examination of 
illustrations. These include the study of two events in Singapore-Indonesian 
relations; namely, the 1968 crisis over the hanging of two Indonesian marines and 
Singapore’s response to Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975, and the 
diplomacy that led to the formulation of the ZOPFAN principle. The 1968 crisis is 
interpreted as an example of the constraining of power through political means. In 
contrast, the rejection of a proposal for regional neutralisation is said to have been 
influenced by contending views on regional order and conventional balance of 
power practices; namely, the preservation of defence ties with external powers 
outside of an ASEAN framework. The interpretation of the balance of power 
factor within cooperative security as well as a conventional understanding of the 
concept are thus applied in this first section.
The constraining of a disposition to hegemony by Indonesia, as displayed 
by its former policy of Confrontation, played a critical role in the formation of 
ASEAN. It was previously argued that the primary relevance of the balance of 
power factor resulted from the fact that some participants needed to deal with one 
issue essential to their individual security; namely, how to handle Indonesian 
power and influence in Southeast Asia. It was claimed that ASEAN was partly 
about coping with Indonesia just as the original European Economic Community 
(EEC) had been about managing German power. Hence, the Association was 
perceived by some participants as a form of political defence for constraining a 
menacing neighbour. It is important to note that Indonesia was a willing party to 
such constraint through its active integration in the cooperative security 
arrangement. There was a conscious restraint in its actions and behaviour within 
ASEAN that could be noticed even at the lowest level of diplomatic interaction.1 
Jakarta eschewed any position of assertive leadership and followed a policy of
lThis point was made by Mr. Sabam Siagian, former Chief Editor of the Jakarta Post and former 
Ambassador of Indonesia to Australia (1991-1995). The interview was held in Jakarta on 20 March 
2000.
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political self-abnegation and at least to a point self-imposed containment. 
Suharto’s policy towards the Association was influenced by a desire to reassure 
his partners and diminish their fears of a potential hegemony in the wider interest 
of Indonesia’s international rehabilitation.
Nevertheless, the New Order did not assign itself an insignificant role in 
the political evolution of the Association. The initial cooperative process was 
influenced by Indonesia’s expectation of a regional order based on the exclusive 
managerial role of Southeast Asian states. This was indicated in 1967 in the 
Bangkok Declaration. In addition, Indonesia’s preference for a regional security 
zone free from outside intervention was later put forward through the principles of 
national and regional resilience. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Adam Malik 
declared at a seminar organised in Jakarta in October 1974:
...we believe that the way most effective and satisfactory in the long run would 
be if the nations of Southeast Asia, jointly and separately, are able to build up 
their own, indigenous ideological, political, economic and socio-cultural 
strength, which, together, constitute a nation’s real capacity to endure, to develop 
and to defend itself against any negative influences, from within or from 
without.2
The ambition to organise Southeast Asian relations independently from external 
interference was central to Indonesia’s nationalism and foreign policy. Its 
introduction within the ASEAN framework symbolised a continuing sense of 
regional entitlement. In that respect, a structural tension existed within the 
cooperative security regime between the notions of Indonesian self-denial and its 
managerial disposition. The other members were aware of the risk of an 
Indonesian dominance. This suspicion can partly explain the lack of institutional 
progress during ASEAN’s early years. For instance, the common preference for 
National Secretariats over a centralised body may be interpreted as a way of 
ignoring the issue of leadership so ensuring the equal status of the participants.
To examine the relevance of the balance of power factor, attention needs to 
be given to the smaller members and their concern to counteract any hegemonic 
disposition within the Association. Such states may be expected to be most
2Adam Malik, “Regional Cooperation in International Politics,” Regionalism in Southeast Asia 
(Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 162.
Narayanan Ganesan, Singapore’s Foreign Policy in ASEAN: Major Domestic and Bilateral 
Political Constraints (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1989), p. 55.
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inclined to take account of power balancing considerations when cooperating with 
their partners. For example, Singapore suffered from an acute sense of 
vulnerability, which resulted from its road to independence, limited size, ethnic- 
Chinese identity and confined geographic location. Despite its participation in the 
Association from the outset, it was particularly suspicious of Indonesia’s and 
Malaysia’s intentions. As a result, it can be argued that “Singapore’s position in 
ASEAN cooperation has to be viewed not just as an aspect of its foreign policy 
but also against a wider background of its approach to the crucial or fundamental 
issue of viability.”4 Let us now illustrate the influence of the balance of power on 
the early years of the Association by first examining two incidents in Singapore- 
Indonesian relations.
On 17 October 1968, Singapore’s government hanged two Indonesian 
marines found guilty of having bombed a bank on the island during the period of 
Confrontation. Suharto had pleaded personally for clemency, but the city-state 
decided to carry out the sentence to register its sovereignty and newly-obtained 
independence. The president felt insulted by Singapore’s unwillingness to 
accommodate his request. Lee Kuan Yew’s intransigence was not understood in 
Jakarta because Suharto had previously terminated the policy of Confrontation and 
sought regional reconciliation.5 Indonesia’s political elite was also less familiar 
with judicial procedures in Commonwealth countries, which are traditionally 
separated from the executive and legislative powers. Public opinion called for a 
fierce governmental response and demonstrations in Jakarta led to the sacking of 
Singapore’s embassy. Under the New Order, Indonesia’s leadership was 
dominated by the military, which regarded Singapore with suspicion due to its 
ethnic-Chinese identity. Some generals were keen to punish the city-state for its 
action. Yet, Suharto’s reaction was constrained. The role of the Foreign Minister 
Adam Malik should be noted here. He wished to play down the issue and maintain 
relations with Singapore. Though the political influence of the foreign ministry 
was limited, Malik succeeded in convincing Suharto of the advantages of self- 
restraint. Hence, the president and his foreign minister avoided a new period of
4Seah Chee Meow, Singapore’s Position in ASEAN Co-operation, Occasional Paper No. 38 
(Singapore: Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1989), p. 5.
5This point was made by Hasnan Habib, former Ambassador of Indonesia to Thailand (1978-1982) 
and the United States (1982-1986). The interview was held in Jakarta on 23 March 2000.
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bilateral tensions and demonstrated their belief in regional cooperation. In 
contrast, Leifer explains when discussing Singapore’s conduct that “the whole 
episode indicated the absence of any serious recognition that the Association 
might serve the security interests of Singapore through providing a regional 
structure of consultation and co-operation.”6 Relations between Singapore and 
Indonesia cooled but were not disrupted.
The 1968 crisis was not addressed by the Association and its management 
remained limited to a bilateral context. Still, it represented a first critical test for 
the new military administration in Indonesia and for ASEAN itself. Indeed, a 
military reaction would have destroyed the viability of the Association. 
Indonesia’s policy of self-restraint towards Singapore may be examined in the 
context of its economic priorities and bilateral relations with the city-state but also 
of its participation in a political association. Suharto was influenced by domestic 
priorities, especially the need to promote economic development.7 He had to 
further legitimise his domestic position of leadership through socio-economic 
progress and consolidate ties with regional and Western states. The relevance of 
the balance of power factor is also central to an analysis of the events. In addition 
to manifesting its strong commitment to regional cooperation, Jakarta may have 
been constrained by the potential consequences of responding in an hegemonic 
fashion. An aggressive reaction towards Singapore would have undermined the 
premises of confidence-building and trust on which ASEAN was based and which 
served as a constraint on Indonesian power. Suharto and Malik showed their 
acceptance of the notion of self-imposed containment within the framework of the 
cooperative security arrangement. In short, the policy of self-constraint adopted by 
Jakarta in 1968 benefited Indonesia’s interests and ensured the survival of the 
embryonic security regime. Singapore had not yet come to appreciate ASEAN’s 
potential in power balancing terms; namely, as a political means for constraining 
its menacing neighbours. Instead, it relied on a self-help policy that rejected any 
kind of accommodation.
6Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 39.
?For a discussion on some of Indonesia’s domestic constraints please refer to Michael Antolik, 
ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f Accommodation (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1990), pp. 
24-28.
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Singapore-Indonesian relations remained strained until May 1973 when 
Lee Kuan Yew paid an official visit to Jakarta and honoured the two marines’ 
graves in the Kalibata Heroes’ cemetery. Suggested by Singapore’s ambassador to 
Indonesia, Lee Khoon Choy, this gesture was perceived in Jakarta as a sign of
o (
conciliation and led to a new beginning in bilateral relations. The official visit 
reduced feelings of suspicion. Lee Kuan Yew’s perception of the role of ASEAN 
also changed after his private meeting with the Indonesian leader. The prime 
minister was convinced by Suharto’s commitment to regional cooperation and 
became aware that the Association could function as a political instrument for 
constraining regional partners. Furthermore, both leaders agreed that ASEAN 
would operate as a form of collective political defence with a political rather than 
a military role against Chinese influence. Bilateral relations were further enhanced 
when Indonesia’s president visited Singapore in August 1974. The personal links 
that were gradually developed between Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto helped 
strengthen bilateral ties but also the cohesion of the Association itself.9
Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in December 1975 was another issue 
that complicated Singapore-Indonesian relations during the early years of the 
Association. While the example of East Timor will be compared to the case of 
Brunei in the next section, let us now focus briefly on the relevance of power 
balancing considerations in an illustration of a lack of ASEAN solidarity. At issue 
was Singapore’s decision to abstain on a resolution in the General Assembly of 
the United Nations that condemned Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. The city- 
state was most vocal in its opposition to the annexation and the only ASEAN 
member that failed to support Indonesia in the UN vote in December 1975. This 
decision angered Suharto and temporarily cooled bilateral relations. Eager to 
oppose any kind of violation of the principle of national sovereignty and the non­
use of force, it is interesting to note that Singapore took corresponding positions
8For an account of Lee Kuan Yew’s official visit to Indonesia in May 1973, please refer to Lee 
Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (Singapore: Times 
Editions, 2000), pp. 300-302 and Lee Khoon Choy, An Ambassador’s Journey (Singapore: Times 
Book International, 1983), pp. 213-230.
9See Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 301-306.
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on the annexation of Western Sahara and on Grenada and subsequently on 
Kuwait.10
While Singapore could not accept a blatant violation of national 
sovereignty, it was primarily concerned about Indonesia’s potential expansionist 
policies. The city-state was in 1975 still fearful of Jakarta’s regional intentions and 
potential hegemonic ambitions. Singapore’s diplomatic stance in the UN should 
therefore be examined as a refusal to endorse an Indonesian act of hegemony. Its 
initial reaction in the General Assembly resulted from a perception of threat that 
took precedence over the obligation of ASEAN solidarity. Due to its geostrategic 
situation, the city-state needed to demonstrate its opposition to the annexation as it 
was itself “afraid of being ‘Timorized’ by Indonesia or Malaysia.”11 Thus, it can 
be argued that its response was influenced by power balancing considerations. 
Singapore eventually closed ranks with all other ASEAN members by voting 
against the resolution during the second vote in the General Assembly held in 
1976. Having sent a diplomatic signal to Jakarta, the city-state was keen 
afterwards to show its continuing commitment to ASEAN and to preserve its 
relationship with Indonesia. It should be noted that the TAC had been signed in 
the meantime during the Bali Summit of February 1976. The TAC had established 
a norm-based code of conduct for regional inter-state relations and introduced the 
respect for national sovereignty as ASEAN’s central principle. The city-state may 
have felt partly reassured by Indonesia’s adherence to a code of conduct that 
offered a system of checks and balances within the regime for cooperative 
security.
The relevance of the balance of power has so far been illustrated by 
focusing on two events that affected a specific bilateral relationship. The 1968 
crisis was viewed as an example of the intra-mural constraining of power through 
political and institutional means. In contrast, Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor 
was an hegemonic action towards an extra-mural territory that provoked a 
diplomatic response from Singapore. Attention will now be given to the ZOPFAN 
principle which was described in chapter two as an associative attempt to register
l0See for example Tommy Koh, The Quest For World Order: Perspectives o f A Pragmatic 
Idealist, Edited with Introduction by Amitav Acharya (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998). 
nShee Poon-Kim, “A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 8 (August
1977), p. 757.
125
a call for regional autonomy. The diplomacy that led to the formulation of the 
declaratory principle was influenced by conflicting strategic perspectives. At stake 
was the existence of contending approaches within the Association regarding how 
to manage regional order and preserve a satisfactory distribution of power. The 
negotiations over the merits of neutralisation also indicated the importance of 
conventional balance of power practices in the foreign-policy calculations of 
Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines.
ZOPFAN originated from the need to react to two interrelated and extra­
mural strategic modifications that occurred in 1971. A rapprochement had begun 
in Sino-US relations and was kept secret until after Dr. Henry Kissinger’s visit to 
Beijing in July 1971. The US national security adviser made a second journey in 
October during which a formal visit by US President Richard Nixon to China was 
discussed. It was feared in Southeast Asia that Washington had granted the PRC a 
regional sphere of influence in return for its support for “Peace with Honor” in 
Vietnam. During that month, the vote on the representation of China in the United 
Nations also took place. On 25 October 1971, Beijing replaced Taipei as the 
representative of China in the organisation and hence joined the United Nations 
Security Council. These surprising developments upset America’s allies and 
friends in Southeast Asia. The need to react to these external changes was felt in 
most ASEAN capitals. Yet, the persistence of contradictory security perspectives 
complicated any attempt at a common response.
Malaysia had already put forward without prior consultation with its 
ASEAN partners a plan for neutralising Southeast Asia at the Lusaka Non- 
Alignment Conference of September 1970. It proposed neutralising the region by 
using external powers as a guarantee to a regional application of this legal 
condition. Koh explains that “Neutralization is a process of international law 
whereby a state assumes the status of permanent or perpetual neutrality, both in 
times of peace and of war; a status which is recognized as such and guaranteed by 
certain other states.” The Malaysian initiative, which emanated from the new 
prime ministership of Tun Abdul Razak, was partly an attempt to accommodate 
the United States, China and the Soviet Union by recognising their regional
12Koh, The Quest for World Order: Perspectives o f a Pragmatic Idealist, p. 240.
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1 1influence. The proposal had resulted from regional changes in the political 
environment and domestic considerations. The former included the onset of the 
gradual American withdrawal from South Vietnam following the election of 
President Nixon and the implementation of the so-called Nixon Doctrine. 
Introduced at a press conference in Guam in July 1969, the Nixon Doctrine called 
for Asian nations to play a more active part in their defence against communism. 
Implying a partial US disengagement from Asia, the Doctrine led to a US policy 
of Vietnamisation in Indochina.14 The Malaysian initiative also reflected concern 
about growing Soviet influence in Vietnam, as Moscow had become Hanoi’s 
principal ally, and about the implications of a British decision to accelerate its 
policy of military withdrawal East of Suez first announced in 1967. Originally 
expected for the mid-1970’s, the military disengagement was moved to the end of 
1971.15 This decision surprised Singapore and Malaysia as both were dependent 
on their military ties with London. In addition to its regional character, the 
proposal was influenced by domestic factors. It was a means put forward by Kuala 
Lumpur to ease tension with the ethnic-Chinese community in Malaysia by 
acknowledging the PRC and possibly normalising relations with Beijing in light of 
the post-May 1969 racial riots.16 Despite Malaysian diplomatic efforts in 1970-71 
to promote the proposal, the latter only received a cold response from the other 
ASEAN states.17 It should also be noted that the great powers; the United States, 
China and the Soviet Union, were not keen to commit themselves to the demands 
of neutralisation.
The events of the autumn of 1971 persuaded ASEAN’s foreign ministers 
to re-consider the Malaysian neutralisation plan during an unofficial meeting held 
in Kuala Lumpur in November. The proposal met with opposition due to clashing 
perspectives on the regional distribution of power. Malaysia’s initiative to 
neutralise Southeast Asia was unacceptable, above all, to Indonesia as it 
questioned its natural position of regional leadership. The proposal went against
13For a discussion on the motives behind the Malaysian initiative, please refer Dick Wilson, The 
Neutralization o f Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 61-70.
14Please refer to Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
15Please refer to Chin Kin-Wah, The Defence o f Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a 
Security System, 1957-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
16Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f Accommodation, p. 113.
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its expectations of a future intra-mural distribution of power determined by 
regional actors. It opened the door to increased external interference; primarily 
from China, and contradicted the preferences laid down in the Bangkok 
Declaration. Hence, the Malaysian initiative reinforced Indonesia’s threat 
perception and challenged its managerial ambitions in Southeast Asia. In addition, 
Jakarta was pressing for its own principle of national resilience. Rather than to be 
reliant on foreign guarantees, Indonesia supported an active and independent 
foreign policy and believed in the development of domestic and regional 
capabilities to reduce external intervention. Malik had expressed reservations 
regarding the neutralisation initiative in September 1971. He had stated:
I strongly believe that it is only through developing among ourselves an area of 
internal cohesion and stability, based on indigenous sociopolitical and economic 
strength, that we can ever hope to assist in the early stabilization of a new 
equilibrium in the region that would not be the exclusive ‘diktat’ of the major 
powers.18
While advocating an autonomous regional order, the military administration still 
tacitly supported the American presence in Southeast Asia and benefited from the 
financial and military assistance it received from the United States.
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines subscribed to a realist tradition of 
International Relations and viewed the conventional practice of countervailing 
power as a crucial ingredient to their foreign policy. Manila was dependent on its 
links with Washington to ensure its security. Bangkok had traditionally relied on 
external ties and was keen to preserve a policy of independence of manoeuvre 
with the great powers. The Philippines and Thailand were also indirectly involved 
in the Vietnam War as allies of the United States and faced internal communist 
insurgencies supported by the PRC. Singapore remained fearful of absorption by 
Malaysia or Indonesia and perceived the US involvement in the region as vital to 
its security.19 S. Rajaratnam, Singapore’s foreign minister from 1965 until 1980, 
declared that the city-state was “under no illusion that it could single-handedly
17Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), pp. 15-16.
,8Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Adam Malik, at a meeting of the Press Foundation of Asia, Bah, 
Indonesia, September 1971. Quoted in Wilson, The Neutralization o f  Southeast Asia, p. 53.
19Please refer to Wilson, The Neutralization o f Southeast Asia, pp. 68-85.
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cope with the many larger predators stalking in the jungle of international 
politics.”20
Consequently, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore opposed the 
neutralisation plan and argued for the involvement of external powers, primarily 
the United States, to maintain regional stability.21 The implementation of the 
Malaysian proposal would have involved the removal of foreign bases and a 
reduced reliance on external security relations 22 The three ASEAN states were 
concerned about a rising Chinese influence. During a visit to Malaysia in June 
1971, the Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachom had for instance criticised a 
neutralisation scheme guaranteed among others by the PRC. Yet, in contrast to 
Indonesia, their opposition resulted from power balancing considerations rather 
than any hegemonic disposition. They feared that the neutralisation plan would 
hasten America’s military withdrawal from the region leaving a “power vacuum” 
to be filled in by increasing Chinese or even Indonesian influence. The three 
member states were keen not to restrict their policy options and to preserve their 
external security ties in balance of power terms. They viewed the regional denial 
of hegemony as dependent on a military dimension; namely, the existence of 
defence ties with external actors outside of an ASEAN framework. Conventional 
balance of power calculations thus influenced their approach to the proposal for 
neutralisation.
ZOPFAN may partly be examined as a formulation that accommodated 
these different security outlooks. Leifer explains that “the outcome of the meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur represented an intra-mural accommodation of views rather than 
any assertion of corporate will.”23 ZOPFAN was a political declaration that 
avoided the legal rights and obligations associated with the concept of 
neutralisation. It merely stated that the ASEAN foreign ministers agreed that “the 
neutralization of South-East Asia is a desirable objective and that we should
20Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Will the Real ZOPFAN Stand Up (Singapore: Library of the Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, October 1989), p. 14.
21For a discussion on the problems associated with the neutralisation proposal, please refer to the 
Address of Professor Tommy Koh to the Commonwealth Society, Singapore 1972. Sections of the 
Address are quoted in Bilveer Singh, ZOPFAN and the New Security Order in the Asia-Pacific 
Region (Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1992), pp. 71-73.
22This point was made by Daljit Singh, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS) and former member of the Ministry of Defence of Singapore (1967-1979). The 
interview was held at ISEAS on 23 February 2000.
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explore ways and means of bringing about its realization”.24 As a declaratory 
principle, ZOPFAN represented continuity with the Bangkok Declaration and did 
not impose any duties or limitations on the member states.25 While the regional 
states acknowledged the legitimate interests of the great powers in the region, the 
ZOPFAN principle was about opposing external military intervention and 
domination in Southeast Asia.26 Indeed, the ASEAN foreign ministers recognised 
“the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from 
outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect
97its freedom, independence and integrity”.
Hence, ZOPFAN reflected Indonesia’s expectation of a regional order 
based on the managerial role of Southeast Asian states. It may also be associated 
with the wider priority of reinforcing regional resilience in Southeast Asia. In 
return, it did not restrict the right of member states to host foreign bases on their 
territory and/or rely on defence links with external powers to ensure their security. 
Interestingly, the document did not mention these issues. Indonesia thus accepted 
the preservation of ties with foreign powers, including the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements of April 1971 that had replaced the Anglo-Malaysian Defence 
Agreement on 1 November 1971 and linked the security of Singapore and
98Malaysia to a defence cooperation with Britain, Australia and New Zealand. It is 
interesting to note that Malaysia did not find its call for the neutralisation of 
Southeast Asia as incompatible with its participation in this defence
29arrangement.
ZOPFAN has never gained operational relevance as a security doctrine and 
differences in its interpretation have persisted among the member states. 
Indonesia, and particularly its foreign ministry, became a strong supporter of the 
principle, which was introduced as part of its foreign policy objective to establish
23Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 58.
24Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Declaration), Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 27 November 1971.
25Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, pp. 18-19.
26This point was made by Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia (1988-1999). The 
interview was held in Jakarta on 21 March 2000.
27Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration.
28Singapore may have perceived the Five Power Defence Arrangements as an additional means to 
regulate its relations with Malaysia and to constrain its potential aggressive disposition towards the 
city-state.
29Chin, The Defence o f Malaysia and Singapore, p. 174.
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an autonomous regional order. Jakarta has since then repeatedly called for the 
regional management of differences free from outside interference and based on 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the post-Cold War, Indonesia has 
actively supported the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) 
Treaty.30 By contrast to Indonesia, Singapore has never endorsed the preference 
for regional autonomy31 and Thailand has at no time interpreted the principle as 
leading to a policy of non-alignment or to the termination of its defence links with 
external players.
II. ASEAN’s Enlargement to Include Brunei
A. Brunei’s Bilateral Relations with Malaysia and Indonesia before 1984
The first part of this section concentrates on Brunei’s strained ties with 
Malaysia and Indonesia during the 1960’s and 70’s that resulted from persisting 
antagonisms and challenges to its international legitimacy. These bilateral matters 
are contrasted with ASEAN’s intra-mural relations by focusing particularly on 
Malaysia’s unrestrained and menacing foreign policy towards the Sultanate during 
the mid-1970’s. In addition, it is pointed out that Brunei developed a close 
relationship with Singapore partly because both states shared a similar sense of 
vulnerability vis-a-vis Malaysia and Indonesia. Yet, in contrast to the city-state, 
the Sultanate could not use the Association before its membership as an 
instrument to constrain its threatening neighbours. In that respect, an analogy is 
drawn between the predicament of Brunei and Indonesia’s annexation of East 
Timor.
Brunei’s historical survival as a separate entity cannot be detached from its 
links with Britain. A treaty relationship was first established in 1847. London 
extended its protection over the Sultanate in 1888 when it took charge of its
30Concemed about the movement of its nuclear warships and submarines in Southeast Asia, the 
United States has refused to support the SEANWFZ Treaty. Beijing has also declined to sign the 
Treaty as it covers maritime areas claimed by the PRC in the South China Sea.
31This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes at the Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and former member of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. The interview was held at IDSS on 3 March 2000.
32For a history of Brunei, please refer to D.S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: The Problems of 
Political Survival (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Graham Saunders, A History o f Brunei 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); A.V.M. Horton, A New Sketch o f the History o f Negara
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defence and external affairs. While never a colony, Brunei came under British 
Residency in 1906. Bilateral ties were redefined in 1959 when a Resident was 
replaced by a High Commissioner. It was then agreed that London would only be 
responsible for Brunei’s defence, including internal security, and foreign affairs. 
The international status of the Sultanate remained unclear to most regional states 
due to its peculiar relations with the United Kingdom.
Brunei’s ambiguous status, limited territory and wealth complicated its 
relations with its neighbours. Despite its very small territory, which is also divided 
in two parts by the Limbang River Valley that became part of Sawarak in 1890, 
the Sultanate’s economy has been exceptionally prosperous thanks to its large oil 
and natural gas reserves. The production of oil first started in 1929. To understand 
Brunei’s distrust of Malaysia and Indonesia, it is essential to review the revolt that 
took place in the Sultanate in 1962 as well as the failed negotiations regarding its 
inclusion in the Federation of Malaysia. These events worsened Brunei’s ties with 
its neighbours as they distorted any kind of trust until the end of the 1970’s and 
early 1980’s. With reference to Malaysia, they also represented the beginning of a 
menacing foreign policy towards the Sultanate.
In May 1961, Malaya’s Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman officially 
announced his proposal to establish a wider federation that would unite Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, the Sultan of 
Brunei, showed an initial enthusiasm for the project and suggested in July 1962 
that the Sultanate would take part in the federation.33 Brunei’s small territory and 
wealth made it vulnerable to external aggression and independence was not 
perceived as a viable possibility. Rahman’s proposal still divided domestic politics 
in Brunei. The Partai Ra ’ayat Brunei (People’s Party of Brunei), which had been 
created in 1956 by A.M. Azahari, opposed the notion of a Malaysian federation 
and supported instead the creation of an independent state of North Borneo 
consisting of Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah. The People’s Party demonstrated its
Brunei Darussalam, First Edition, Second Impression (London: A.V.M. Horton Publisher, March 
1996).
33Stanley S. Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore: The Building o f New States (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), p. 260.
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large popular support in the first partial legislative elections held in August 
1962.34
Domestic divisions led in December 1962 to a revolt organised by the
7 ^military wmg of the People’s Party. The rebellion was rapidly crushed by British 
troops brought in from Singapore. Attention must be given though to the part 
played by Indonesia as its support, even perhaps during the preparation of the 
revolt, created distrust and animosity in future bilateral relations. To the 
disappointment of the People’s Party, Sukarno offered no real practical help to the 
rebels. His assistance was primarily rhetorical as the revolt was portrayed m
77Jakarta as a fight for independence against British colonialism. The uprising 
provided the Indonesian leader with an excuse to oppose the establishment of 
Malaysia, viewed only as a neo-colonial design, and to launch his policy of 
Confrontation. Brunei was later also the victim of small-scale Indonesian attacks
7Rduring the period of Confrontation. In sum, Sukarno’s support for the People’s 
Party and their call for an independent state in Northern Borneo led to Brunei’s 
deep mistrust of Indonesia until the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
The first round of negotiations for Brunei’s entry in the Federation of 
Malaysia occurred in February 1963 and ended with high hopes on the future 
inclusion of the Sultanate. Due to its size and domestic vulnerability after the 
rebellion, Kuala Lumpur was convinced that Brunei had no choice but to enter the
7QFederation of Malaysia. Taking place in June, the second round revealed that 
serious differences remained. These included disagreements on the distribution of 
oil revenues and the question of the sultan’s order of royal precedence among the 
rulers of Malaysia that would determine the king of the federation on a five-year 
rotating period. It resulted also from the sultan’s perception that the population of
34For additional information on the political ambitions of the People’s Party, please refer to Haji 
Zaini Haji Ahmad, ed., The People’s Party o f Brunei: Selected Documents (Kuala Lumpur: 
Institute of Social Analysis (INSAN), 1988).
35Michael Leifer, “Decolonisation and International Status: The Experience of Brunei,” 
International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April 1978), p. 243.
36Saunders, A History o f Brunei, p. 151.
37See for instance Greg Poulgrain, The Genesis o f Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 
1945-1965 (London: C. Hurst & Co Ltd., 1998), p. 283-284.
38Tim Huxley, Brunei’s Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, Working Paper No. 166 
(Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1988), p. 4.
39V.G. Kulkami, “Family Feuds are giving Way to Fraternal Ties,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 
26 January 1984, p. 33.
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Brunei opposed the new federation.40 Moreover, Omar Ali Saifuddin may have 
wished after the events of December 1962 to preserve his feudal control and avoid 
the organisation of new elections in the Sultanate, which would most likely have 
resulted in a victory of the People’s Party41 The negotiations were eventually 
interrupted and Malaysia was established on 16 September 1963 without the 
participation of Brunei, which preserved its political and defence links with 
Britain. The failure to reach an agreement affected relations with Kuala Lumpur 
and enhanced Brunei’s regional sense of vulnerability. Saunders explains that 
“Tunku Abdul Rahman never forgave the Sultan for his intransigence and early in 
1964 recalled the hundreds of teachers and government officers seconded to 
Brunei.”42
Brunei-Malaysian ties worsened significantly after the formation of 
ASEAN. Tunku Abdul Rahman was succeeded in 1970 by a new prime minister 
of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak. The latter conducted an adventurous and coercive 
policy towards Brunei, which was perceived in the Sultanate as designed to 
undermine its aristocratic regime and international legitimacy and ensure its 
annexation into the Malaysian federation. Ties were complicated in 1970 when 
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, who had been enthroned in August 1968 after the 
abdication of his father Omar Ali Saifuddin, revived in a public statement an 
historical claim to Limbang. Brunei had never recognised the annexation of the 
territory by Sarawak in 1890 and the sovereignty issue remained a source of 
bitterness and tension. Malaysia later questioned Brunei’s international status by 
supporting the claims and activities of the People’s Party. It should be noted that 
Kuala Lumpur had strongly opposed that political party and its demands before 
the establishment of the federation. In July 1973, some of the leaders of the 
People’s Party, who had remained under arrest in Brunei since the 1962 revolt, 
were helped to escape and received asylum in Malaysia. This aggravated Brunei’s 
mistrust of its neighbour. Allowed to open a political branch in the capital, it was 
presumably from these facilities that the People’s Party sent a new manifesto to
40Leifer, “Decolonisation and International Status: The Experience of Brunei,” p. 243.
41This point was made by Dr. Khoo Kay Kim, Associate Professor, Department of History at the 
Malaya University and Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies 
(IDSS). The interview was held at IDSS on 1 March 2000.
42Saunders, A History o f Brunei, p. 158.
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the sultan in April 1975.43 Malaysia was also said to have arranged military 
training for students who opposed Brunei’s feudal political regime 44
Malaysia’s antagonism towards the Sultanate was demonstrated in the 
United Nations. It funded in 1975 the visit of a delegation of the People’s Party to 
the UN Committee on Decolonisation where it demanded Brunei’s independence. 
Malaysia also sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly that challenged 
Brunei’s international status by questioning its colonial links with Britain. 
Adopted in November 1977, the resolution demanded the holding of free elections 
and the introduction of a democratic political system. It was supported, among 
others, by Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand but not by Singapore and 
provoked political embarrassment in London.
Malaysia’s unrestrained foreign policy towards Brunei resulted from 
several factors. Kuala Lumpur had territorial ambitions in Northern Borneo as it 
was keen to include the Sultanate in the federation. It was interested in Brunei’s 
oil and gas revenues, which it had failed to take under its control after the 1963 
negotiations. Greed thus played an important part in its policy calculations. In 
addition, bilateral ties may have been affected by a struggle for cultural leadership. 
Introduced as the state ideology to establish Brunei’s separate identity, the 
Sultanate defined itself as the last Malay Islamic Monarchy which complicated 
relations with Kuala Lumpur45 Finally, Malaysia’s actions were influenced by 
domestic security considerations. These involved separatist tendencies in Sarawak 
and Sabah, the possible revival of North Borneo nationalism that could have been 
exacerbated by the example of Brunei,46 and the fear that the latter may as a result 
of external intervention become a base of instability. A rapid integration of the 
Sultanate may have been perceived as a solution to these concerns. At a seminar 
organised in Jakarta in October 1974, Tan Sri Mohamad Ghazali Shafie, 
Malaysia’s minister for home affairs, drew attention to “a set of security issues
43Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States, p. 266.
‘“Refer to Leifer, “Decolonisation and International Status: The Experience of Brunei,” p. 248 and 
Huxley, Brunei’s Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, pp. 7-8.
45This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan.
46Lord Chalfont, By God’s Will: A Portrait o f the Sultan o f Brunei (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1989), p. 114.
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that cannot be neatly categorised, but which has the potential for upsetting the best 
security calculations of several Southeast Asian states.”47 He referred to:
the security issues that resolve around the continuing existence of vestigial 
colonial territories in our region. Their existence besides being historically 
anomalous, also make them the foci of local discontent and foreign intrigue. The 
security issues that they pose may be peripheral to the ambit of our concern here, 
but they are nevertheless potential areas of instability 48
Ghazali Shafie was here referring to the Sultanate but also to the case of East 
Timor. In short, Malaysia’s diplomatic behaviour was influenced by the need to 
ensure its defence in light of the potential consequences associated with Brunei’s 
survival as a separate entity.
Partly arising from its difficult relations with Malaysia, Brunei had 
gradually established from the mid-1960’s close political and military ties with 
Singapore. The relationship reflected a mutual recognition that they did not 
represent a threat to each others’ survival. Though links remained particularly 
discreet, Singapore and Brunei shared a common strategic perspective, 
comparable security interests and a similar mistrust of their neighbours. 
Doubtlessly, they had a comparable sense of vulnerability vis-a-vis Malaysia and 
to a lesser extent Indonesia. The latter was perceived as a potential challenge to 
their individual security while the former had to be coped with as the most 
influential regional power. It is interesting to note that close personal links were 
developed between Lee Kuan Yew and Omar Ali Saifuddin who would continue 
to have great political influence even after his abdication in 1968.49 From the early 
1970’s, bilateral relations started to involve military contacts; including, defence 
agreements, joint exercises and the presence of troops of the Singapore Armed 
Forces (SAF) in Brunei.50 Diplomatic assistance was also strengthened. In contrast 
to all other ASEAN members, Singapore failed to support Malaysia’s actions in 
the UN against Brunei’s international legitimacy. That said, their respective 
response to a similar sense of vulnerability may be distinguished. Singapore was 
active on the world scene and sought recognition and legitimacy through its
47Tan Sri Mohamad Ghazali Shafie, “ASEAN’s Response to Security Issues in Southeast Asia,” 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 
23.
48Ghazali Shafie, “ASEAN’s Response to Security Issues in Southeast Asia,” p. 23.
49See Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 343-346.
50Huxley, Brunei's Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, p. 17.
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participation in international organisations while Brunei focused nearly 
exclusively on the preservation of its links with Britain.
Malaysia was provided with a possible script for its dealings with Brunei 
by Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. The history of Indonesia’s ultimate 
decision to invade in December 1975 need not to be reproduced here in detail.51 In 
contrast to the Sukarno period, the aggressive military operation took place 
without the prior formulation of irredentist claims or strong nationalist rhetoric. 
Jakarta intervened partly to ensure its own security due to the fear of an 
independent East Timor under the control of the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor (Fretilin) and communist influence in the Territory. The 
fear of communism was at its peak as the episode during 1975 coincided with the 
closing phase of the Vietnam War and the communist take-over of Phnom Penh 
and Laos. The annexation of East Timor was viewed in the context of the 
containment of China. Most Western states, including the US and Australia, 
tacitly accepted the Indonesian action which was regarded to have eliminated a 
possible threat of communist intervention.53 Through an act of military 
aggression, Jakarta had also terminated the so-called security dangers posed by a 
colonial vestige. Jakarta received strong Malaysian diplomatic backing as some of 
the concerns that led to its action were felt in Kuala Lumpur vis-a-vis the 
Sultanate. Moreover, Fretilin later argued that Malaysia had provided to Indonesia 
the armament necessary for the invasion.54 Indonesia’s military could not make 
use of US equipment.
Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor was a direct denial of self- 
determination and a violation of international law. East Timor was formally 
incorporated on 17 July 1976 as the twenty-seventh province of the Republic of 
Indonesia. The annexation still had negative international repercussions for
51Please refer for instance to Gabriel Defert, Timor Est: Le Genocide Oublie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1992); James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Australia: ABC Books, 1996); Richard W. Franke, 
East Timor: The Hidden War (New York: East Timor Defense Committee, 1976).
52Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 159- 
160.
53This point was made by Dr. Leo Suryadinata, Associate Professor, Department of Political 
Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS). The interview was held at NUS on 10 
March 2000.
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Indonesia, especially within the UN. Endless resistance in East Timor to 
Indonesia’s occupation would also lead over the next twenty-four years to a 
constant policy of repression and severe violations of human rights. One should 
note that Indonesia only renounced its sovereignty over East Timor in 1999 that 
has remained since then under UN administration.
The annexation had dramatic implications for Brunei. It fuelled its sense of 
vulnerability. In addition to enhancing its suspicion towards Indonesia, it 
increased the apprehension of a comparable Malaysian intervention.55 The 
invasion also strengthened the ties that existed between Brunei and Singapore, 
which perceived the example of East Timor as a threat to their own security. In 
contrast to the city-state, Brunei could not use the Association as a political 
instrument to constrain its ominous neighbours. Yet, it may be argued that 
Singapore’s initial reaction to Indonesia’s invasion sent a message to its partners 
regarding its refusal to endorse a similar solution in Northern Borneo.56
In response to its menacing environment and the need to avoid annexation 
by a neighbouring state, Brunei had continued to rely primarily on its military and 
political links with the United Kingdom. A battalion of British Gurkha Rifles had 
been stationed in the Sultanate since 1962 ostensibly in a training role and 
represented “an effective deterrent against any external military intervention.”57 
However, Britain was eager to break with its colonial past and wished for Brunei’s 
return to full sovereignty. It was also anxious to complete its military 
disengagement East of Suez. Desperate to preserve the status quo, the Sultanate 
aimed to “delay independence as long as possible and resisted British attempts to
CO
withdraw the Gurkha garrison.” An additional step was reached in 1971 when it 
was agreed that the High Commissioner would no longer advise the sultan on 
internal matters. Hence, Brunei was granted full control of its domestic affairs 
while external affairs stayed under the supervision of the United Kingdom. The 
British defence role was amended to match Five Power Defence obligations;
54James Cotton, “PKO and East Timor: Context and Consequences,” Presentation given at the 
Seminar on Asia and the Pacific in International Relations, London School of Economics (LSE), 1 
March 2001.
55Huxley, Brunei’s Defence Policy and Military Expenditure, p. 9.
56Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f Accommodation, p. 86.
57Leifer, “Decolonisation and International Status: The Experience of Brunei,” p. 250.
58Horton, A New Sketch o f the History o f Negara Brunei Darussalam, p. 32.
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namely, to consult in the case of an external attack. The British desire to amend 
relations with Brunei was further enhanced by the election of a Labour 
government in 1974, which announced its decision to withdraw the Gurkha 
troops. It subsequently postponed and finally renounced that withdrawal. Still, 
Brunei’s ability to ensure its long-term defence through its special links with 
Britain had become increasingly uncertain.
In addition to its external ties, the Sultanate developed a limited military 
capability independent of the Gurhka battalion. The Royal Brunei Malay 
Regiment was established in 1962 and slowly evolved over the next two decades 
into a small but well-equipped military force.59 Large increases in military 
spending occurred from the mid-1970’s until the early 1980’s that provided the 
regiment with helicopters, communication equipment and other supplies. Huxley 
writes that extensive military budgets were required in that period for “the 
acquisition of increasingly sophisticated and expensive weaponry suitable for 
deterring and defending against external threats”.60 Brunei’s military build-up was 
connected to the British desire to revise bilateral relations but also to a rise in 
governmental oil revenues. Nevertheless, one can question whether Malaysia or 
Indonesia was ever deterred by Brunei’s military forces alone. It was unlikely, for 
instance, that the Royal Brunei Regiment could have responded to an invasion or 
faced a guerrilla infiltration.
In sum, Malaysia showed no restraint in its foreign policy and behaved in a 
menacing fashion towards the Sultanate. Its policy lacked the element of self­
constraint that characterised ASEAN’s intra-mural relations. Kuala Lumpur 
sought to undermine Brunei’s international legitimacy and acted in an hegemonic 
fashion in Northern Borneo. In addition, Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor and 
its implications for Brunei demonstrated that the practice of self-denial did not 
apply outside the walls of the Association. Indonesia’s invasion of the Territory 
may be contrasted to its intra-mural policy of political self-abnegation and at least 
to a point self-imposed containment. Consequently, Brunei could hardly rely on 
ASEAN as a form of political defence for constraining a similar Malaysian
59For a discussion on the development of military capabilities in Brunei please refer to Saunders, A 
History o f Brunei, p. 167 and Huxley, Brunei’s Defence Policy and Expenditure, pp. 3-6.
60Huxley, Brunei’s Defence Policy and Expenditure, p. 5.
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intervention. On the contrary, the Sultanate distrusted and kept a diplomatic 
distance from the Association mainly due to its suspicion of Indonesia and 
Malaysia.61 Brunei was reliant on conventional balance of power tactics; namely, a 
policy of balancing through external association and to a much lesser extent the 
strengthening of its own military power, to ensure its security. Except for its 
military links with Britain, which were uncertain in the long run, the Sultanate did 
not possess the capabilities to deter any potential aggression.
B. Motives for Brunei to join the Association
The second part of this section deals with the circumstances that led to 
ASEAN’s initial enlargement to include Brunei in 1984. It is argued that the 
motives included a desire to locate a process of reconciliation between the 
Sultanate and Malaysia and Indonesia within an already-existing structure of 
dialogue. Accordingly, the expansion of membership is described as a replication 
of the original associative raison d ’etre of ASEAN. Moreover, it is claimed that 
the enlargement process involved a calculation of the balance of power factor and 
the benefits linked to the constraint from political association which had a power 
balancing relevance. ASEAN may be deemed to have provided Brunei with a 
vehicle through which to constrain its neighbours by political rather than military 
means. The expansion of the Association is analysed by first focusing on its 
associative dimension before trying to determine how a balance of power 
perspective played a role in this specific case.
a. Associative Dimension
The motives for a state to join a regime for cooperative security should be 
examined in light of the advantages the latter already provides its original 
members. Brunei’s willingness to take part in the cooperative process can be 
understood partly by focusing on how the Association served its participants’ 
narrowly-defined objectives and enhanced the convergence of common interests. 
By the early 1980’s, ASEAN had developed a political identity and a shared 
approach to security and had increased stability in intra-mural relations. In
6lLeifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 46.
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addition, it had evolved into an internationally-respected institution that gave 
some sense of diplomatic confidence to its participants. As a tiny state, Brunei 
could greatly benefit from a diplomatic platform that disposed of some regional 
and international relevance. Finally, the Association had established a code of 
conduct based on a set of standard international norms and principles. The TAC 
had enunciated the respect for national sovereignty as ASEAN’s central principle. 
For instance, while Singapore had initially registered its opposition to the 
annexation of East Timor, it later supported Indonesia in the UN vote after the 
Bali Summit of February 1976. ASEAN’s reaction to Vietnam’s invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia and its respect for Cambodia’s national sovereignty 
should also be noted. In accordance with a neo-liberal interpretation of security 
regimes, these institutional achievements influenced Brunei’s decision to 
participate in ASEAN despite the membership of former and potentially future 
enemies to its security.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s enlargement to include the Sultanate was first 
dependent on a diplomatic rapprochement between Brunei and Malaysia and 
Indonesia. The rapprochement was initiated by political change in Malaysia that 
led in 1976 to the new prime ministership of Tun Hussein Onn. Though still 
pressing for decolonisation, Hussein Onn was keen to introduce moderation and 
cooperation in his government’s policy towards the Sultanate. Changes in 
perception vis-a-vis Brunei were first officially expressed in May 1978 when 
Suharto and Hussein Onn agreed during the course of a bilateral meeting in 
Labuan on the need to reach an accommodation with the Sultanate.62 The shift 
was a recognition of the new political realities in Northern Borneo. Malaysia and 
Indonesia realised by 1978 that the forthcoming independence of Brunei had 
become a fait accompli. The issue of sovereignty needed therefore to be 
addressed. Their new foreign policy also resulted from economic pragmatism. The 
Sultanate was a tiny entity with great wealth that could provide financial aid and 
free-of-interest loans. During a meeting between Suharto and Lee Kuan Yew in
62Antolik, ASEAN and The Diplomacy o f Accommodation, pp. 86-87.
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June 1978, Singapore’s prime minister was asked to inform the sultan that Brunei 
was welcome to join the Association after its return to independence.
This initial reduction of tension may have influenced Brunei’s negotiations 
with the United Kingdom on the schedule of its proclamation of independence. A 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed with Britain on 7 January 1979 
in which it was agreed that it would take effect and the Sultanate would gain full 
sovereignty on 1 January 1984. Brunei’s international status, which had 
complicated its ties with neighbouring states, would soon be clarified and its 
coming independence made a future participation in the Association possible. Yet, 
Brunei remained aware of its vulnerability and was eager to preserve its security 
links with Britain even after its reversion to sovereignty. This was promoted by 
the return to power of a Conservative government in 1979, which favoured 
continuing military ties with the Sultanate. A private defence cooperation 
agreement was eventually reached in 1983 that ensured the presence of a rotating 
battalion of the Gurkha Rifles under British command in Brunei.
Bilateral contacts with Malaysia and Indonesia were slowly developed, 
initially through informal social gatherings that were soon replaced by official 
visits. In March 1980, the Malaysian king came to Brunei while Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah made his first official trip to Malaysia in September 1981. Tensions in 
inter-Borneo relations were reduced in March 1981 by the visit of Tan Sri Adbul 
Rahman Yaakub, the Sarawak chief minister, to Brunei. Malaysia’s Deputy Prime 
Minister Datuk Musa Hitam travelled to the Sultanate in March 1982 and 
announced that Kuala Lumpur would sponsor Brunei’s membership in ASEAN. 
The same support was later expressed by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Professor 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, when he visited Brunei in August 1982. He also 
declared that there would be no return to the past policies of hostility.64 The sultan 
had previously paid an unofficial visit to Jakarta in April 1981. Finally, Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad, who became prime minister of Malaysia on the retirement of 
Tun Hussein Onn in 1981, travelled to Brunei in March 1983.
“ Timothy Ong Teck Mong, “Modem Brunei: Some Important Issues,” Southeast Asian Affairs 
1983 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), p. 82.
“ Ong, “Modem Brunei: Some Important Issues,” p. 82.
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These bilateral contacts were linked to Brunei’s informal participation in 
the Association that started before it reached independence. Its gradual 
involvement in the cooperative security regime needs to be mentioned. Leifer 
explains that “The five years grace period from January 1979 before the 
resumption of sovereignty was employed to secure familiarity with the working 
practice of the Association through attendance at its committees.”65 Prince 
Mohamed Bolkiah, the future minister for foreign affairs, first attended as an 
observer the ASEAN ministerial meeting held in Manila in June 1981 and was 
subsequently present at the following ministerial sessions organised respectively 
in Singapore and Bangkok. This time offered a learning period that preceded 
Brunei’s membership. The Sultanate officially joined the Association during a 
ceremony of admission held in Jakarta on 7 January 1984.66 In his speech, Prince 
Mohamed Bolkiah declared that:
We are confident,..., that in this new era based on relations between equals and 
on the basis of mutual respect for our independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, Brunei Darussalam will be able to continue to pursue the economic 
progress and happiness of its people in a wider family of nations.67
Brunei’s motives for taking part in the Association also derived from the 
existence of a code of conduct regulating intra-mural relations. At the ministerial 
meeting of July 1984, Brunei’s minister for foreign affairs declared that “I have 
observed the important role played by ASEAN in the promotion of regional peace 
and stability, through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the 
relationship among countries of the region, and the adherence to the principles of 
the United Nations Charter.”68 Of particular significance to Brunei’s security was 
the practical registration of respect for national sovereignty. The latter had been 
enunciated in the TAC in 1976 and demonstrated by ASEAN’s common position 
vis-a-vis the Third Indochina Conflict. Brunei’s independence coincided with 
ASEAN’s diplomatic involvement in the Cambodian issue. The violation of the 
Cambodian national sovereignty greatly concerned the Sultanate. Besides
65Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, pp. 46-47.
66Please refer to the Declaration of the Admission of Brunei Darussalam into the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Jakarta, Indonesia, 7 January 1984.
67Speech by His Royal Highness Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, Ceremony of Admission of Brunei 
Darussalam to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 7 January 1984.
680pening Statement by H.R.H Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, Minister For Foreign Affairs of Brunei 
Darussalam, at the Seventeenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, 9 July 1984.
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ASEAN, Brunei joined in 1984 the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference. By 1992, it had also become a member to 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Membership in these organisations strengthened and 
secured, at least to some extent, its international recognition and newly-obtained 
independence.
Brunei is geographically part of Southeast Asia and its participation in 
ASEAN can thus be examined as a natural and logical consequence of its 
reversion to sovereignty. The New Straits Times wrote in January 1984 that 
“Brunei’s admission is the most logical, given the factors of geography, history 
and contemporary policy disposition.”69 The first expansion in membership should 
be associated with the original hope stated in the Bangkok Declaration of uniting 
the entire sub-region under ASEAN auspices. If deciding not to join, the Sultanate 
would have been regarded as a regional anomaly, fuelling suspicion among 
regional states.70 Brunei had no real alternative but to become a member. An 
integration in the Malaysian federation was not viewed as an option in the 
Sultanate and a policy of isolation or the development of close ties with one of the 
great powers were unlikely alternatives to an ASEAN membership.
In sum, ASEAN’s enlargement to include Brunei was influenced by an 
associative dimension. It resulted from a situation of mutual benefits. In 
accordance with the concept of cooperative security, the Sultanate joined a 
multilateral security regime that operated on an intra-mural basis. The 
institutionalisation of a process of reconciliation within an already existing 
structure of dialogue contributed to improving the climate of regional relations. 
An analogy should be made between the first expansion of membership and the 
associative origins of ASEAN which primarily resulted from an act of 
reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia and the need to prevent the 
recurrence of regional confrontation.71 Brunei’s membership was expected to
69Quoted in “Newspaper Reports Welcome its Entry into ASEAN,” The Straits Times, 23 February 
1984, p. 4.
70This point was made by Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor at the Habibie Centre and 
former spokesperson of President B.J. Habibie. The interview was held at the Habibie Centre, 
Jakarta, on 24 March 2000.
71Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle 
East? (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 
1998), p. 6.
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build trust and promote confidence-building in specific bilateral relations. 
Moreover, it extended the respect and application of a code of conduct to an 
additional regional actor.
b. Balance o f Power Factor
The associative dimension involved in ASEAN’s enlargement to include 
Brunei has so far been discussed. Keeping this analysis in mind, it will now be 
argued that balance of power politics, resulting in part from enduring feelings of 
mistrust, played a role in the expansion of membership. Let us begin with how the 
enlargement process was regarded within ASEAN, with special reference to 
Malaysia and Indonesia. At issue was a common understanding of the benefits of 
Brunei’s membership by Hussein Onn and Suharto when they met in 1978 as
77neither saw profit in threatening the Sultanate. These views on the need to 
maintain stability in inter-state relations should be related to the establishment of 
the Association. The latter was formed partly to deny intra-mural hegemony, 
ensure the sovereignty of the individual members and promote stability, primarily 
in Indonesian-Malaysian relations. It can be claimed that by asking the Sultanate 
to join the Association both leaders agreed to contain potential hegemonic 
ambitions towards the future state. Acting in an aggressive fashion towards Brunei 
once it was a member would otherwise disturb the cooperative premises and 
credibility of ASEAN.
This shared understanding of Brunei’s membership is an example of 
associative, rather than competitive, power balancing. The associative balance of 
power tradition is based on the notion that instead of using power competitively to 
enhance narrow self-interests, it may be used collectively to ensure an equilibrium 
that may serve the interests of the states part of the system.73 In accordance with 
our approach to the balance of power concept, defined in political terms, the 
practice of employing balancing power can take an associative form. It is in that 
respect that this specific illustration should be considered. Both leaders agreed on
72See for example A. J. Crosbie, “Brunei in Transition,” Southeast Asian Affairs 1981 (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981), p. 91.
73Richard Little, “Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought,” Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1989), p. 95. Please refer also to Michael Sheehan, 
The Balance o f Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 167-169.
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the need to constrain their potential hegemonic disposition in Northern Borneo in 
order to secure an intra-mural political equilibrium. Constrained by their stake in 
the political association, they were eager to preserve ASEAN’s cohesion and 
stability. This interpretation helps us to elaborate upon the operation of the 
balance of power within ASEAN. It seems that this factor most easily interacts 
with the cooperative perspective when represented in an associative form.
In addition to an intra-mural denial of hegemony, an expansion of 
membership was in accordance with Indonesia’s preference for an autonomous 
management of regional order within Southeast Asia. Though not enthusiastic 
about its domestic political regime, Suharto was keen to integrate the Sultanate 
into the Association to remove an opportunity for external intervention and 
communist manipulation. The tiny state needed to be part of ASEAN as it may 
otherwise become a base of instability where subversive actions could be 
organised against Indonesia. Weatherbee rightly pointed out in 1983 that “A 
vulnerable Brunei will to some extent be insulated from the currents of 
competition through its absorption into the established pattern of ASEAN 
orientations, and its potential for becoming a venue for new conflict will be 
reduced.”74 Subsequently, the new membership consolidated ASEAN’s operation 
as a collective political defence to reduce vulnerabilities with Chinese influence in 
mind. Indeed, it was feared in Southeast Asia that Beijing had the capacity to 
damage internal order by exploiting domestic vulnerabilities. While this 
motivation may be examined as influenced by countervailing tactics against a 
menacing external power, it also indicated Indonesia’s ambitions within ASEAN.
Let us now further discuss Brunei’s motives for joining the Association. Its 
participation was linked to an attempt to enhance its national security in light of its 
constant vulnerability. Except for its military links with Britain, the Sultanate did 
not possess the capabilities to deter a potential Malaysian aggression. The act of 
reconciliation and its location within a structure of dialogue did not eliminate 
Brunei’s mistrust of Malaysia and to a lesser extent Indonesia. Sukarno’s support 
for the 1962 rebellion and Malaysia’s coercive foreign policy during the mid- 
1970’s were vividly remembered in the Sultanate. Brunei’s relations with its
74Donald E. Weatherbee, “Brunei: the ASEAN Connection,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 
(June 1983), p. 734.
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neighbours could again deteriorate in the future and it was therefore willing to 
cooperate with new partners that remained potential enemies. Bilateral relations 
with Malaysia would remain difficult even after the Sultanate joined the 
Association, partly due to the unresolved issue of sovereignty over Limbang. For 
example, the issue of sovereignty over Limbang affected relations in 1987 after it 
had been reported that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah had discussed with Prime Minister 
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad the possibility of purchasing the disputed territory. This 
was denied in Malaysia. In sum, it is in that context of suspicion that an 
unconventional practice of countervailing power could have played a part in 
Brunei’s calculations.
Brunei’s decision to join ASEAN was influenced by the benefits linked to 
an intra-mural denial of hegemony. The Sultanate may have perceived the 
arrangement as a diplomatic instrument to constrain potential hegemonic 
ambitions in Northern Borneo. ASEAN offered some form of political guarantee 
that neither Malaysia nor Indonesia would in the future threaten or seek to annex 
the tiny state. An aggressive action towards the Sultanate would undermine the 
norms and principles promoted by the Association; above all, the respect for 
national sovereignty. Leifer writes that:
The nature of the political evolution of ASEAN had enabled the government of 
Brunei to regard the Association as a collective security organisation whose 
members were constrained by self-denying ordinance from behaving in a 
threatening manner towards one another.75
The constraint imposed on Indonesia and Malaysia through their political stake in 
ASEAN thus had a power balancing relevance. It should be noted, however, that 
the enlargement had first been dependent on a willingness by Suharto and Hussein 
Onn, initially expressed in May 1978, to include Brunei as a member of the 
Association.
Besides ASEAN and its intra-mural denial of hegemony, Brunei continued 
to rely on a conventional practice of countervailing power through the 
preservation of defence ties with Britain. Despite its membership, Brunei did not 
terminate in 1984 a private agreement reached with Britain in 1983 and open for 
review after five years that ensured the continuing presence of a one thousand- 
man battalion of the Gurkha Rifles in the Sultanate. The agreement was renewed
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in December 1994 in the light of the withdrawal of the Gurkha Brigade from Hong 
Kong by June 1997. These troops, which remain under British command, have 
been regarded as a means to deter external intervention or annexation by a 
neighbouring state. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) also maintained in Brunei 
after its reversion to sovereignty several hundred soldiers under training in a 
military jungle camp first made available by the sultan in the late 1960’s.
To complete this analysis, one should focus on the role of Singapore in 
convincing the Sultanate to take part in the Association. As seen before, strong but 
discreet links existed between both states, which shared a common sense of 
vulnerability vis-a-vis their neighbours. It is therefore not surprising that Suharto 
asked Lee Kuan Yew to convey a welcoming message in 1978. Singapore’s prime 
minister was best suited to persuade Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of the change in 
regional attitude towards Brunei. Lee personally informed the sultan during a visit 
to Brunei in March 1979. He also discussed the issue with Omar Ali Saifuddin. 
In his memoirs, Lee refers to his private meeting with Sir Omar and writes that:
He agreed to consider seeking observer status for Brunei in Asean, but nothing 
came of it. I explained to him how the world had changed. Sir Omar held on to 
his implicit faith in the British, that they would always be there to back him. He 
did not want to recognise Britain’s changed circumstances, that there were no 
British naval or air task forces to come to Brunei’s rescue.77
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah travelled to the city-state in January 1980. Singapore 
made clear to the Sultanate that it had no option but to join the Association as it
7Runited Brunei’s neighbours but also its potential future enemies. During a one- 
to-one meeting, Singapore’s prime minister explicitly asked Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah to look beyond a traditional reliance on Britain and to view ASEAN, as
7 0well as other international organisations, as a means to secure Brunei’s security. 
Lee Kuan Yew may have succeeded in persuading the sultan that joining ASEAN 
would enhance Brunei’s defence because any threat by a participant would
75Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, pp. 47-48.
76Pushpa Thambipillai, “Brunei in ASEAN: The Viable Choice?,” Southeast Asian Affairs 1982 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 108.
77Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 344-345.
78This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan.
79This point was made by Barry Desker, Chief Executive Officer of the Singapore Trade 
Development Board (TDB), as well as former Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN and 
former Ambassador of Singapore to Indonesia (1986-1991). The interview was held at the TDB on 
17 February 2000.
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rebound adversely on the cohesion and credibility of the Association. The city- 
state was well-aware by the early 1980’s that ASEAN was an asset for protecting 
its own national sovereignty. Consequently, Brunei gained from Singapore’s 
experience as the former could be expected to achieve similar security objectives 
through its membership of the Association.
III. The Intra-Mural Denial of Hegemony: Balance of Power Factor Meets 
Associative Perspective
This final section discusses how a balance of power perspective 
complemented the associative dimension involved in ASEAN’s early years and its 
enlargement to include Brunei in 1984. Attention needs to be given to the 
relevance of conventional balance of power tactics before discussing the 
constraining of power within cooperative security through political means. Most 
individual members regarded the regional denial of hegemony as dependent on a 
traditional military dimension; namely, the existence of defence ties with external 
actors. Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines considered the conventional 
practice of countervailing power outside of an ASEAN framework as vital to their 
individual survival. Defence relationships linked Thailand and the Philippines to 
the United States and Singapore participated in the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements. Despite its proposal for neutralising Southeast Asia, Malaysia took 
part in the defence group when it superseded the Anglo-Malaysian Defence 
Agreement in 1971. Finally, Brunei was eager to maintain a British military 
presence in the Sultanate after its return to independence. Indonesia was thus the 
only ASEAN state not to rely on formal defence ties with external powers during 
the historical period discussed in this chapter.
It is important to examine if the conventional practice of countervailing 
power by individual member states influenced the institutional experience of 
ASEAN. Traditional balance of power tactics set a limit to the application of an 
associative dimension. The reliance on defence ties with external powers 
negatively affected the operational relevance of ZOPFAN as a declaratory 
principle. In the case of Brunei, a continuation of the British military connection 
reflected its feelings of suspicion and mistrust towards Malaysia and Indonesia. 
These enduring views were introduced in the Association and limited Brunei’s
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future involvement and confidence in the cooperative process. Nonetheless, a 
regional distribution of power supported by outside powers promoted security in 
Southeast Asia and positively influenced the functioning of the Association. In 
particular, the US involvement in Southeast Asia and its operation as a 
conventional source of countervailing power contributed to regional stability, 
which was crucial for the development of the cooperative security regime. Hence, 
intra-mural cooperation was reliant on a specific regional context supported by
on
external powers, primarily the US.
The constraining of power within cooperative security complemented the 
associative dimension involved in ASEAN’s early years and in its expansion to 
include Brunei. The need to deal with Indonesia’s power and influence in 
Southeast Asia was an important dimension of ASEAN’s institutional experience 
between 1967 and 1975. In that context, the balance of power factor played a 
critical part in ASEAN’s early years and in the calculations of some participants. 
Its primary relevance resulted from a denial of intra-mural hegemony imposed on 
Indonesia through its integration within an embryonic security regime. The 
practice of countervailing power, though not in a conventional sense, was best 
illustrated through the 1968 crisis. Beyond showing its strong commitment to 
ASEAN, Indonesia’s understanding of the denial of intra-mural hegemony 
positively influenced the associative dimension. Jakarta was restrained, among 
other factors, by its political stake in the Association from which Singapore 
benefited in 1968. Suharto preserved the viability of the associative arrangement 
by demonstrating his acceptance of the notion of self-imposed containment. Some 
core principles had been laid down in the Bangkok Declaration, including 
commitments to the peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for national 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. An 
aggressive reaction to the hanging of the two marines would have undermined 
these norms and rebound adversely on the emerging political association. The 
result was to preserve stability in Singapore-Indonesian relations.
Other illustrations revealed the influence of balance of power on intra­
mural relations and the early institutional experience of ASEAN. Yet, these cases 
should be contrasted to our discussion on the constraining of power through
80This point was made by Daljit Singh.
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political means. Singapore’s eagerness to respond to an Indonesian act of 
hegemony in East Timor was considered. While acting in an aggressive fashion, 
Indonesia’s actions were conducted towards an extra-mural territory. Hence, the 
intra-mural denial of hegemony through political association was not violated. 
Nevertheless, Singapore registered opposition to the violation of UN principles. In 
the case of ZOPFAN, contradictory views on the regional order and conventional 
balance of power calculations played a counter-productive part in cooperation and 
restricted the institutional development of ASEAN. The fear of a potential 
hegemon in Southeast Asia influenced the reaction of Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines to the Malaysian neutralisation plan. With China, but perhaps also 
Indonesia in mind, the three states indicated their persistent reliance on 
conventional balance of power practices to ensure their individual security. These 
member states perceived the regional denial of hegemony to be dependent on a 
distribution of power supported by external actors.
In the case of Brunei, the focus of the analysis has been to indicate the 
presence of associative and balance of power factors that influenced the 
enlargement process and the calculations of the different actors involved. Balance 
of power practice played an implicit role in the rationale for the enlargement and 
overlapped with the process of reconciliation. ASEAN’s expansion to include 
Brunei involved the restraining of Indonesian and Malaysian power through 
political and institutional means. The constraint imposed on these members 
directly benefited Brunei’s security interests and consolidated its position vis-a-vis 
its neighbours. A practice of countervailing power by political means was thus a 
central element in the institutionalisation of the act of reconciliation. As a result, 
the notion that the expansion of membership should be analysed as an additional 
example of a radical shift from balance of power politics to inter-state cooperation 
needs to be questioned. Some may insist that an enlargement process reduces 
regional power struggles by expanding geographically the influence of a 
cooperative security arrangement defined as an alternative to the balance of power 
concept. In contrast, this thesis claims that ASEAN’s enlargement to include 
Brunei was constructed with the denial of hegemony in mind, the key objective of 
the balance of power.
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The balance of power factor was dependent on the political evolution of 
the Association. The constraint was imposed on the larger members through their 
growing stake in ASEAN. Once Brunei became a member, Indonesia and 
Malaysia were in no position to interfere in its domestic affairs or threaten its 
survival without undermining the political cohesion of the Association. Of 
particular importance were the standard international norms enunciated in the 
TAC that established a code of conduct regulating intra-mural relations. The fact 
that all the members adhered to these norms secured the national sovereignty of 
Brunei and Singapore. To that extent, the intra-mural distribution of power was 
held in check.
The constraining of power through political means positively influenced 
ASEAN’s enlargement to include Brunei. The balance of power factor promoted 
the associative principles by offering the Sultanate a form of political defence for 
containing hegemonic dispositions. The intra-mural denial of hegemony provided 
the tiny state with a prime incentive to take part in the regime for cooperative 
security. In addition, the expansion of membership initially resulted from a 
willingness by Hussein Onn and Suharto to constrain their potential hegemonic 
dispositions in Northern Borneo and to include Brunei within the political 
association. Both perceived Brunei’s membership as beneficial for domestic and 
regional stability. Doubtlessly, the enlargement would not have taken place if 
Malaysia and to a lesser extent Indonesia had not first endorsed a policy of self- 
imposed containment towards the Sultanate.
Finally, ASEAN’s enlargement to include Brunei needs to be compared to 
the formation of the Association in 1967. In chapter three, it was claimed that 
these founding moments involved the co-existence and interaction of associative 
and balance of power perspectives. It was argued that the membership of 
cooperative security was constructed with a reference to the balance of power 
factor. The similarities with the first expansion process demonstrate the 
continuing relevance of the balance of power as an intra-mural factor that outlasts 
the simple creation of a cooperative security regime. In that respect, the 
enlargement to include Brunei questions neo-liberal expectations that realist 
persuasions diminish or even disappear once an institution reaches maturity. 
Though a code of conduct had been established, conventional as well as
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unconventional power balancing practices still influenced the Association and the 
calculations of its members. Resulting from contradictory security perspectives, 
their persistence helps to understand explain why ASEAN was still a weak 
security regime after more than fifteen years of existence.
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Chapter Five
The Balance of Power and Extra-Mural Hegemony: 
ASEAN’s Response to the Third Indochina Conflict
Introduction
The Third Indochina Conflict (1978-1991) posed an immense political 
challenge for the ASEAN states. Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia 
was a blatant case of aggression that altered the strategic environment in mainland 
Southeast Asia. This matter became the centre of ASEAN’s activities for a period 
of twelve years. One may wonder why the Cambodian question was such an 
important issue for the Association. No comparable apprehension had been 
demonstrated with Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 or during the mid- 
1970’s when Malaysia challenged Brunei’s international legitimacy. In contrast to 
these cases, a member state, namely Thailand, faced an unprecedented direct 
external threat to its national security as indicated by the presence of Vietnamese 
military troops on its border and repeated incursions into its territory.
This chapter discusses ASEAN’s response to Vietnam’s invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia by analysing its actions through both associative and 
balance of power perspectives. The common standpoint adopted by the member 
states vis-a-vis a case of aggression will first be examined. It will be pointed out 
that a collective reaction to the events in Indochina brought significant diplomatic 
achievements and enhanced the international standing of the Association. Yet, 
unable to evolve into a defence arrangement, ASEAN failed ultimately to manage 
the problem of regional order. The balance of power will be addressed in the 
conventional use of the term because the power balancing did not occur through 
political means but through a combination of military, economic and diplomatic 
ones. By joining a tacit alliance with China, amongst others, the ASEAN states 
engaged in traditional balance of power practice. Imposed by Bangkok, that policy 
had a negative effect on intra-mural relations.
The chapter will consist of three sections. The first will consider ASEAN’s
relations with Hanoi from the communist victories in 1975 until the invasion of *
Cambodia in December 1978. The second section will offer a brief account of the 
Third Indochina Conflict, including the motives for the invasion and the
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international response that it provoked. Finally, ASEAN’s reaction to Vietnam’s 
policy in Cambodia will be studied by examining its role and influence in the war. 
In addition to reviewing the co-existence of associative and balance of power 
dimensions, it will be analysed how the latter influenced the cooperative aspects 
involved in ASEAN’s response to the Third Indochina Conflict.
I. ASEAN-Vietnamese Relations and Changes in the Regional Power 
Distribution, 1975-1978
A new political environment resulted in Indochina from the communist 
take-over of Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975 and Laos by the end of the 
year. The rapid success of revolutionary communism, after the US withdrawal 
from South Vietnam in 1973, alarmed ASEAN’s members. Southeast Asia was 
polarised ideologically into two groups of communist and non-communist states. 
Vietnam represented a potential threat to some ASEAN members. Its communist 
leadership disposed over the largest armed forces in the region and had 
demonstrated its military capabilities by uniting the country despite the successive 
intervention of external powers. Some feared an adventurous Vietnamese foreign 
policy in Indochina that could affect the stability of Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
Hanoi was perceived as an indirect threat due to the material and rhetorical 
support it could provide to communist insurgencies operating within the ASEAN 
states.
The strategic modifications in Indochina dominated the annual meeting of 
the foreign ministers held in Kuala Lumpur in May 1975. The joint press 
statement “expressed their readiness to enter into friendly and harmonious 
relationship with each nation in Indochina.”1 Still, the initial reaction portrayed a 
sense of consternation and lacked the formulation of a collective response. 
Differences in perception divided the ASEAN members. The Malaysian Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak expressed optimism on the end of the Second 
Indochina War and suggested an enlargement of the Association to include the 
other Southeast Asian states.2 In contrast, Bangkok was alarmed by these events
’Press Statement, the Eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 15 May 1975.
2Shee Poon-Kim, “A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 8 (August 
1977), p. 759.
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and displayed a great feeling of vulnerability exemplified in establishing, along 
with the Philippines, diplomatic relations with China in 1975 and expelling 
American bases the following year. Thailand did not dispose of the military 
capability to deter Vietnam and lacked access to a reliable external source of 
countervailing power to oppose its potential hegemony in Indochina. In addition to 
a divergence in the strategic outlook, which will be discussed below, the member 
states were in no position to influence events in Indochina. Their control over the 
security environment was severely limited by the nature of their association. 
Hence, ASEAN would focus until 1978 on a policy of accommodation with 
Vietnam.
The changes in Indochina eventually led to the first summit of the ASEAN 
heads of government held in Bali in February 1976. As their collective response to 
external shocks, the Bali Summit was the signing of the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation.3 Both documents 
consolidated the commitment made by each member state to the Association. 
They provided ASEAN with a political identity, a shared approach to security and 
a code of conduct for regulating intra-mural relations. Specifically, the TAC was a 
collective attempt to regulate the regional order by aiming to apply a code of 
conduct to the whole of Southeast Asia. It may thus be viewed as a diplomatic 
instrument for managing relations with a reunited Vietnam. The attempt to 
develop peaceful relations with the Indochinese states was later repeated during 
the second meeting of the ASEAN heads of government organised in Kuala 
Lumpur in August 1977 that celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Association.
Nevertheless, the Bali Summit indicated important limitations. The events 
of 1975 did not lead to the transformation of the Association into a formal or tacit 
alliance. Despite the existence of external adversity, no military dimension was 
included in the Bali declarations. Bilateral collaboration against border 
insurgencies had developed between some member states. The ASEAN Concord 
called for the “continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between 
member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and 
interests.”4 In contrast to a military dimension, the principles of national and
3The content of the ASEAN Concord and the TAC were discussed in chapter two.
declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976.
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regional resilience were introduced in Bali as a collective security doctrine. 
Sources of instability were regarded as associated with internal threats that could 
be manipulated by foreign subversive influences. The exclusion of military 
cooperation within an ASEAN framework should be examined as a collective 
effort not to alienate or provoke Vietnam and the PRC and as resulting from a lack 
of military capabilities. Yet, it also indicated the persistence of suspicion and 
contradictory security perspectives among the member states. These 
disagreements revolved primarily around divergent threat perceptions with 
reference to China and Vietnam.5
Two major strategic outlooks co-existed within the Association. Thailand 
perceived a reunited Vietnam as the most immediate danger to its security 
environment as it feared the creation of an Indochinese federation that would 
border its territory. Thailand had in its recent history competed with Vietnam over 
influence in mainland Southeast Asia. Bangkok had developed ties with the PRC 
since the 1969 Nixon Doctrine. However, fearful of China’s potential menace in 
both domestic and regional affairs, it waited until July 1975 before opening 
diplomatic relations with Beijing.6 Thailand followed the lead of Malaysia, which 
had been the first ASEAN state to establish relations with the PRC in May 1974. 
Eager to preserve a policy of equi-distance with the great powers, Thailand wished 
to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and to preserve its links with the 
United States despite the closure of US bases in 1976. The latter had resulted from 
domestic pressure in Thailand as well as the need to develop peaceful relations 
with neighbouring communist states.7 The rapid communist victories in Indochina 
after the Paris Peace Agreements of January 1973 had questioned the US 
commitment to regional security. Evans and Rowley explain that “Thailand was 
seeking to balance Moscow and Beijing against each other - though Bangkok’s 
aim was to bring as much restraining influence as possible to bear on a reunited
5For a discussion on these differences, please refer to Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f 
South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 70-73; Nicolas Regaud, Le Cambodge dans la 
Tourmente: Le Troisieme Conflit Indochinois, 1978-1991 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1992), pp. 154- 
155.
6Corrine Phuangkasem, Thailand’s Foreign Relations, 1964-80 (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 37-38.
7Khien Theeravit, “The United States, Thailand, and the Indochinese Conflict,” in Hans H. Indorf, 
ed., Thai-American Relations in Contemporary Affairs (Singapore: Executive Publications PTE 
Ltd., 1982), pp. 149-150.
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Vietnam.”8 Sharing the Thai threat perception, Singapore feared Vietnam’s 
aspirations in Indochina and the growing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. 
Consequently, it supported a US presence in the region to deter Soviet and 
Vietnamese hegemonic ambitions.
By contrast, Indonesia perceived the PRC as its primary source of external 
threat, partly due to its alleged involvement in the abortive coup d'etat of 1965, 
but regarded Vietnam as a useful buffer state against China’s regional expansion. 
Hein explains that it is “almost axiomatic in Jakarta that an independent and 
secure Vietnam can make a positive contribution to overall regional security and 
resilience in the face of the external threat posed by Beijing.”9 In addition, 
Indonesia shared with Vietnam the experience of a military struggle for 
independence and considered its domestic political regime to be primarily 
nationalistic rather than communist. It should be noted that the TAC reflected 
Indonesia’s preference for an autonomous management of the regional order that 
would include Vietnam and thus reduce its reliance on external powers. Malaysia 
viewed the PRC, though to a lesser extent than Indonesia, as a primary danger to 
its security and wished for Vietnam to be integrated within the region. Malaysia’s 
threat perception was dominated by fears of internal subversion due to China’s 
past assistance to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), its interference in 
domestic affairs and the existence of a large ethnic Chinese minority in the 
federation.10 Thanks to its geographic location and military links with the United 
States, the Philippines did not feel acutely threatened by either Vietnam or the 
PRC. The Philippines was the third ASEAN state to establish relations with the 
PRC in July 1975. Indonesia and Singapore, which had pledged to be the last 
member to recognise China, only normalised relations with Beijing in 1990.
Regardless of its initiatives to regulate regional relations, Vietnam did not 
recognise ASEAN as a diplomatic entity and regarded the arrangement with 
hostility due to its conservative and anti-communist ideology. Seen as a 
reformulation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ASEAN was
8Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War (London: Verso, 1984), p. 182.
9Gordon R. Hein, Soeharto’s Foreign Policy: Second-Generation Nationalism in Indonesia (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1988), p. 343.
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considered as part of an American policy of containment. Vietnam also expected 
the Association to be short-lived. By rejecting the TAC, Hanoi thwarted ASEAN’s 
attempt to apply a code of conduct to the whole of Southeast Asia and 
demonstrated its limited influence in dealing with extra-mural affairs. Moreover, 
Vietnam and Laos prevented the inclusion of the ZOPFAN principle in the final 
resolution of the Fifth Non-Aligned Conference held in Colombo in August 1976 
in spite of its inclusion in Algiers in 1973. Hanoi had formerly criticised existing 
ties with external powers by referring to the promotion of “independence, peace 
and genuine neutrality in Southeast Asia.” Vietnam was willing to open bilateral 
relations with individual participants. Relations were established with Malaysia 
and the Philippines in 1976 and Thailand in 1978. Indonesia had maintained 
diplomatic ties with Hanoi throughout the Second Indochina Conflict. Hanoi’s 
refusal to confer at a multilateral level was aimed at weakening ASEAN by 
dividing its member states and to avoid Vietnam being subject to collective 
pressure.
Despite the contradictory strategic perspectives and Vietnam’s hostility 
towards the Association, the Indochinese question was not yet a source of tension 
among the member states. Intra-mural differences and contrasting threat 
perceptions were kept latent by the emergence of a xenophobic regime in 
Cambodia, which was keen to preserve its independence from Vietnam.11 Laos 
came under Vietnamese influence after the communist victory and Hanoi imposed 
a relationship of dependency on Vientiane through a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation signed in July 1977.12 In contrast, Pol Pot’s government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) opposed such external control and relations with 
Hanoi soon worsened. Between 1975 and 1978, Vietnamese-Cambodian relations 
were strained by traditional feelings of animosity, border disputes and ideological
1 3quarrels. These divisions favoured the Thai interest as they secured Cambodia’s
,0Bilveer Singh, Singapore-Indonesia Defence Cooperation: A Case Study o f Defence Bilateralism 
within ASEAN, ISIS ASEAN Series (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
Malaysia, 1990), p. 5.
1 Michael Leifer, “The Role and Paradox of ASEAN” in M. Leifer, ed., The Balance o f Power in 
East Asia (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), p. 125.
12Please refer to Robert Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 123-125.
13For a discussion on the growing antagonism in bilateral relations that led eventually to open 
conflict, please refer to Nguyen-vo Thu-huong, Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina
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traditional role as a buffer state against Vietnam. Leifer writes that “For Thailand, 
in particular, the prospect of an inter-Communist balance of power was attractive 
politically, while ASEAN as a corporate entity could contemplate the prospect of a 
structure of regional relations based on a limitation of Vietnamese dominance 
within Indochina.”14 Indonesia’s interests were also enhanced by a deterioration of 
Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1975-1976. A revival of hostility had started to 
appear by the end of the Second Indochina War. Matters that led to a worsening of 
bilateral ties included territorial disputes, ideological disagreements, the issue of 
overseas Chinese living in Vietnam as well as Hanoi’s relations with Moscow.15 
In short, the emergence of a power equilibrium in Indochina and renewed Sino- 
Vietnamese antagonism accommodated intra-mural differences and reduced fears 
of a Vietnamese or Chinese hegemony.
This acceptable situation in Indochina quickly changed for the worse. A 
series of clashes on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border led to a Vietnamese 
military incursion in December 1977 and the suspension of diplomatic relations. 
The escalation of tension convinced Hanoi and Phnom Penh of the need to 
reinforce their links with external powers, respectively the Soviet Union and the 
PRC. Vietnam joined the COMECON on 29 June 1978 and its relations with 
China continued to deteriorate. The gradual involvement of the Soviet Union and 
the PRC lessened the advantages of a satisfactory distribution of power in 
Indochina and led the ASEAN states to fear new external intervention in the 
region.16 Due to the nature of their association, the members were incapable of 
reacting to these events. However, ASEAN became involved in the emerging 
conflict when the opposite sides lobbied for its support. During official visits to
Conflict (London: McFarland Sc Company Inc. Publishers, 1992), pp. 78-85 and 96-124; Chang 
Pao-Min, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), 
pp. 51-71; Stephen P. Heder, “The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict,” in David W.P. Elliot, ed., 
The Third Indochina Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 21-67; Research Institute for 
Peace and Security, Asian Security 1979 (Tokyo: Nikkei Business Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 103- 
104.
14Michael Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in South-East Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 162 
(London: International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 3.
I5For an analysis of the deterioration of relations between 1975 and 1978, please refer to Nguyen 
Manh Hung, “Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 11 (November 1979), pp. 1037-1045; Robert Sutter, “China’s Strategy 
Towards Vietnam and its Implications for the United States,” in David W.P. Elliot, ed., The Third 
Indochina Conflict (Boulder. Westview Press, 1981), pp. 167-185.
16Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in South-East Asia, p. 3.
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the ASEAN capitals in September-October 1978, including a five-day trip to 
Bangkok, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Van Dong offered a Treaty of 
Friendship and Non-Aggression to his hosts. He pledged that Vietnam would not 
interfere in internal affairs or assist domestic communist parties. Thayer points out 
that “As a sign of its growing political maturity, ASEAN co-ordinated its response 
to Dong’s visit, presented a united front, and collectively agreed to individually 
decline the offer of a non-aggression treaty.”17 Chinese Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping visited Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore later that year. General 
Kriangsak Chomanan, Thailand’s prime minister between November 1977 and 
February 1980, had previously strengthened relations with the PRC during an 
official visit to Beijing in April 1978.
While consolidating the diplomatic image of the Association, these 
initiatives were steps on the road to war. Vietnam and the Soviet Union formalised 
their alignment by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 3 November 
1978 and later supported the establishment of the exile Kampuchean National 
United Front for National Salvation that challenged the Pol Pot regime. Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia began on 25 December 1978 and ended the power 
equilibrium in Indochina. Santoli explains that Hanoi “conceived of its invasion in 
terms of the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia: a blitzkrieg 
operation with quick destruction of all resistance, rapid establishment of a puppet 
government, and an occupation force that could survive short-term world 
condemnation.”18 The DK government was overthrown in early January 1979 and 
its Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary travelled to Beijing to seek assistance. A pro- 
Vietnamese government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was 
established on 8 January 1979 under the nominal leadership of Heng Samrin. A 
former Khmer Rouge official, the latter had found refuge in Hanoi the previous 
year. Finally, a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 18 
February 1979, which provided Vietnam with a legal justification for maintaining 
military forces in Cambodia.
17Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN and Indochina: The Dialogue,” in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN 
in the 1990’s (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp. 146-147.
l8Al Santoli, Endless Insurgency: Cambodia (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985), p. 63.
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II. The Third Indochina Conflict
The Cambodian conflict originated from a struggle over the distribution of 
power in Indochina.19 In addition to its domestic dimension, consisting of a 
struggle between Cambodian factions, the war enjoyed a regional scope defined by 
a series of hostile bilateral relations, above all, Sino-Vietnamese antagonism. 
Moreover, the conflict became an element in East-West rivalry and thus part of the 
strategic calculations of the great powers. It is often argued that Vietnam invaded 
its neighbour either to establish an Indochinese federation under its control or to 
respond to a Chinese threat on its Southwestern border.20 Both explanations need 
to be included in an analysis of Vietnam’s policy in Cambodia. The creation of a 
loose federation may be examined as the outcome of a military doctrine 
introduced during the First Indochina Conflict.21 General Vo Nguyen Giap, 
leading strategist and founding father of the People’s Army of Vietnam, had then 
declared:
Indochina is a strategic unit; a single theatre of operations. Therefore, we have 
the task of helping to liberate all of Indochina - especially for reasons of strategic 
geography, we cannot conceive of Vietnam completely independent while 
Cambodia and Laos are mled by imperialism.22
Vietnam imposed militarily a relationship of dependency on Cambodia already 
established in Laos through a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Vietnam was 
influenced in its military action by the close ties that had developed between 
Cambodia and the PRC.
Chinese strategic calculations were dominated by the need to avoid a 
situation where one single state could control Indochina and threaten its 
Southeastern border. Vietnam’s hegemony over Cambodia and Laos was therefore 
unacceptable to the PRC. Beijing was highly suspicious of Hanoi’s alignment with
19For a complete examination of the origins and evolution of the conflict, please refer to David 
W.P. Elliot, ed., The Third Indochina Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); Evans & Rowley, 
Red Brotherhood at War; Donald E. Weatherbee, ed., Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN- 
Indochina Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Chang, Kampuchea Between China and 
Vietnam; Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1986); Regaud, Le Cambodge dans la Tourmente; Nguyen-vo Thu-huong, Khmer-Viet 
Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict.
20Gareth Porter, “Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis,” in David Elliot, ed., The Third 
Indochina Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 69.
21Michael Leifer, “Cambodian Conflict- The Final Phase?,” Conflict Studies, 221 (1989), p. 2.
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Moscow and perceived the invasion of Cambodia as part of a Soviet regional 
expansion. The occupation of Cambodia was conditional on military and financial 
assistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviet regional presence was also 
intensified in early 1979 through its military deployment at the air and naval bases 
at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Consequently, the Third Indochina Conflict was 
part of the so-called Second Cold War and became particularly relevant with 
regard to the Sino-Soviet Split.23 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 consolidated fears in Beijing of a Soviet encirclement of its territory and 
expansion in Asia. Though sharing these apprehensions, the United States had 
scaled down its military involvement in Southeast Asia and was unwilling to 
orchestrate a response to the power shift in Indochina.
Rather than being accepted as a fait accompli, Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia was strongly condemned and provoked an international response, 
consisting of military, diplomatic and economic dimensions. It united China, the 
United States, Japan and the ASEAN members in an effort to terminate an illegal 
occupation of a sovereign state. Leifer argues that “The object of the collective 
enterprise was to apply a strategy of attrition at Vietnam’s expense which over 
time would subject its government and society to breaking strain so obliging it to 
abdicate its geopolitical advantage.”24 Affecting its credibility as a regional player, 
the PRC reacted most strongly to Vietnam’s policy in Cambodia. Deng Xiaoping 
authorized a punitive offensive across Vietnam’s Northern border that lasted from 
mid-February until mid-March 1979. The offensive had been tacitly approved by 
US President Jimmy Carter during Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States in 
early 1979.25 Restrained in its objectives to avoid a Soviet response, the operation 
indicated the inexperience of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and failed to 
influence Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. For instance, it did not deter Hanoi
22Quoted in Porter, “Vietnamese Policy and The Indochina Crisis,” p. 88.
23The Sino-Soviet Split gradually developed during the 1960’s and resulted from ideological, 
economic and military factors. These included the issue of nuclear cooperation, which was 
terminated by the Soviet Union in 1960 to preserve its nuclear monopoly amongst the communist 
states, and the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) that aggravated an 
ideological struggle between Moscow and Beijing. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 and the Brezhnev Doctrine of September 1968 deepened the antagonism. A final sign 
of the Split occurred in March 1969 when military clashes took place along the Ussuri River.
24Michael Leifer, “The Indochina Problem,” in T.B. Millar and James Walter, eds., Asian-Pacific 
Security After the Cold War (London: Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, University 
of London, 1992) p. 52.
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from announcing the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with the 
Heng Samrin government. The PRC never attempted to teach Vietnam a second 
lesson. Nevertheless, the attack served to remind Hanoi of a constant Chinese 
threat and questioned the reliability of the Soviet Union as a military ally. 
Afterwards, the PRC imposed military pressure on Vietnam through a large 
deployment of forces on their joint frontier. This led to a series of border clashes.
In addition to its direct military activities, the PRC actively supported the 
Khmer Rouge resistance, which had established sanctuaries along the Thai- 
Cambodian border. By June 1980, the Khmer Rouge disposed over forty to fifty 
thousand soldiers.26 Receiving Chinese assistance through Thailand, the Khmer 
Rouge fought a guerrilla warfare that prevented the Heng Samrin government 
from fully controlling its territory. Moreover, it obliged Vietnam to commit 
numerous troops in Cambodia and organise yearly offensive operations along the 
Eastern border of Thailand. These attacks against the sanctuaries of the Khmer 
resistance led to military incursions in the Thai territory. While less influential in 
military terms, other opposition groups also developed. The Khmer People’s 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF) was established in October 1979 under the 
leadership of former Premier Son Sann. A royalist resistance faction, led by King 
Norodom Sihanouk, was organised into the National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). Some 
limited military assistance was provided by Thailand and Singapore to the so- 
called non-communist Khmer resistance. In short, Vietnam was confronted with 
fierce Cambodian nationalism that challenged the legitimacy of his puppet regime 
in Phnom Penh.
The diplomatic response to the events in Indochina was primarily 
coordinated by ASEAN and will be examined in the next section. It suffices to say 
now that the member states maintained a common standpoint in relation to the 
Cambodian question by taking a legalistic position vis-^-vis a case of aggression. 
Economic isolation was implemented by the United States and Japan, which 
imposed economic sanctions on Vietnam. Moreover, Washington ended
25R oss, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979, p. 228.
26Please refer to Research Institute For Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980 (Tokyo: Nikkei 
Business Publishing Co., 1980), p. 148.
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negotiations with Hanoi regarding the establishment of bilateral relations and 
increased its economic and military aid to the ASEAN states, particularly 
Thailand.27
The Third Indochina Conflict quickly reached a military deadlock. On the 
one hand, the Chinese intervention of early 1979 and the military assistance 
provided to the Khmer Rouge did not affect Hanoi’s willingness to preserve its 
Indochinese federation. On the other, it was obvious by the mid-1980’s that 
Vietnam could not expect a complete victory on the battlefield. For instance, 
despite a successful dry season offensive in 1984-85 that removed the resistance 
groups from their border sanctuaries, Huxley writes that “by the time of the 1985- 
86 dry season the resistance had established new, smaller bases, had trained 
several thousand more guerrillas and had begun to take their military and political 
struggle deeper into Cambodia.”28 In spite of the international significance of the 
conflict, its military dimension remained confined to a domestic level. With a low 
level of military intensity, the war could be expected to last in the long term. The 
unlikelihood of a military victory transformed diplomacy into an important 
strategic instrument. The outcome of the Third Indochina Conflict was dependent 
on a political interpretation of its nature.29 Eager to ensure the legitimacy of the 
PRK, Hanoi described the conflict as a civil war between Cambodian factions. In 
contrast, ASEAN argued that the Cambodian question was an international 
conflict that had resulted from Vietnam’s illegal invasion and occupation of the 
country.30 It refused, therefore, to recognise the pro-Vietnamese government in 
Phnom Penh. The search for a diplomatic solution was severely affected by the 
Sino-Vietnamese rivalry as Beijing and Hanoi wished for a distribution of power 
in Indochina that would benefit their own strategic interests. Vietnam excluded 
even a partial return to power of the Khmer Rouge while the PRC rejected any 
initiative that questioned the legitimacy of the overthrown-DK government.
27Please refer to Regaud, Le Cambodge dans la Tourmente, pp. 261-268.
28Tim Huxley, “Cambodia in 1986: The PRK’s Eighth Year,” Southeast Asian Affairs 1987 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), p. 170.
29Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, “Cambodia,” in James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism 
1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 30.
30Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee and Sorpong Peou, “The Road to the Paris Conference: The 
Cambodian Peace Process in Historical Perspective,” in A. Acharya, P. Lizee and S. Peou, eds.,
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The resolution of the Third Indochina Conflict resulted from 
transformations at the international level rather than from ASEAN’s diplomatic 
proposals or events on the battlefield.31 The coming to power of Mikhael 
Gorbachev, as general secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, led on to 
Soviet attempts to reach detente with the United States and China. Gorbachev’s 
desire to improve relations with the PRC was indicated in a speech held in 
Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. Negotiations on the normalisation of relations were 
initiated in August 1988. The restoration of diplomatic ties with Beijing was 
dependent, among other issues, on the cessation of Soviet support for Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia. When that occurred, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement 
terminated the Cold War dimension of the conflict. Sino-Soviet relations were 
normalised during Gorbachev’s official visit to China in May 1989. No longer 
able to rely on external assistance and in urgent need for domestic economic 
reforms, Vietnam withdrew its troops in September 1989. Its decision made a 
Sino-Vietnamese dialogue possible as well as negotiations for a peaceful solution 
in Cambodia. The settlement of the conflict was signed on 23 October 1991 at the 
International Conference on Cambodia held in Paris. The organisation of the 
conference and the accord that was reached derived predominantly from the 
diplomatic efforts made by the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council.32
III. ASEAN’s Reaction to the Cambodian Conflict
The member states were shocked by Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, 
which broke the assurances given by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in the Fall 
of 1978, and by the assistance provided by the Soviet Union. The invasion 
terminated hopes of establishing stable relations with Hanoi and violated the 
cardinal rule of the international states system; namely, respect for national
Cambodia- The 1989 Paris Peace Process: Background Analysis and Documents (Millwood, NY: 
Kraus International Publications, 1991), pp. xxiii-xlviii.
3‘For a discussion on the final phase of the Third Indochina Conflict, please refer to Leifer, “The 
Indochina Problem,” pp. 60-68; Berdal and Leifer, “Cambodia,” pp. 32-58; and Acharya et al, 
“The Road to the Paris Conference: The Cambodian Peace Process In Historical Perspective,” pp. 
xxxiv-xlviii.
32Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1999), p. 31.
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sovereignty, which had been promulgated as the core principle of the Association 
in 1976. A failure to respond would have discredited ASEAN and created a 
dangerous precedent. Furthermore, Vietnam’s policy in Cambodia brought to an 
end a distribution of power in Indochina tolerable to the Association. It altered the 
strategic environment in mainland Southeast Asia by removing Thailand’s 
traditional buffer state against Vietnam with hostile military forces deployed along 
its Eastern border. Subsequently, collective solidarity had to be demonstrated 
towards a new front line state.
ASEAN’s response to the Third Indochina Conflict assumed two major 
forms which were primarily determined by Bangkok. The members followed a 
common diplomatic position that transformed the Association into a well- 
respected regional organisation. To review this side of its reaction, we shall focus 
on some achievements and also on failures that denoted ASEAN’s limited 
influence as a diplomatic actor. Only a few specific events will be examined 
therefore. Furthermore, the Association entered a tacit alliance with China to exert 
additional pressure on Vietnam. ASEAN’s reply to the invasion of Cambodia will 
thus in part be analysed as an example of the traditional practice of countervailing 
power. The Association also relied on the economic sanctions imposed on 
Vietnam by the US, Japan and other dialogue partners. This aspect will not be 
addressed in this section. The latter will be concluded by discussing how the 
associative and balance of power dimensions interacted in ASEAN’s response to 
the Third Indochina Conflict. Both perspectives were indeed closely intermingled. 
Beyond their common position, it will be noted that the member states perceived 
the Cambodian question according to their respective threat perception. In that 
respect, it brought to surface differences in strategic outlooks and became a source 
of tension in intra-mural relations.
A. Associative Dimension: A Collective Diplomatic Response
The initial ASEAN reply to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was 
formulated by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja,
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as chairman of ASEAN’s Standing Committee, on 9 January 1979.33 Restrained in 
its wording, the statement did not mention Vietnam to preserve a possible form of 
dialogue with the country. A special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers was 
held in Bangkok on 12-13 January 1979 and led to a stronger position that 
condemned the invasion. The joint statement of 12 January declared that “The 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers strongly deplored the armed intervention against the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea.” In addition, it 
“affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future by 
themselves free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise 
of their rights of self-determination” and “called for the immediate and total 
withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory.”34 These points 
would represent the essence of ASEAN’s common diplomatic position throughout 
the conflict.
ASEAN’s standpoint was later repeated in the joint communique of the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting organised in Bali on 28-30 June 1979.35 The 
significance of that session was raised by the attendance of US Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance and ministers from other dialogue partners. The common stand 
indicated the cohesion of the Association and the recognition of its core principles. 
By registering a hard-line position towards Vietnam, it also demonstrated 
collective solidarity vis-a-vis Thailand. The joint communique declared that the 
ASEAN foreign ministers agreed that:
... any further escalation of the fighting in Kampuchea or any incursion of any 
foreign forces into Thailand would directly affect the security of the ASEAN 
member states, and would endanger peace and security of the whole region. In 
this regard the ASEAN countries reiterated their firm support and solidarity with
33Professor Mochtar declared that: “The ASEAN member countries strongly regret the escalation 
and expansion of the armed conflict now taking place between the two Indochinese states. The 
ASEAN member countries have expressed their great concern over the implications of this 
development and its impact on peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia.” Statement by the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja as Chairman of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee on the Escalation of the Armed Conflict Between Vietnam and Kampuchea, 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 9 January 1979.
34Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political 
Development in the Southeast Asia Region, Bangkok, Thailand, 12 January, 1979.
35 The communique declared that: “The Foreign Ministers reiterated their support for the right of 
the Kampuchean people to determine their future by themselves, free from interference or 
influence from outside powers in the exercise of their right to self-determination and called for the 
immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory.” Joint 
Communique of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 28-30 June 1979.
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the government and people of Thailand, or any other ASEAN country in the
preservation of its independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity.36
ASEAN’s diplomatic response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was 
brought to the United Nations in 1979. Under UN auspices, the Association 
attained a position of leadership in its diplomatic struggle against a case of 
aggression. Its primary achievements involved the diplomatic isolation of Vietnam 
and its puppet regime in Phnom Penh, the tenure of the Cambodian seat in the 
United Nations General Assembly by the DK government and later by establishing 
a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). In November 1979, 
ASEAN sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly that demanded a cease­
fire in Cambodia, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and called for the right of 
self-determination for the Cambodian people. Adopted with a large majority, the 
resolution was a diplomatic defeat for Vietnam, which had expected its action to 
be rapidly accepted as a fait accompli. From that year onwards, ASEAN lobbied 
effectively at the UN to ensure the annual condemnation of Vietnam’s occupation 
of Cambodia.
Beyond the violation of the Cambodian national sovereignty, ASEAN was 
confronted with another development that had first arisen with the communist 
victory in Indochina in 1975; namely, the influx of refugees into different member 
states. The arrival of refugees severely increased after the invasion of Cambodia. 
The ASEAN foreign ministers declared on 13 January 1979 that the influx of 
refugees “is encountering severe economic, social, political and security problems 
particularly in those countries bearing the main brunt of the influx, such as 
Thailand and Malaysia.”37 The issue was discussed at the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting of June 1979 and included in the joint communique. Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister S. Rajaratnam affirmed in his address that the “refugee problem is not 
one to be resolved by simple humanitarianism. It is a military exercise to further 
the ambitions which the Vietnamese have concealed from us but not from their
• • • • ' I f iown people and their allies. Their ambition is hegemony in Southeast Asia.” The
36Joint Communique of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.
37Joint Press Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Indochinese 
Refugees, Bangkok, Thailand, 13 January 1979.
38Speech given by Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Rajaratnam at the Twelfth ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 28 June 1979.
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flow of predominately ethnic Chinese refugees alarmed the ASEAN states. The 
Thai government feared that some may engage in subversive activities in 
Thailand. Singapore and Malaysia were concerned by the prospect of instability in 
their multi-racial societies. A first United Nations Meeting on Refugees and
39 >i'iDisplaced Persons in Southeast Asia was organised in Geneva in July 1979. The 
Association later succeeded in maintaining this dramatic problem on the 
international agenda.
The legitimacy and recognition of the DK government was achieved 
through an ASEAN-sponsored resolution in September 1979. It consolidated the 
notion that the Cambodian question was an international conflict which had been 
provoked by Vietnam’s invasion of the country. Backing the overthrown-DK 
government posed two serious complications for the ASEAN states however. It 
was close to impossible to secure long-term international support for a 
government which had implemented genocidal policies that had cost the lives of at 
least one million Cambodians. The United Kingdom and Australia were, for 
instance, no longer willing to support the legitimacy of the DK government. In 
addition, Vietnam radically opposed a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. As a 
result, ASEAN sought to integrate the DK government in an alternative grouping 
that would unite the three Khmer resistance factions in a coalition arrangement. 
After long and tedious negotiations, the leaders of the three factions, Sihanouk, 
Son Sann and Khieu Samphan, who had replaced Pol Pot as the formal leader of 
the Khmer Rouge, agreed to meet in Singapore in September 1981.
The CGDK was eventually established in Kuala Lumpur in June 1982 and 
represented an important diplomatic achievement for the Association.40 It ensured 
the tenure of the Cambodian seat and prevented the PRK from gaining 
international recognition. Buszynski explains that the CGDK “made it more 
difficult for the Phnom Penh government to appear as anything more than a 
foreign-controlled regime whose legitimacy was questionable.”41 In addition, the
39For a discussion on the issue of refugees, please refer to William Shawcross, The Quality of 
Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modem Conscience (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), pp. 302- 
328.
40See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (Singapore: 
Times Editions, 2000), pp. 375-376.
4lLeszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 77.
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coalition government eased the provision of international assistance to the Khmer 
resistance and offered the possibility of an alternative to a Vietnamese-installed 
government and the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge. Finally, the CGDK was 
presided over by King Sihanouk who was recognised both by the Cambodian 
people and the international community. Nevertheless, the coalition government 
was weakened by persistent mistrust and rivalry among the factions, which 
maintained separate military forces. The Khmer Rouge conserved its leading role 
and dominant military position. Moreover, the creation of a coalition arrangement 
did not change Vietnam’s standpoint as it continued to declare the situation in 
Indochina as irreversible. Discussing the CGDK, Leifer explains that “Its main 
effect was to safeguard a diplomatic position rather than advance the prospect for 
a political settlement.”42
Prior to the formation of the CGDK, ASEAN succeeded in organising an 
International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in New York in July 1981 under 
the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union declined to participate which ended hopes of any progress. Hanoi 
rejected any diplomatic solution that would question the recognition of the Heng 
Samrin government and limited the conflict to a border problem between Thailand 
and Cambodia. The Vietnamese position had formerly been reiterated at a 
conference held in Vientiane in July 1980, which gathered the foreign ministers of 
Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. The communique had proposed the signing of non­
aggression treaties with the ASEAN states, the creation of a demilitarised zone on 
the Thai-Cambodian border and mutual cooperation to solve the refugee 
problem 43 Hence, it suggested a de facto recognition of the PRK.
Yet, the ICK also indicated the existence of opposing views between the 
Association and the PRC on an eventual peace settlement in Cambodia. ASEAN 
set forward a diplomatic initiative during the conference, which proposed the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia under UN supervision, the disarming 
of the different Cambodian factions and the organisation of free elections. The 
member states were keen to avoid a political outcome that would replace a
42Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 119.
43Vientiane Statement, 18 July 1980. Reproduced in Documents on the Kampuchean Problem, 
1979-1985 (Bangkok: Department of Political Affairs, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 1988), pp. 148- 
151.
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Vietnamese puppet regime by a Chinese dominance of Cambodia.44 Their attempt 
to offer a diplomatic solution to the Cambodian issue was rejected by the PRC and 
the United States. Stressing the legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge, China argued that 
only the military troops of the PRK should be forced to disarm. Justus van der 
Kroef writes that “The Chinese strongly objected on the grounds that these 
proposals infringed the DK’s exclusive sovereign rights as Cambodia’s only 
legitimate government. The United States accepted these Chinese objections, 
despite evident ASEAN displeasure.”45 The American position resulted from a 
need to consolidate ties with Beijing after the opening of relations in January 
1 9 7 9 46 The Chinese intransigence concerned the ASEAN states, primarily 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The final declaration of the ICK accommodated the PRC 
by making no reference to a disarmament of the Khmer Rouge and it failed to 
have a diplomatic impact on the conflict.47
In sum, an associative position was adopted by the ASEAN states during 
the Third Indochina Conflict that reflected the norms and principles promoted by 
the Association since 1967. The member states maintained a common stand based 
on the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the affairs of 
other states. They demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia
A O
and called for the right of self-determination for the Cambodian people. It should 
be noted that a similar position was not adopted in response to Indonesia’s 
invasion of East Timor or to China’s punitive offensive of early 1979.49 The 
member states made considerable efforts and used any diplomatic means available 
to challenge the occupation of Cambodia. They were successful in isolating 
Vietnam diplomatically and preventing the Heng Samrin government from gaining
^Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 116.
45Justus M. van der Kroef, Dynamics o f the Cambodian Conflict (London: Institute for the Study of 
Conflict, 1986), p. 6.
4<5Discussing the International Conference on Kampuchea, US President Ronald Reagan declared in 
1985 that Washington continues “to support the basic principles for the settlement o f the 
Cambodian situation agreed upon at that conference—the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces under international supervision; the restoration of Cambodian independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity; a Cambodian government chosen in free elections under international 
auspices.” Address by US President Ronald Reagan to the Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 
Bali, Indonesia, on 1 May 1985.
47ICK Declaration on Kampuchea, New York, 17 July 1981.
48This was for instance repeated in the Appeal for Kampuchean Independence by the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers, Jakarta, Indonesia, 20 September 1983.
49M.L. Smith and D.M. Jones, “ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New 
World Order,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3 (December 1997), p. 137.
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international recognition. Through its collective diplomatic activities in the UN, 
ASEAN indicated its cohesion and enhanced its international standing and 
credibility as a diplomatic arrangement. In spite of different threat perceptions, the 
members also closed ranks with Thailand. The degree of solidarity manifested 
during the Third Indochina Conflict should be viewed as surprising in light of the 
cooperative fragility that had defined ASEAN since its creation.
Nonetheless, the common diplomatic response to the Cambodian issue was 
undermined by significant limitations. Devoid of military capabilities, ASEAN’s 
actions on their own failed to influence events on the battlefield or to affect 
Vietnam’s commitment in Cambodia. By refusing to negotiate with the 
Association other than on its own terms, Hanoi thwarted its collective diplomatic 
undertakings. The latter only evolved into political tactics set forward by ASEAN 
with little bearing on the final resolution of the conflict. Moreover, Vietnam 
demonstrated ASEAN’s inability to manage the regional order and to influence 
extra-mural events. China’s intransigence also restricted attempts to find a 
political solution to the conflict. As a result, collective efforts rapidly reached a 
deadlock. ASEAN’s weakness as a diplomatic actor was displayed in the 
international settlement of the conflict that followed the normalisation of Sino- 
Soviet relations and in which it played only a secondary role. Though Indonesia’s 
foreign minister co-chaired the Paris conference, the Association was not involved 
in the final diplomatic stages that led to the resolution of the war. Hence, the Third 
Indochina Conflict revealed the limits of diplomacy without supporting sanctions, 
which ASEAN lacked. As will be noted in the next chapter, this limitation has 
also restricted ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute.
B. Balance of Power Dimension: ASEAN’s Tacit Alliance with China
Having so far examined the associative dimension, let us now focus on the 
politics of the balance of power in ASEAN’s response to the occupation of 
Cambodia. Its reaction needs to be analysed in light of its strategic collaboration 
with outside powers.50 Despite its objective of national and regional resilience, the 
Association cooperated with the PRC to exert countervailing pressure on Vietnam
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and to supplement a necessary military dimension to its collective diplomatic 
efforts. In that respect, it followed conventional balance of power tactics to 
counterbalance a Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. This policy of tacit alliance 
was imposed by Thailand on its ASEAN partners. It resulted from Sino-Thai 
relations and not from a common institutional position. While supported by 
Singapore, the tacit alliance was generally tolerated by Indonesia and Malaysia in 
the name of ASEAN solidarity. It would still concern and frustrate Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur and affect the cohesion of the Association. A large part of the 
following discussion deals with the intra-mural consequences of the conventional 
power balancing policies.
Faced with a direct threat to its security, Thailand could not ensure its 
defence by relying on a cooperative security regime that lacked the joint military 
capabilities and a common threat perception among its participants to evolve into 
a tacit or formal alliance. Such a shift was, despite the invasion of Cambodia, 
opposed by the members that primarily associated sources of regional instability 
with internal threats. Moreover, the ASEAN states did not dispose of the 
necessary means to influence the military dimension of the conflict. Singapore’s 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew declared that “there is no combination of forces in 
Southeast Asia that can stop the Vietnamese on the mainland of Asia.”51 There 
was also a strong desire not to provoke Vietnam or further deepen its reliance on 
the Soviet Union. Besides, a move towards alliance formation would have been 
viewed by Indonesia as violating its active and independent foreign policy. 
Thailand was thus unable to rely on the weak ASEAN states to oppose militarily 
the occupation of Cambodia, deter incursions on its border or defend its territory 
in the rather unlikely event of an open Vietnamese offensive. Instead, it sought 
assistance from the PRC and to a lesser extent from the United States. In short, 
though regarded as a significant diplomatic instrument, the Association would 
only receive during the Third Indochina Conflict a secondary position in 
Thailand’s strategic planning.52
50This point was made by Dr. Mike Smith, Lecturer in Pacific Security, Department of War Studies 
at King’s College London (KCL). The interview was held at KCL on 9 February 2000.
51Quoted in Rodolfo C. Garcia, “Military Co-operation in ASEAN,” The Pointer, Vol. 12, No. 3 
(April-June 1986), p. 9.
52Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 91.
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In contrast to cooperative security, Thailand had traditionally entered 
power balancing arrangements to react to changes in the regional distribution of 
power. A tacit alliance with China, the historic enemy of Vietnam, was concluded 
in January 1979 in response to the events in Cambodia.53 Though no formal treaty 
was signed, the PRC gave assurances to Thailand that it would intervene in the 
case of a Vietnamese aggression. Copper explains that “In terms of military 
cooperation, China cemented a kind of informal military alliance with Thailand 
shortly after Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea and China’s invasion of Vietnam, 
promising to once again invade Vietnam if Vietnamese troops enter Thailand.”54 
Besides acting as a deterrent, the PRC contributed to Thailand’s defence 
capabilities through the transfer of military equipment. Bangkok was also reliant 
on increased financial and military aid from the United States. During a visit to 
Washington in February 1979, Thailand’s Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan 
received confirmation from President Carter that the US would honour its security 
commitments under the Manila Pact of September 1954. The United States also 
accelerated the supply of arms to the Thai military.55 Yet, it was unwilling to play 
a direct military role in the Cambodian issue mainly due to its bitter experience in 
the Second Indochina Conflict.
In addition to its defensive character, the special relationship with the PRC 
aimed to end Vietnam’s control over Cambodia. Thailand allowed the passage 
through its territory of Chinese military supplies for the Khmer Rouge resistance 
operating in Cambodia and the border area. The use of Thai facilities was thus 
indispensable to sustain the guerrilla warfare. In return, Thailand was strongly 
criticised by Hanoi and faced a flow of refugees and repeated incursions on its 
territory. China’s punitive offensive in early 1979 also indicated its disposition to 
act as a direct source of countervailing power against Vietnam. Yet, the attack 
failed to reduce the number of Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia. It therefore 
indicated the limits of China’s capacity to intimidate its neighbour and defend the 
security of Thailand. Nevertheless, the PRC maintained a large military presence
53Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War, pp. 348-349.
54John F. Copper, “China and Southeast Asia,” in Donald E. Weatherbee, ed., Southeast Asia 
Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 55.
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on its Southeastern border to exercise pressure on Hanoi. The fear of a second 
attack forced Vietnam to deploy numerous troops along its frontier, which was 
expected in Beijing to divert its military commitment in Cambodia. In sum, the 
conventional operation of the balance of power factor was dependent on China’s 
commitment to a war of attrition against Vietnam.
The tacit alliance was a function of a common opposition to Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia. It served the Chinese and Thai narrowly-defined 
interests. It enabled Beijing to enhance its Southeast Asian influence after the 
downfall of the Khmer Rouge and to offset the rising Soviet power in the region. 
In the absence of Thai collaboration, China would have been unable to assist the 
Khmer resistance. The tacit alliance promoted Thai security interests by 
challenging the PRK and led China to end its support for the Communist Party of 
Thailand (CPT). This greatly reduced the activities of the subversive movement. 
Moreover, Beijing gradually decreased its aid to communist insurgencies 
operating in other ASEAN states. Yet, the partnership was also affected by several 
constraints.56 Thailand and the PRC disagreed on an eventual political settlement 
of the conflict. Though aiding its military efforts, Thailand opposed a return to 
power of the Khmer Rouge, which would replace a Vietnamese with a Chinese 
domination of Cambodia. Additionally, Bangkok was fearful of China’s 
hegemonic ambitions in Southeast Asia and concerned about its remaining 
subversive influence in Thailand. Finally, China’s influence as a deterrent against 
Vietnam was restricted, particularly with reference to Vietnam’s military activities 
on the Thai-Cambodian frontier.
Thailand succeeded in imposing on its partners its tacit alliance with China 
and thus to integrate a power balancing dimension into ASEAN’s reaction to the 
Cambodian crisis. Under the Thai guidance, the Association took sides with the 
PRC in its struggle against Vietnam and was integrated within a larger 
international effort to oppose Vietnamese and Soviet policies in Indochina.
55Please refer to Tim Huxley, The ASEAN States ’ Defence Policies, 1975-8: Military Responses to 
Indochina?, Working Paper No. 88 (Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, October 1984), pp. 31-32.
56Sukhumbhand Paribatra, “Dictactes of Security: Thailand’s Relations with the PRC since the 
Vietnam War,” in Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee and Soedjati Djiwandono, eds., ASEAN and 
China: An Evolving Relationship, Research Papers and Policy Studies (Berkeley: Institute of East 
Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 318-323.
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Concerned about China’s intentions in mainland Southeast Asia, Bangkok was 
eager though to preserve the unity of the Association and its operation as a 
credible diplomatic arrangement. Forming the link between the PRC and ASEAN, 
Thailand wished to rely both on military and diplomatic pressure to oppose 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. General Prem Tinsulanond, Thailand’s prime 
minister from 1980 to 1988, and Siddhi Savetsila, who served as foreign minister 
until 1990, played an important role in challenging Vietnam and preserving the 
cohesion of the Association. Siddhi, in particular, was gifted at keeping options 
open and managing bilateral relations with China and Indonesia.57 Hence, he took 
a decisive part in successfully combining the two major forms that characterised
c o
Thailand’s reaction to the Third Indochina Conflict.
That said, ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts were reliant on traditional balance 
of power tactics. Doubtlessly, the tacit alliance was a prerequisite for Bangkok’s 
stand against the occupation of Cambodia. Leifer writes that “had China not made 
absolutely clear its unrelenting opposition to Vietnam’s policy in Kampuchea, 
then Thailand would have almost certainly been obliged to accommodate itself to 
the political fait accompli”59 This suggests that the diplomatic response of the 
Association was conditional on China’s willingness to exert countervailing power 
on Vietnam. The associative dimension was dependent in particular on the 
Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge resistance. Without an ongoing guerrilla 
warfare against the PRK, Vietnam would have won the conflict despite ASEAN’s 
diplomatic efforts in the UN.60 This argument is developed in the final part of this 
section when the interaction between the associative and balance of power 
dimensions is examined.
ASEAN’s tacit alliance with the PRC evolved into a source of division in 
intra-mural relations. The response of the different member states to a practice of 
countervailing power was subject to their respective threat perception. 
Contradictory views on the tacit alliance soon appeared within ASEAN. Singapore
57This point was made by Hasnan Habib, former Ambassador of Indonesia to Thailand (1978-82) 
and the United States (1982-86). The interview was held in Jakarta on 23 March 2000.
58This point was made by Dr. John Funston, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS). The interview was held at ISEAS on 2 March 2000.
59Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 105.
60This point was made by Dr. Leonard Sebastian, Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS). The interview was held at ISEAS on 25 February 2000.
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advocated a confrontational stance against Vietnam and accepted Thailand’s 
reliance on China to oppose the PRK. Due to its own strategic situation, the city- 
state could not tolerate Vietnam’s act of hegemony towards its smaller neighbour. 
In addition, it was fearful of a growing Soviet naval influence in the region 
enhanced from March 1979 by a deployment of its aircrafts and naval vessels at 
Cam Ranh Bay. Though fully aware of China’s potential menace, Singapore 
regarded the special relationship with the PRC as necessary to limit Vietnam’s 
control of Indochina backed by Moscow. Moreover, the city-state supported 
China’s punitive offensive across Vietnam’s Northern border. Lee Kuan Yew 
would later explain in his memoirs that “Deng Xiaoping deterred any assault 
against Thailand by attacking Vietnam in February 1979.”61 In short, Singapore 
perceived the Soviet Union and its alliance with Vietnam as posing the most 
immediate threat to regional security. Least affected by the Cambodian crisis, the 
Philippines supported Thailand’s position.
Indonesia and Malaysia favoured a more accommodating line towards 
Vietnam that would take into account its regional security interests as well as its 
difficult relations with China. They also opposed the international isolation of 
Vietnam as it was expected to increase its reliance on the Soviet Union. Taking a 
more insular approach to security, the military leadership in Jakarta did not feel 
threatened by the events in Indochina. Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, 
perceived the PRC as their primary source of external threat and judged the Soviet 
rising presence in the region as less menacing. Both members were troubled by 
China’s military intervention against Vietnam in early 1979.62 The ASEAN 
foreign ministers had responded to the Chinese attack by calling “for the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops from the areas of conflict in Indochina to avoid 
the deterioration of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.” Finally, Indonesia and 
Malaysia comprehended that the long-term weakening of Vietnam would enable 
the PRC to consolidate its Southeast Asian influence. Yet, keen to preserve the 
cohesion of the Association, Indonesia and Malaysia were left with no choice but 
to accept the tacit alliance with China. Though expressing their concern, they
61Lee, From Third World to First, p. 377.
62Narayanan Ganesan, Singapore’s Foreign Policy in ASEAN: Major Domestic and Bilateral 
Political Constraints (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1989), p. 203.
63ASEAN Statement on the Vietnam-China Border War, Bangkok, Thailand, 20 February 1979.
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recognised that breaking ranks with Thailand would only increase its dependence 
on the PRC. It should be noted that Bangkok repeated this point frequently.64
Indonesia’s policy on the Cambodian question was rather ambivalent due 
to the different positions adopted by the ministry of foreign affairs and the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI).65 Professor Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, Indonesia’s foreign minister from 1978 to 1988, was mostly 
inclined to adjust the official governmental line with ASEAN’s stance against the 
invasion. He viewed Vietnam’s undertaking primarily as an act of aggression and 
focused on the restoration of the Cambodian national sovereignty. The notion of 
ASEAN solidarity, supported by Suharto himself, was thus respected. In addition, 
foreign ministry officials realised that the PRC needed to be involved in a 
settlement of the war. Yet, they were “also obliged to avoid the impression that by 
siding with ASEAN’s stance, Indonesia indirectly supported China’s position in 
the Cambodian conflict.”66 This would have been unacceptable to the military. 
General Benny Murdani, commander of Indonesia’s armed forces from 1983 to 
1988 and later minister of defence until 1993, favoured a resolution of the conflict 
that would exclude China and reckon with Vietnam’s security interests. The 
military elite argued that Vietnam was primarily acting in self-defence in response 
to a border conflict provoked by the Khmer Rouge and supported by Beijing. 
ABRI admired the Vietnamese armed forces and shared with them the experience 
of a military struggle for independence. In contrast to Thailand, which was said to 
follow a “bamboo policy,” Vietnam was perceived as a safeguard against Chinese 
expansionism in Southeast Asia. Bangkok was aware of Indonesia’s ambivalent 
stand on the Cambodian crisis.
While in contradiction with its security perspective, the imposition of a 
tacit alliance with China also violated Indonesia’s preference for an autonomous 
management of the regional order. The integration of Vietnam within a regional 
order was regarded as indispensable to achieve long-term autonomy in Southeast 
Asia. Through its strategic relations with the PRC and the United States, ASEAN 
opposed the Soviet Union and its regional ally. Indonesia was distressed by the
^This point was made by Dr. John Funston.
65This paragraph is based on a discussion with Hasnan Habib. See also Rizal Sukma, Indonesia 
and China: The Politics o f a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 93-99.
66Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics o f a Troubled Relationship, p. 95.
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fact that the situation in Cambodia had led to external interference in Southeast 
Asia, chiefly from China and the Soviet Union. The reliance on the PRC and a 
deeper involvement in Cold War antagonism delayed the implementation of the 
ZOPFAN principle and frustrated Indonesia’s managerial disposition. Jakarta 
hoped that the Third Indochina Conflict would become the last manifestation of 
external military intervention in Southeast Asia.
Finally, ASEAN’s reaction to the Cambodian issue questioned Indonesia’s 
position of natural leadership within the Association. As will be discussed later 
on, Indonesia and Malaysia set forward various diplomatic initiatives to find a 
regional solution to the conflict. Yet, Thailand dictated the ASEAN stand on 
Cambodia and used its right as a front line state to reject or modify proposals. 
Thailand became the Association’s political centre of gravity. Polomka points out 
when discussing Thailand’s leading role in the formulation of collective policies 
that it “had the consequence of shifting the centre of gravity of decision-making 
on ASEAN/Indochina relations away from Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, where it
/TO
resided in the early post-1975 period, towards Bangkok and Singapore.” The 
demand for cohesion and uniformity prevented Indonesia from formulating an 
independent foreign policy towards Vietnam and to influence the regional order. 
In short, Indonesia was confined by a common diplomatic position that aimed to 
oppose Vietnam’s policy in Cambodia.69 The Thai guidance and its restraining 
impact on Jakarta were negatively perceived by the Indonesian public opinion.
Differences over the tacit alliance with China were best demonstrated in 
March 1980 when talks between President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister 
Tun Hussein Onn led to the formulation of the Kuantan principle. Despite the 
common position adopted by the Association, two member states bilaterally 
expressed contrasting views on Cambodia. The preference for regional autonomy 
and the integration of Vietnam into a Southeast Asian pattern of power were at the
67This point was made by Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia (1988-1999). The 
interview was held in Jakarta on 21 March 2000.
68Peter Polomka, “Intra-Regional Dynamics: ASEAN and Indochina,” in T.B. Millar, ed., 
International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region (St. Lucia: University 
of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 126.
69This point was made by Barry Desker, Chief Executive Officer of the Singapore Trade 
Development Board (TDB), former Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and 
former Ambassador of Singapore to Indonesia (1986-1991). The interview was held at the TDB on 
17 February 2000.
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core of the statement. Weatherbee argues that “the Kuantan principle was a
reiteration of the 1971 ZOPFAN declaration but with direct applicability to the
Kampuchean crisis.”70 Both leaders agreed that a political settlement of the
conflict required a broader Vietnamese autonomy from the Soviet Union and
China and the recognition of its security interests in Indochina. They suggested the
legitimacy of some Vietnamese control in Cambodia in exchange for greater
independence from the Soviet Union, which would reduce the Sino-Vietnamese
71struggle in the region. In short, the Kuantan principle rejected ASEAN’s tacit 
alliance with the PRC. It acknowledged Vietnam’s hegemonic disposition in 
Indochina and implied that external intervention was the primary threat to regional 
stability.
Vigorously opposed by Thailand and Singapore, the Kuantan principle 
caused tension in intra-mural relations. Indonesia and Malaysia, which were 
unwilling to break ranks with their partners, quickly dropped a proposal that may 
have led to the fragmentation of the Association. Solidarity towards Thailand was 
thus maintained. Both would also restrain in the future their official opposition to 
the special relationship with the PRC. The Kuantan principle remained relevant 
however as it had shown a division within ASEAN. Two influential members had 
demonstrated their concern for a collective policy that contradicted associative 
principles and opposed their desire for regional autonomy. It should also be noted 
that the Kuantan principle was received negatively in Hanoi, which rejected the 
implication that Vietnam was not independent from external powers. Instead of 
taking advantage of intra-mural frictions, Vietnam made a brief military incursion 
into Thailand on 23 June 1980 as a response to a Thai repatriation programme of 
Cambodian refugees. Issued on 25 June, an ASEAN statement affirmed that 
Vietnam’s action “constitutes a grave and direct threat to the security of Thailand
71
and the South East Asian region.” Vietnam’s incursion into Thailand also served
70Donald E. Weatherbee, “The Diplomacy of Stalemate,” in D. Weatherbee, ed., Southeast Asia 
Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Craw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 12.
71Justus M. van der Kroef, “ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Conflict: Between ‘Kuantan’ 
and a ‘Third Alternative’,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, No. 5 (May 1981), p. 517.
72van der Kroef, “ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Conflict,” p. 518.
73Joint Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Situation on the Thai-Kampuchean 
Border, Bangkok, Thailand, 25 June 1980.
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to reinforce the hard-line position on Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia during 
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 25-26 June 1980.
Despite the rapid withdrawal of the Kuantan principle, Indonesian and 
Malaysian concerns regarding the tacit alliance with China were strengthened. 
Jakarta criticised Thailand’s flexible foreign policy and argued that the resolution 
of the conflict could only result from a negotiated settlement with Vietnam. 
Indonesia took a more active part in the Cambodian question partly due to its 
frustration over the ASEAN position. It was eager to reach a settlement that would 
serve its own regional design and indicate its position of regional leadership. A 
core motivation of the initiatives proposed by Indonesia but also Malaysia was to 
reduce Thailand’s dependence on China and to keep out external players from a 
regional solution to the conflict. In short, these undertakings should be analysed as 
a response to the Chinese strategy of attrition against Vietnam. They provoked 
additional discord within the Association.
At the Seventh Non-Aligned Conference in New Delhi in March 1983, 
Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Tan Sri Mohamed Ghazali Shafie suggested a “five- 
plus-two formula” that would bring together Laos, Vietnam and the ASEAN states 
in a series of talks without the Khmer factions. While accepted by Hanoi, the 
proposal was denied, primarily due to Chinese pressure, during a special meeting 
of the ASEAN foreign ministers held in Bangkok. Weatherbee points out that “It 
was the failure to follow up on this possible breakthrough that is at least part of 
the inspiration for what became Indonesia’s dual track diplomacy towards 
Vietnam in 1984.”74 Indonesia’s dual policy aimed at maintaining ASEAN’s 
cohesion while establishing closer relations with Vietnam. In response, the other 
members provided Indonesia with the role of “interlocutor” with Vietnam, though 
on an ad hoc basis, so encouraging its ambition to reach a regional solution within 
an ASEAN framework. Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach visited 
Jakarta in March 1984 and held talks with Suharto. No progress was made 
towards a diplomatic settlement. General Murdani had previously declared during 
an official trip to Hanoi in February 1984 that Indonesia did not perceive Vietnam
74Weatherbee, “The Diplomacy of Stalemate,” p. 15.
75Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements Through Political Cooperation,” 
The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1988), p. 188.
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as a threat to Southeast Asia. This incident had strained intra-mural relations. As a 
consequence of Indonesia’s dual track diplomacy, the Association needed to 
indicate its unity on the Cambodian question and its solidarity vis-a-vis Thailand. 
A special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers was organised in Jakarta in 
May 1984.76 In July, the foreign ministers also “reiterated ASEAN’s firm support 
and solidarity with the government and people of Thailand in the preservation of
77Thai independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Indonesia and Malaysia did not lessen their efforts to find a regional 
resolution of the conflict that would exclude a direct Chinese involvement in the 
settlement. While chairman of ASEAN’s Standing Committee, Tengku Ahmad 
Rithauden, Malaysia’s new foreign minister since the retirement of Ghazali Shafie 
in July 1984, suggested in 1985 the notion of “proximity talks” between the 
CGDK and the Heng Samrin government. Under Thai and Chinese pressure, the 
initiative was later modified to consist of negotiations between the coalition 
arrangement and Vietnam, which then refused to participate. The outcome of the 
Malaysian proposal once more manifested the influence of Bangkok and Beijing 
on ASEAN’s negotiating position. Furthermore, during an official visit to Hanoi 
in July 1987, Professor Mochtar and Nguyen Co Thach agreed on the organisation 
of informal discussions, the so-called “cocktail party,” that would first include the 
different Khmer factions before introducing other regional actors. Reviewed 
during a special meeting in August, the proposal was renounced by Singapore and 
Thailand, which feared a de facto recognition of the PRK.
The two-stage proposal was eventually applied in both the first and second 
Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) held in July 1988 and February 1989.78 
Organised by Ali Alatas, who had been appointed Indonesia’s foreign minister in 
March 1988, the meetings failed to reach a regional solution to the conflict. Yet, 
they enabled Indonesia to open negotiations with Phnom Penh and Hanoi and to 
co-chair the International Conference on Cambodia of October 1991. The JIMs 
also confirmed that the military leadership in Jakarta rejected the Chinese policy
76The Informal Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to Discuss the Recent Political and 
Military Developments with Regards to the Kampuchean Problem, Jakarta, Indonesia, 8 May 1984.
77Joint Communique of the Seventeenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, 9-10 July 
1984.
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of attrition against Vietnam imposed on the Association.79 By acting as a 
mediator, Indonesia gained credibility as a responsible and peaceful regional
DA f #
player and indicated its position of leadership within ASEAN. These diplomatic 
efforts should therefore be regarded as an Indonesian attempt to enhance its 
managerial position in Southeast Asia. Similar calculations partly motivated 
Indonesia to launch in 1990 the extra-ASEAN Workshops on the South China 
Sea. Interestingly, Thailand’s stand on the Cambodian issue was by the late 1980’s 
dramatically modified by the new prime ministership of General Chatichai 
Choonhavan (1988-1991). Without informing his regional partners, Chatichai 
called for the need “to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a market place.” He 
invited Hun Sen, the prime minister of the PRK, to visit Bangkok in January 1989. 
This political shift, that again revealed the flexibility of the Thai foreign policy, 
developed from rapid transformations at the international level and the beginning 
of Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia. Having displayed their solidarity 
towards Thailand and its hard-line position for a decade, most ASEAN states 
reacted negatively to the sudden change in policy.
C. Balance of Power Meets Associative Perspective
The invasion of Cambodia violated ASEAN’s central principle and 
affected the Southeast Asian distribution of power. Both aspects were included in 
the ASEAN response, which consisted of collective diplomatic efforts to condemn 
an act of aggression and a tacit alliance with an external source of countervailing 
power to challenge a Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. Bridging ASEAN to the 
PRC, Thailand relied on both dimensions to oppose the occupation of Cambodia. 
Let us now discuss how balance of power tactics interacted with the associative 
perspective.
78For a discussion on the Jakarta Informal Meetings, please refer to Acharya et al, “The Road to the 
Paris Conference: The Cambodian Peace Process in Historical Perspective,” pp. xl-xlv.
79This point was made by Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor at the Habibie Centre and 
former spokesperson of President BJ. Habibie. The interview was held at the Habibie Centre, 
Jakarta, on 24 March 2000.
80This point was made by Dr. Bantarto Bandoro, Head of the Department of International Relations 
at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The interview was held at CSIS on 22 
March 2000.
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In order to do so, one needs to define our interpretation of the balance of 
power in the case of ASEAN’s response to the Third Indochina Conflict. In 
accordance with the prior observations of the balance of power factor; namely the 
formation and early years of the Association and its expansion of membership in 
the case of Brunei, the member states indicated a disposition to promote 
countervailing arrangements, in this case beyond cooperative security. In contrast 
to the previous illustrations where the power balancing occurred generally through 
political means, the ASEAN states relied on conventional measures to affect the 
distribution of power and deny hegemony in Indochina. By entering a tacit alliance 
with the PRC, even if through diplomatic alignment, the members engaged in 
traditional balance of power practice. This distinction derives from the fact that 
the Association was faced with an external military threat rather than an intra­
mural hegemonic disposition. It should be remembered however that, except for 
some military supplies provided by Thailand and Singapore to the non-communist 
Cambodian factions, ASEAN’s participation in the tacit alliance remained devoid 
of a direct military content. In fact, the need for an external source of 
countervailing power mainly resulted from ASEAN’s inability to evolve into a 
tacit or formal alliance. The conventional operation of the balance of power was a 
function of China’s commitment to a strategy of attrition against Vietnam. This 
policy of attrition consisted of a guerrilla warfare in Cambodia and military 
pressure on Vietnam’s Northern border. In short, the distribution of power in 
mainland Southeast Asia would have drastically changed if the PRC had decided 
during the course of the conflict to end its military support to the Khmer Rouge 
resistance.81
When reviewing the part played by a conventional practice of the balance 
of power, it is important to analyse its influence on ASEAN’s diplomatic response 
to the Cambodian crisis but also its repercussions on intra-mural relations. Let us 
begin with the former. The Association gained from a favourable strategic context 
as it became part of an international response which aimed to undermine 
Vietnam’s policy in Indochina. The associative dimension was conditional, in its
8lThis point was made by Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes at the Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and former member o f the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs of Singapore. The interview was held at IDSS on 3 March 2000.
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early formulation and later development, on the operation of conventional power 
balancing policies. In the absence of an external source of countervailing power, 
Thailand would have been obliged to accept the new distribution of power in 
Indochina and may have been subject to more Vietnamese military pressure and 
intimidation.82 ASEAN’s initial reaction was therefore made possible by China’s 
strong resistance to a Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia. Its diplomatic success in 
isolating Vietnam internationally was also reliant on its tacit alliance with the 
PRC. Its limited diplomatic voice was strengthened by China’s military role in the 
conflict. ASEAN’s diplomatic significance thus resulted from specific 
circumstances; namely, the availability of external support and in particular its 
tacit alliance with China. In sum, the relevance of an associative dimension 
beyond cooperative security seems to be dependent on access to an external source 
of countervailing power. This argument is further developed in chapter seven 
when ASEAN’s reaction to the Third Indochina Conflict is contrasted with its 
post-Cold War involvement in the South China Sea dispute.
Nevertheless, the practice of balance of power politics influenced 
negatively ASEAN’s diplomatic response. While the collective activities were 
contingent on China’s interest in the conflict, the tacit alliance restricted the 
diplomatic freedom of the member states in their attempt to find a political 
settlement. Alagappa explains that “Beijing’s own objectives of punishing 
Vietnam and containing the Soviet threat overrode ASEAN’s concerns and its 
peace proposals on several occasions.”83 This was illustrated, for instance, by 
China’s rejection of an initiative introduced during the 1981 ICK that questioned 
the sole legitimacy of the DK government. Although reliant on guerrilla warfare, 
ASEAN’s diplomacy was weakened by the Khmer Rouge as Vietnam rejected any 
political solution that would include its participation. Thailand gave primary 
importance to its special relationship with the PRC, which lessened the autonomy 
of ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts. That said, Beijing and Bangkok disagreed on the
82This point was made by Daljit Singh, Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS) and former member of the Ministry of Defence of Singapore. The interview was held at 
ISEAS on 23 February 2000.
83Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis,” Review 
o f International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), p. 377.
84Jonathan Stromseth, Time on whose Side in Cambodia?, ISIS Paper (Bangkok: Institute of 
Security and International Studies, Chulalongkom University, 1988), p. 5.
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role to be played by the Khmer Rouge in a final resolution of the war. As the 
weaker part of the tacit alliance, the Association could not influence China’s 
regional policies and was concerned about its aspirations in Southeast Asia.
The engagement in conventional balance of power practice also became a 
factor in intra-mural cooperation. The Cambodian crisis in general and the tacit 
alliance with China in particular brought to surface original differences and caused 
discord among the participants.86 At issue were opposing security perspectives. 
The tacit alliance was a source of great concern for Indonesia and Malaysia as it 
challenged their security interests and reinforced their perception of a Chinese 
threat in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, in particular, was frustrated by Thailand’s 
reliance on an external source of countervailing power. Moreover, the tacit 
alliance was resented by Indonesia because it questioned its position of natural 
leadership within the Association and violated its preference for an autonomous 
distribution of power placed under its guidance. As such, the special relationship 
with the PRC contradicted the call for regional autonomy registered in the 
Bangkok Declaration and the ZOPFAN principle.
Walt’s research on alliance formation is applicable to an examination of 
ASEAN’s tacit alliance with the PRC and its impact on intra-mural relations.87 
Thailand’s partnership with China and the negative response that it provoked 
among some ASEAN members strengthen the notion that states aim to balance 
threats rather than aggregate power. In terms only of capabilities, China was a 
more significant danger to the Southeast Asian security environment than Vietnam 
but was still perceived in Thailand as less menacing to its national security. This 
resulted from Vietnam’s aggressive policy in Cambodia. These views were not 
shared by Indonesia and Malaysia. Hence, disagreements over the tacit alliance 
with the PRC indicated the importance of contradictory threat perceptions within 
the regime for cooperative security.
85Charles Me Gregor, The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union, Adelphi Paper No. 
232 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 34.
86This point was made by Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono, former member of the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and frequent columnist for the Jakarta Post. The interview was held 
in Jakarta on 17 March 2000.
87See chapter three for a brief discussion on Stephen Walt’s study of alliances and balance of threat 
theory.
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In light of the level of division, one may wonder how ASEAN preserved 
its unity and succeeded in operating as an effective associative arrangement until 
the end of the conflict. Indeed, Indonesia and Malaysia manifested their 
continuing solidarity towards Thailand and never broke ranks with their partners. 
The general cohesion of the Association can be explained by several factors. The 
member states shared an interest in responding to the violation of Cambodia’s 
national sovereignty.88 Respect for this core principle was a uniting element that 
defined ASEAN’s collective position. In spite of the differences, all the members 
wanted a political settlement that would ensure Vietnam’s withdrawal from 
Cambodia.89 This concealed to a certain extent the divergence in strategic 
outlooks. Moreover, Vietnam’s inflexible position on the Cambodian crisis helped 
preserving the unity of the Association by frustrating the efforts of those who 
favoured a regional solution. Hanoi’s negative response to the Kuantan principle 
needs to be noted for instance. Vietnam may have succeeded in exacerbating intra­
mural tensions by adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards Indonesia and 
Malaysia.
Furthermore, Indonesia had since 1967 benefited from the Association, 
which had become the central pillar of its foreign policy. Its dissatisfaction was 
also in part accommodated by the integration of its dual-track diplomacy within an 
ASEAN framework and by its role of co-chair at the 1991 International 
Conference on Cambodia. In addition, Thailand was aware of the frustration of 
some of the member states and made efforts to preserve the unity of the 
Association. ASEAN had by the 1980’s gained a life of its own and its dissolution 
over Cambodia never seemed conceivable. As discussed in chapter four, the risks 
of fragmentation had been much higher during the early years of the Association. 
In short, associative benefits and a common willingness to ensure the lasting 
viability of the cooperative security regime received precedence over individual 
power balancing considerations. Intra-mural disparities were constrained by 
judgements about long-term interests. That said, Indonesia and Malaysia were 
influenced by the geo-strategic consequences of breaking ranks with Thailand.
Regaud, Le Cambodge dans la Tourmente, p. 177.
89This point was made by Dr. Leonard Sebastian.
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Such an action would have increased its dependence on Beijing and therefore 
enhanced China’s influence in Southeast Asia.
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Chapter Six
The Post-Cold War Regional Security Context:
The Role of the Balance of Power Factor within the ARF
Introduction
The role of the balance of power factor within regimes for cooperative 
security will be analysed in this chapter by examining the formation and workings 
of the ARF. The establishment and institutional evolution of the Forum were 
discussed in chapter two through an associative perspective. The object of this 
third case study is not to provide an adverse interpretation but rather to 
complement our previous analysis by illustrating one specific aspect of the 
creation and operation of the Forum; namely, the possible influence of the balance 
of power factor on the calculations of some participants. This factor may influence 
the modalities of a cooperative security regime by aiming to contain a disposition 
to hegemony on the part of a rising power.
This chapter will consist of three sections. The first will describe the 
strategic environment that emerged in the Asia-Pacific at the end of the Cold War. 
The second section will discuss the role of the balance of power factor in the 
formation of the ARF noting, in particular, the chairman’s statement of the 
ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in May 1993. Beyond the 
founding moments of the ARF, it will be considered how the role of this factor has 
carried over in the workings of the institution. It will be argued that the ARF has 
failed as an instrument for constraining China in a way that corresponds to 
ASEAN’s degree of success with Indonesia. Finally, attention will be given to the 
existence of different perceptions within the framework of the ARF and 
specifically to China’s preference for multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific that can be 
defined with particular reference to the United States.
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I. The Post-Cold War Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific
The cessation of Soviet-US and Sino-Soviet rivalries contributed to a sense 
of relief and optimism and also to a feeling of strategic uncertainty in East Asia.1 
ASEAN’s transformed security environment at the end of the Cold War derived 
from the resolution of the Third Indochina Conflict and in the broader regional 
context from a shifting distribution of power in East Asia. The settlement of the 
Cambodian conflict followed the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations and 
resulted directly from the nature of the end of the Cold War.2 ASEAN played only 
a secondary role in the final settlement of the conflict despite its high-profile 
diplomatic activities during the war to oppose Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia.
The resolution of the Cambodian conflict was indicative of the rapid 
transformations occurring at the international level and of a shifting distribution of 
power in East Asia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 
dramatically limited Russia’s regional role and influence as Moscow was now 
primarily concerned with domestic changes.3 The Soviet Union had already 
announced in October 1990 its decision to withdraw its troops from Cam Ranh 
Bay. The reduction in regional influence was less significant in the case of the 
United States, the sole global superpower, which had demonstrated its modem 
military capability in Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and budgetary constraints obliged Washington to reconsider its 
military deployment in East Asia.4 This led to a measured reduction of US forces 
in the region. In addition, the Philippine Senate denied a new base treaty with the 
US in September 1991 leading to a complete withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval 
Base and Clark Air Base by November 1992.5 At issue were the terms of
1Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Adelphi Paper No. 279 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 12.
2For a discussion on the changes in the Soviet foreign policy under Mikhael Gorbachev and their 
impact on the Cambodian conflict, please refer to Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast 
Asia (London: Routledge, 1992).
3Please refer to Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance o f Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 295 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, May 1995), pp. 17-25, 34-36.
4For a discussion on the US defence policy in Asia in the post-Cold War, please refer to Douglas 
T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Paper No. 299 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, December 1995), pp. 6-20.
5For a discussion on the events that led to the US withdrawal from the Philippines, please refer to 
Derek McDougall, The International Politics o f the New Asia Pacific (New York: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1997), pp. 206-208.
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extending leases. By then, Clark Air Base needed to be closed down as its 
operational use had been undermined by the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo 
in June 1991. In sum, the long-term US commitment to regional security seemed 
uncertain in the early 1990’s.6
Even so, the US strategic retreat should not be exaggerated. Washington 
reached an agreement with Singapore in November 1990 allowing its Air Force 
and Navy to use its military facilities more extensively. The agreement that 
offered the US compensating facilities in the city-state mitigated the strategic 
consequences of its departure from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. 
Initially critical of the memorandum, Malaysia and Indonesia were prepared after 
the US withdrawal from the Philippines to provide access to the US Navy so 
enhancing their military ties with Washington. A US Navy logistics facility was 
also transferred in 1992 from Subic Bay to Singapore. Later on, the United States 
redefined its alliance with Japan in the post-Cold War through a Joint Declaration 
of April 1996 and subsequent provision for new guidelines. Moreover, it 
demonstrated its security commitment to the region. For example, the 1996 
Taiwan Straits crisis led the US to deploy two carrier squadrons near Taiwan to 
deter further Chinese actions of intimidation.
At the end of the Cold War, the influence of Japan and China became 
more significant due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the uncertain nature 
of US involvement in the region. As a result of the legacy of its experience in the 
Pacific War, Japan was reluctant to extend its security role in East Asia. Its 
military power, including its naval force, continued to be limited to self-defence 
purposes. In these circumstances, China became the prime beneficiary of the 
changing strategic context.7 Having reached a rapprochement with Moscow in the 
late 1980’s, China no longer faced a threat on its Northern border and could now 
focus on other security interests, including its territorial claims in the South China 
Sea. Furthermore, since the 1980’s, China had experienced a sustained economic 
development that had accelerated up to a point the modernisation of its military
6This point was made by Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia (1988-1999). The 
interview was held at Mr. Alatas’ house on 21 March 2000.
7Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f  Regional Security, 
Adelphi Paper No. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, July 1996), p. 8.
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capabilities.8 Consequently, China’s regional influence was viewed with 
apprehension at the end of the Cold War. Some Southeast Asian states, Singapore 
being the prime example, feared that a US military disengagement in East Asia 
might encourage China or even Japan to fill “the power vacuum” left by retreating 
external powers.9 Interestingly, Indonesia recognised China’s rising influence and 
normalised relations with Beijing in August 1990.10 In sum, the post-Cold War 
strategic architecture in the Asia-Pacific was said to be primarily dependent on a 
triangular power relationship between the United States, Japan and China.
The emergence of an uncertain multipolar structure was regarded by the 
ASEAN states as a source of concern. In response to the changing security 
context, most members wanted the United States to remain militarily engaged in 
the region to promote peace and stability and contain China’s rising power. In the 
new strategic context, the problem of the overlapping claims in the South China 
Sea had become a major regional security issue and complicated relations between 
the PRC and some member states of the Association. The US deployment in the 
region was regarded by most Southeast Asian states as a means to constrain 
China’s hegemonic aspirations and prevent possible violations of the freedom of 
navigation, specially in the South China Sea. In addition, the US presence in East 
Asia obviated the need for an active and independent Japanese security role.
II. The Role of the Balance of Power Factor in the Formation and Workings 
of the ARF
The ARF is based partly on ASEAN’s model of cooperative security, 
which focuses on confidence-building, an informal process of dialogue, and a 
mode of conflict avoidance. While the Forum should be viewed as ASEAN’s 
attempt to expand to the wider region its approach to cooperative security, its
8Please refer to Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact 
on Security (London: Routledge, 1996).
9Leszek Buszynski, “Post-Cold War Security in the ASEAN Region,” in Gary Klintworth, ed., 
Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1996), p. 121.
l0Michael Yahuda, “How Much has China learned about Interdependence?,” in David S.G. 
Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 20. For a discussion of the normalisation of Sino-Indonesian relations, see 
Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics o f a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 
1999).
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establishment also involved power balancing considerations. The ASEAN states 
feared that a reduced US regional deployment might give rise to regional 
instability and were concerned about China’s growing influence. Leifer writes:
For ASEAN, a constructive regional order would ideally be based on the 
balancing military engagement of the United States. This would allow Japan to 
continue its limited security policy which in turn would be critical in encouraging 
China to conduct its regional relations according to those norms that had served 
the general interests of the ASEAN states so well.11
In the post-Cold War, China’s rising power was the most central issue facing the 
ASEAN members.12
The institutional steps that led to the formation of the ARF should first be 
identified. The members of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), that 
included the United States, needed in the post-Cold War to cope with the changing 
security environment in East Asia and particularly with the potential American 
strategic retreat from the region.13 The ASEAN-PMC had initially been developed 
after the second summit of ASEAN heads of government held in Kuala Lumpur in 
August 1977, which had been followed by a series of bilateral meetings with the 
heads of government of Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Subsequently, the 
ASEAN-PMC took place after the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). 
By the early 1990’s, the ASEAN-PMC consisted of serial discussions on 
economic matters with seven dialogue partners; namely, Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada and the European Union (EU). 
Although the PMC was primarily limited to economic issues until 1992, ASEAN 
had used the dialogue structure in the 1980’s to address the Cambodian conflict 
and the Indochinese refugee problem. In short, the Association succeeded through 
the PMC in establishing formal and regular contacts with a number of key states 
and thus in enhancing its international diplomatic influence.
The idea of using the ASEAN-PMC as a forum for a regional security 
dialogue was first proposed in 1990 by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and 
International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). The proposal was then discussed at the
11 Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model o f Regional Security, p. 19.
12This point was made by Ali Alatas.
13Michael Leifer, “Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?,” in David S. Goodman and Gerald 
Segal, eds., Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 116.
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AMM held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 where it was received differently by the 
various ASEAN foreign ministers. In his opening statement, Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister Wong Kan Seng suggested that the ASEAN-PMC could evolve “into a 
structure for political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.”14 Indonesia 
and Malaysia, however, were somewhat reluctant to widen the scope of the 
conference. Consequently, no consensus was reached in Kuala Lumpur on the 
need for a regional security dialogue.15 The AMM Joint Communique only stated 
that the foreign ministers “were of the view that ZOPFAN, the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in South East Asia and the PMC (Post Ministerial Conferences) 
process are appropriate bases for addressing the regional peace and security issues 
in the nineties.”16 At the ASEAN-PMC that followed, which was attended by 
China and Russia as observers, Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama 
suggested that the conference be used to address security issues. He declared that 
“it would be meaningful and timely to use the ASEAN Post Ministerial 
Conference as a process of political discussions designed to improve the sense of
17security among us.” In contrast to ASEAN’s equivocal response, the Umted 
States openly opposed Nakayama’s proposal. The US was suspicious of a 
multilateral security dialogue that might undermine its bilateral arrangements with 
regional players.
The fourth summit of ASEAN’s heads of government was held in 
Singapore in January 1992. It followed the US announcement in November 1991 
of its forthcoming withdrawal from the Philippines and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in December. ASEAN’s heads of government acknowledged the dramatic 
political and economic changes that had taken place since the end of the Cold 
War.18 In contrast to the AMM of 1991, the member states agreed to address
14Opening Statement by Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng, at the Twenty-Fourth 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 19-20 July 1991.
15Tobias Ingo Nischalke, “Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-operation: The ‘ASEAN 
Way’, a Real Spirit or a Phantom?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2000), p. 
97.
16Joint Communique of the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
19-20 July 1991.
l7Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Nakayama, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the Meeting 
Between ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 23 July 1991.
I8Singapore Declaration of 1992, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore, 27-28 
January 1992.
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security matters through the ASEAN-PMC. The Singapore Declaration stated that
“ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters
by using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC)”.19 It is interesting to
distinguish ASEAN’s decision to extend the scope of the PMC from the common
position adopted by member states at their third summit in Manila in December
1987.20 The Manila Declaration had simply affirmed that “each member state shall
be responsible for its own security” and that cooperation on security matters
• 21would continue to be conducted by the members on a non-ASEAN basis. By 
1992, the Association was forced to adjust to a changing strategic context and to 
acknowledge the limits of its sub-regional approach to security.
The next annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers was held in 
Manila in July 1992 and was dominated by the problem of the overlapping claims 
in the South China Sea. On 25 February 1992, Beijing had passed “The Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas” that 
had reiterated China’s claims in the South China Sea and stipulated the right to 
use force to protect islands, including the Spratlys, and their surrounding waters. 
ASEAN responded through formulating a Declaration on the South China Sea. At 
the ASEAN-PMC that followed the AMM, the first discussions on regional 
security were held though on a serial rather than on a multilateral basis. During the 
ASEAN-US dialogue session, US Secretary of State James Baker referred to the 
American withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bay and reassured the member states 
by stating that “this development has not altered our interest in, nor our 
commitment to, Asian security. The form of our presence may have changed, but 
the substance of our commitment is firm.” The South China Sea question and 
the closure of the US bases in the Philippines by the end of 1992 further 
influenced the ASEAN states to establish a new multilateral security dialogue that 
would include non-PMC members.
l9Singapore Declaration of 1992.
20Nischalke, “Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-operation,” p. 96.
21Manila Declaration of 1987, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Manila, the Philippines, 
14-15 December 1987.
22Statement by H.E. Mr. James A. Baker, III., Secretary of State of the United States of America, at 
the ASEAN-US Dialogue Session, Manila, the Philippines, 26 July 1992.
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A first ever ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was organised 
in Singapore in May 1993 and joined the permanent secretaries of the ASEAN 
countries and of the seven dialogue partners. One should note here the 
significance of Singapore as chair of ASEAN’s Standing Committee during 1992- 
93. The city-state was keen to establish a multilateral structure of security dialogue 
in the Asia-Pacific and succeeded in collaborating successfully with Japan and 
Australia. Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), led by Foreign Minister 
Wong Kan Seng, played therefore a key role in the formation of the ARF. It can be 
argued that no other foreign ministry in Southeast Asia would have been capable 
of reaching similar results.
The post-Cold War political and security context in the Asia-Pacific was 
discussed in May 1993 by the senior officials. The latter agreed on the need to 
form a multilateral process of cooperative security to promote cooperation in the 
region.23 Significantly, the ASEAN PMC-SOM registered balance of power 
considerations in signalling the forthcoming establishment of the ARF. The 
chairman’s statement affirmed that “The continuing presence of the United States, 
as well as stable relationships among the United States, Japan and China, and 
other states of the region would contribute to regional stability.”24 The prime 
object of a region-wide cooperative security arrangement would be therefore to 
secure a continuing US involvement in the Asia-Pacific and to address China’s 
rising influence in the region. Excluding a policy of containment, the permanent 
secretaries expressed a willingness to engage China, and other non-PMC 
members, within an extended security dialogue. The chairman’s statement 
declared that “the senior officials felt that it was important to develop an open 
process to take into account the presence of other regional countries that could 
contribute to the regional dialogues.”25 It was decided to invite the foreign 
ministers of China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea to a special 
session of foreign ministers in Singapore in July 1993 that would coincide with 
the AMM. In their conclusion, the senior officials stated that it was “important for 
ASEAN and its dialogue partners to work with other regional states to evolve a
23Chairman’s Statement, ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, Senior Officials Meeting, 
Singapore, 20-21 May 1993.
24Chairman’s Statement, 20-21 May 1993.
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• i 9926 mipredictable and constructive pattern of relationships in the Asia-Pacific.” The 
last part of the sentence would later be repeated in the chairman’s statement of the 
first ARF meeting.27
The Association also introduced the TAC at the ASEAN PMC-SOM.28 By 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the TAC, the member states aimed to advance 
the Association’s diplomatic centrality within the forthcoming Forum. Most 
regional players supported the position of leadership adopted by ASEAN. The 
diplomatic centrality and managerial role of the Association was essential, for 
instance, to ensure an initial Chinese participation. The ASEAN states were keen 
to promote their code of conduct for regional inter-state relations, which was 
based primarily on respect for national sovereignty. The ASEAN Declaration on 
the South China Sea had made reference to the TAC in July 1992.29 The ASEAN 
members appeared to believe that a collective code of conduct based on standard 
international norms would help to restrain the larger participants in the 
forthcoming ARF. They may have hoped that this source of constraint might 
encourage China not to threaten its smaller partners. Indeed, any aggressive action 
would undermine such norms and rebound adversely on the political cohesion of 
the arrangement as well as on the interests of larger participants with a stake in its 
viability. The TAC would later be endorsed at the first ARF meeting “as a code of 
conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for 
regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security 
cooperation.”30
The inaugural dinner of the ARF was held in Singapore on 25 July 1993 
and was attended by eighteen foreign ministers, including China’s Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen. It was agreed that the Forum’s first working session would 
take place in Bangkok one year later. The following day at the start of the 
ASEAN-PMC, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng stated that “Peace 
and Stability in the Asia-Pacific depend not only on whether the United States
25Chairman’s Statement, 20-21 May 1993.
“ Chairman’s Statement, 20-21 May 1993.
27Chairman’s Statement, the First meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, Thailand, 25 
July 1994.
“ Chairman’s Statement, 20-21 May 1993.
29ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, the Philippines, 22 July 1992.
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continues to lead as she has in the past. It also depends on how America settles her
1
relationships with other major powers - Russia, China and Japan.” A key 
purpose of the ARF was therefore to engage the US, Japan and the PRC in a 
structure of multilateral dialogue in order to promote a stable distribution of power 
in the Asia-Pacific. This core ASEAN objective has not changed since the 
formation of the Forum. For example, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Professor S. 
Jayakumar affirmed in 1996 that “For ASEAN, the issue now is not how to avoid 
entanglement in big power conflict. It is how to maintain a stable balance of the 
major powers at a time of immense fluidity.”
The establishment of the ARF was dependent on the participation of the 
three main regional players. At the end of the Cold War, the US had been 
unwilling to support multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific as it feared that a 
multilateral security structure might undermine its bilateral arrangements with 
regional actors. This position had changed by the end of the Bush Administration. 
In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 1991, US Secretary of State James 
Baker had referred to three pillars for regional security and prosperity; namely, 
economic integration, democratisation and a new defence structure. Elected in 
November 1992, US President Bill Clinton welcomed the establishment of a 
multilateral security forum. The ARF was seen in Washington as a diplomatic 
instrument to complement US bilateral security relations and to convince regional 
allies to take a more active part in their own security.
Japan played an active role behind the scene in the formation of the ARF. 
In addition to Nakayama’s proposal of July 1991, Japan’s Prime Minister Kichii 
Miyazawa had declared during a tour of Southeast Asia in January 1993 that Japan 
would actively participate in a multilateral security dialogue. Furthermore, Yukio 
Satoh, now Japan’s Ambassador to the UN, explains that “Tokyo played a 
significant role in impressing upon Washington the importance of multilateral
30Chairman’s Statement, 25 July 1994.
3‘Welcoming Remarks by H.E. Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, at 
the Meeting Between ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners, Singapore, 26 July 1993.
32Singapore’s Foreign Minister Professor S. Jayakumar, “The Southeast Asian Drama: Evolution 
and Future Challenges,” Georgetown University, Inaugural Distinguished Lecture on Southeast 
Asia (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 22 April 1996), p. 18.
James A. Baker, III., “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5 (Winter 1991/92), p. 1-18.
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security dialogue for the Asia-Pacific region, when Washington was sceptical 
about a multilateral approach.”34 The ARF was viewed in Japan as supplementary 
to its alliance with the United States and as a tool to improve relations with South 
Korea and China. By backing the ASEAN initiative, Japan succeeded in 
advancing its national interests without hurting the sensitivities of other East 
Asian countries. However, the ARF also symbolised the persisting constraints on 
its foreign policy as it indicated Tokyo’s capacity to participate but not to take a 
leading position within a multilateral security arrangement.
From its perspective, Beijing perceived multilateralism as an attempt to 
encircle China as a threatening rising power and to interfere in its domestic affairs. 
Nonetheless, it was reassured by the fact that the ASEAN states were leading the 
new cooperative process. Beijing was willing to support an informal and flexible 
security dialogue sponsored by middle powers that did not represent a potential 
threat to its security interests. China also agreed with ASEAN’s emphasis that 
progress should be gradual within the ARF.35 A US- or Japanese-led arrangement 
would have been unacceptable to the PRC. However, China could also not afford 
to be left-out of a multilateral security forum that included the most significant 
regional states.36 Despite its initial suspicion, the PRC would quickly learn to use 
the ARF to its advantage.
The creation of the Forum was regarded by the Association as a diplomatic 
instrument to promote a continuing US involvement in the region, thus avoiding 
the need for an independent Japanese security role, and to encourage the PRC in 
habits of good international behaviour.37 Interestingly, US Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher confirmed during the 1993 ASEAN-PMC that “the United 
States will remain actively engaged in Asia. America is and will remain an Asia
34Yukio Satoh, “Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan,” The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995), p. 273.
35Koro Bessho, Identities and Security in East Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 325 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 71.
36Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle 
East? (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 
1998), p. 5.
37Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f Regional Security, p. 19.
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Pacific power.”38 A driving factor behind the organisation of the first ever 
ASEAN PMC-SOM had been the need to cope with the potential US strategic 
retreat from the region. Yet, regional concerns about the uncertain long-term US 
involvement in the Asia-Pacific had primarily disappeared by May 1993. Indeed, 
President Clinton had indicated by then his views on regional security and his 
support for the formation of a new multilateral institution. The United States had 
also actively taken part in the ASEAN PMC-SOM. By July 1993, China’s rising 
power had therefore become the main source of concern. The ARF was perceived 
by the ASEAN members as a tool to encourage China to act with good 
international citizenship in mind. As part of its calculations, the Association 
wanted the PRC to be constrained through its participation in an embryonic 
security regime and respect for its norms and principles. The establishment of the 
ARF was thus influenced by balance of power practices. The latter should be 
understood as involving the constraining of power through political means within 
the cooperative process rather than a reliance on traditional military tactics. Leifer 
argues that “the very attempt to lock China into a network of constraining 
multilateral arrangements underpinned hopefully by a sustained and viable 
American military presence would seem to serve the purpose of the balance of
7Qpower by means other than alliance.”
It needs to be said, however, that the formation of the ARF indicated that 
ASEAN’s sub-regional approach to security was insufficient in the new regional 
security context. The extension of the ASEAN model of cooperative security to 
the Asia-Pacific represented an informal abdication of the commitment to realise 
ZOPFAN. Indeed, the latter was made obsolete by the establishment of the Forum. 
Promulgated in 1971, the principle had registered a call for regional autonomy and 
repeated a determination, previously announced in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, 
to avoid external intervention. As the strongest supporter of ZOPFAN, Indonesia 
was most concerned about the creation of the ARF due to its own aspiration for a 
regional order based on the exclusive managerial role of the Southeast Asian 
states. Keen to avoid external interference, Jakarta had for instance opposed a
38Statement by H.E. Mr. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State of the United States of America, at 
the Meeting Between ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners, Singapore, 26 July 1993.
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Thai-Singaporean proposal made prior to the Singapore summit to invite the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council to sign the TAC.40 Still, 
Indonesia supported the formation of the ARF primarily due to balance of power 
considerations.41 Indeed, Jakarta was apprehensive of China’s rising regional 
influence and was increasingly fearful of its potential hegemonic disposition in the 
South China Sea. With China’s growing power in mind, Indonesia would also in 
December 1995 sign a security agreement with Australia and support Singapore’s 
initiative to give India the status of dialogue partner.
By concentrating on security cooperation, the ARF was expected to 
complement the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which had 
been created in Canberra in November 1989. Both APEC and the Forum were 
region-wide arrangements that included the United States, Japan and China. In 
contrast to the ARF, APEC also included Taiwan. Beijing regards Taiwan as a 
renegade province of China and would not tolerate its participation in the Forum. 
While the ARF’s institutional structure has to this day been limited to ministerial 
meetings, the first summit of the APEC heads of government was organised in 
Seattle in November 1993 after the scheduled session of finance ministers. The 
summit derived from a proposal made by President Clinton at the meeting of the 
Group of Seven (G7) held in Tokyo in July 1993. Consequently, APEC has 
developed into an institutional structure that combines ministerial and heads of 
government meetings. By providing a framework for both multilateral and 
bilateral discussions, the arrangement has assumed an indirect security 
significance beyond its focus on economic issues.
The relevance of the balance of power factor within the Forum was further 
demonstrated through ASEAN’s initiative to admit India during the ARF’s third 
session in Jakarta in July 1996. India had automatically become a participant of 
the ARF after having received the status of dialogue partner at the summit of 
ASEAN heads of government in Bangkok in December 1995. Strongly pushed by
39Michael Leifer, “Truth about the Balance of Power,” in Derek da Cunha, ed., The Evolving 
Pacific Power Structure (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), p. 51.
Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 62.
41Michael Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement,” in 
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management o f an 
Emerging Power {London: Routledge, 1999), p. 105.
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Singapore and supported by Indonesia, ASEAN’s initiative was motivated by 
power balancing considerations.42 da Cunha explains that leaders in Singapore 
“are clearly concerned about the staying power of the United States in the region, 
and are likely to see India as one possible counterweight to China’s expanded 
power in the future.”43 India is a growing regional actor and perceived in Jakarta 
as a natural countervailing power to the Chinese ambitions in Asia. India’s 
participation in the ARF was thus viewed as beneficial in light of the uncertain 
long-term US involvement in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s decision to enlarge the 
geographical scope of the Forum was not welcomed by the United States and 
Japan but supported by the PRC that favours multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific.
The role of the balance of power factor in the formation of ASEAN and 
the ARF are comparable. The participants of the Forum, in particular the ASEAN 
states, needed to deal with China’s rising power just as some ASEAN members 
had been anxious in 1967 to constrain any disposition towards hegemony by 
Indonesia. The various ASEAN states had been forced to rely on institutional and 
political channels as they were in no position in a post-Confrontation period to 
contain Indonesia through conventional methods. Similarly, in the post-Cold War 
the ASEAN members were not able to depend on a policy of containment against 
China due to their lack of countervailing power 44 To complicate matters further, 
the ASEAN states shared no common security perspective and had differential 
relationships with Beijing. In addition, the economic opportunities provided by 
China’s growing economy made a policy of confrontation unattractive. As part of 
their calculations, it may be asserted that the ASEAN countries wanted China to 
be constrained through its participation within a cooperative security arrangement 
and respect for its standard international norms and principles. Moreover, they 
may have anticipated that the PRC would find itself isolated within the institution 
if failing to follow a policy of self-restraint. Among other objectives, the ARF was
42This point was made by Dr. Derek da Cunha, Senior Fellow at the Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS) and Co-ordinator for Regional, Strategic and Political Studies. The interview was 
held at ISEAS on 22 February 2000.
43Derek da Cunha, Southeast Asia’s Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity o f Approaches Amidst 
Changing Geopolitical Circumstances, ISEAS Working Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, July 1999), p. 16.
^Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Policy in the South China Sea,” p. 154.
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therefore expected to become a structure of dialogue helping regional states to 
deal with the “China problem.” Yong Deng writes that “Since ASEAN countries, 
collectively or individually, do not have the capability or the willingness to rely on 
traditional balance of power allying with other great powers to ‘constrain’ China, 
institutional entrapment appears to be the only way to manage China’s power 
ascension.
Yet, in contrast to the founding moments of the Association, it is far from 
clear if China was willing in 1993 to follow a policy of political self-abnegation 
along Indonesian lines in order to reassure its cooperative partners and to be 
constrained through developing a stake in an emerging regime for cooperative 
security. The PRC could promote some of its national interests by adopting 
restrained behaviour within the ARF and vis-a-vis its different participants. The 
benefits of such a constrained policy could include sustained economic 
development, which is highly dependent on access to capital, technology and 
foreign markets, the avoidance of regional and international isolation and stable 
Sino-ASEAN relations. However, Beijing’s assertiveness in foreign policy has led 
to a sense of insecurity and vulnerability among other regional states. For instance, 
China’s seizure of Mischief Reef, discovered in February 1995, and its military 
exercises in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996, which led the US to deploy two 
carrier squadrons to deter further Chinese undertakings, were assertive actions that 
complicated relations with ARF participants. Beijing seemed ready after joining it 
to undermine the premises of confidence-building and trust on which the Forum 
was based. The PRC ameliorated its relations with the Association after the 
Mischief Reef incident but mainly to promote multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific in 
view of its worsening relations with the United States and Japan. In short, China’s 
participation in the Forum has not led to a policy of self-imposed containment 
comparable to Indonesia within ASEAN.
This limited experience suggests that the Forum has failed as an 
instrument for constraining China in a corresponding way to ASEAN’s degree of 
success with Indonesia. This measure of failure can be explained by several 
factors. The PRC still feels subject to American containment and perceives
45Yong Deng, “Managing China’s Hegemonic Ascension: Engagement from Southeast Asia,” The 
Journal o f Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1998), p. 35.
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multilateralism as a Western attempt to restrain its growing regional influence. In 
contrast, Indonesia was acknowledged within the Association as the primary state. 
This was, for instance, indicated by the fact that its preference for a regional order 
based on the exclusive managerial role of the Southeast Asian states was 
registered in the Bangkok Declaration of August 1967. Indonesia’s expectations 
were later further incorporated in the Association through the principles of 
national and regional resilience. An ASEAN Secretariat was also established in 
Jakarta in 1976 after a decade of cooperation and confidence-building during 
which Indonesia had adopted a policy of self-restraint within the Association.
Furthermore, Indonesia’s and China’s respective diplomatic and economic 
conditions at the time of the formation of ASEAN and the ARF should be 
distinguished. In a post-Conffontation period, Indonesia was keen to restore its 
credibility and was willing to follow a policy of self-constraint in order to promote 
domestic economic development within a framework of regional stability. It 
therefore attained international rehabilitation by acting according to standard 
international norms. In short, ASEAN’s success “derived, in great part, from an 
initial willingness by a potential but economically prostrate hegemon to give up 
challenging the regional status quo and to inspire trust among new-found partners 
through a self-abnegating political role.”46 In contrast to Indonesia in 1967, the 
PRC joined the ARF as the prime beneficiary of the changing strategic 
environment in East Asia. It was not in any need of institutionalising a process of 
reconciliation with its neighbouring states. Moreover, China had experienced 
sustained economic development since the 1980’s and was already becoming 
well-integrated in the regional and international economy. Hence, the Forum did 
not contain sufficient incentive to counter a disposition towards hegemony by the 
PRC.47
Nonetheless, Indonesia’s lack of constraint over East Timor should be 
noted. Indonesia’s annexation of the Territory in December 1975 was an act of 
regional hegemony that demonstrated that its practice of constraint did not apply
46Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East?, p. 
15.
47This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes at the Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and former member of the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs of Singapore. The interview was held at IDSS on 3 March 2000.
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outside the walls of the Association. Still, the case of East Timor should not be 
compared to China’s irredentist claims in the South China Sea or its policy vis-a- 
vis Taiwan. Indonesia’s invasion of the Territory was a special case of strategic 
denial within its own archipelago that did not transform the regional pattern of 
power. This may be contrasted with a future PRC dominant in the South China 
Sea. Moreover, East Timor was not in 1975 an issue in Indonesian domestic 
politics. The annexation of the Territory was influenced by a defensive 
consideration rather than linked to a question of domestic legitimacy. The military 
action was perceived in Jakarta as having eliminated a possible threat of 
communist influence and intervention within the archipelago. This distinguishes 
the case of East Timor from China’s policy towards Taiwan.
Indonesia renounced its sovereignty over East Timor in 1999. The UN 
currently manages the transition to the future independence of East Timor, which 
may be expected in 2002. East Timorese leaders rejected until quite recently the 
prospect of joining the Association. The ASEAN members had demonstrated for 
many years their solidarity towards Indonesia and had played an active diplomatic 
role in the UN to oppose resolutions that demanded an Indonesian withdrawal. 
The same political leaders are now more realistic about the geo-strategic condition 
of East Timor.48 Moreover, the ASEAN states have been careful since the events 
of 1999 to indicate their support and to receive East Timorese visitors. East Timor 
may wish to take part in ASEAN after it gains its full sovereignty as a means of 
managing its relations with Indonesia.49 It could therefore follow the example of 
Brunei that became a member of the Association in January 1984 partly to protect 
and confirm its newly-obtained sovereignty. It was argued in chapter four that 
ASEAN’s expansion to include the Sultanate involved power balancing 
considerations. At issue was the constraint imposed on Indonesia and Malaysia 
through their stake in the Association from which Brunei could benefit to promote 
its own security and consolidate its position vis-a-vis its neighbours.
48James Cotton, “PKO and East Timor: Context and Consequences,” Presentation given at the 
Seminar on Asia and the Pacific in International Relations, London School of Economics (LSE), 1 
March 2001.
49This point was made by Dr. Leonard Sebastian, Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS). The interview was held at ISEAS on 25 February 2000.
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In sum, the Forum has so far failed to operate as a structure of constraint 
on China’s regional foreign policy; at least, as indicated by its sustained irredentist 
claims in the South China Sea.50 Partly due to the limits of multilateralism as a 
constraining factor on the PRC, various ASEAN states have continued to depend 
on bilateral relations with external players to ensure their security. Individual 
members have adopted traditional balance of power practices, primarily on a 
bilateral basis with the United States, outside of an ASEAN framework.
Singapore relies on the US to operate as a conventional source of 
countervailing power in the region. Despite its increasingly anti-Western rhetoric, 
Malaysia has also perceived the US presence as necessary to preserve regional 
stability. The Philippines signed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United 
States in February 1998.51 Moreover, Malaysia and Singapore are parties to the 
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a defence grouping that also includes 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Malaysia withdrew from the FPDA exercises 
in September 1998, officially because of economic difficulties but also as a result 
of the deterioration of its relations with the city-state. The activities of the 
arrangement were resumed in 1999. Brunei has relied on a private agreement 
reached with Britain in 1983 and renewed in December 1994 that ensures an 
ongoing presence of a battalion of Gurkha Rifles in the Sultanate. Significantly, 
Indonesia signed a security agreement with Australia in December 1995. The 
bilateral agreement terminated Indonesia’s declaratory reliance on non-alignment 
and questioned the relevance of the Forum. Leifer explains that “Indonesia was 
concerned about the utility of the ARF process in its undeclared role of seeking to 
restrain China’s regional assertiveness.”53 Indonesia’s need to deter China 
influenced Suharto’s decision to sign the security agreement. The latter was 
repudiated in September 1999 over East Timor. Finally, the ASEAN states have 
aimed to modernise their defence forces and acquire naval capabilities to patrol
50This argument is developed in chapter seven.
51The Visiting Forces Agreement was only ratified by the Philippine Senate in May 1999.
52Derek da Cunha, Southeast Asia’s Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity o f  Approaches Amidst 
Changing Geopolitical Circumstances, ISEAS Working Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, July 1999), p. 21. The deterioration of bilateral relations resulted from a series of 
issues, including remarks made by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew on the crime rate in Johor.
Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f Regional Security, p. 52.
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claimed maritime territories in the South China Sea. Except for Singapore and 
Brunei, the modernisation programmes have been delayed by the recent economic 
adversity.54
III. The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor within the ARF: 
Unilateralism versus Multipolarity
The role of the balance of power factor in the formation of the ARF has so 
far been examined. Beyond the establishment of the Forum, it has been viewed 
that the influence of this factor has carried over in the workings of the institution. 
In addition to relating to a denial of a potential Chinese hegemony, the balance of 
power factor may have an additional significance within the Forum, when 
examining the calculations made by some of its participants. Central to a second 
relevance of the balance of power factor is the existence among some ARF 
participants of alternative views on the role of the embryonic regime for 
cooperative security. Indeed, it will now be argued that China has perceived the 
Forum as a vehicle for promoting multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific to counter 
America’s unipolar status in the post-Cold War. This suggests that the ARF is 
essentially dominated by major power relationships; above all, that between China 
and the United States.
The three key regional players; namely, the United States and Japan on the 
one hand and China on the other, hold opposing expectations on the cooperative 
security arrangement.55 The US views the multilateral security dialogue as a 
means of complementing its bilateral arrangements with regional states. For 
example, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed at the ASEAN-PMC 
held in Singapore in July 1993 that “While alliances and bilateral defense 
relationships will remain the cornerstone of American strategy in Southeast Asia, 
the Clinton Administration welcomes multilateral security consultations - 
especially within the framework of the PMC.”56 America’s reliance on bilateral
54See the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 176.
55This point was made by Dr. Narayanan Ganesan, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political 
Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS). The interview was held at NUS on 18 
February 2000.
56Statement by H.E. Mr. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State of the United States of America, at 
the ASEAN-United States Dialogue Session, Singapore, 27 July 1993.
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security structures has been further demonstrated since the creation of the ARF. 
The joint US-Japanese Declaration of April 1996 on regional security and 
subsequent provision for new guidelines confirmed the post-Cold War 
significance of the Mutual Security Treaty. Similar to Washington, Tokyo 
examines the Forum as a means to complement rather than replace existing 
bilateral alliances. Japan regards the ARF as supplementary to its alliance with the 
US and as an instrument to preserve an ongoing American engagement in East 
Asia.57
This latter security perspective is shared by most ASEAN states. By 
establishing the ARF, they recognised the need for a new security structure in the 
post-Cold War that could supplement existing bilateral alliances.58 A consensus 
had already emerged during the separate session of the ASEAN PMC-SOM in 
May 1993 that the Forum would only complement a bilateral approach to security. 
It is interesting to note, however, that all the participants at the meeting, except for 
Indonesia and Malaysia, had formal bilateral agreements with the United States. 
This security perspective has not changed since May 1993. For instance, 
Singapore’s Foreign Minister Professor S. Jayakumar declared in 1999 that the 
ARF “is an important vehicle to supplement our bilateral relations with the major 
powers.”59
In contrast to the United States and Japan, China has come to perceive the 
ARF as a vehicle for promoting multipolarity defined with reference to countering 
US unilateralism. The PRC supports a multipolar rather than a multilateral 
perspective in the Asia-Pacific that would include the traditional Sino-Japanese- 
US triangle but also recognise India, Russia and the ASEAN states as relevant 
regional actors. Beijing favours a multipolar system based on equality and 
partnership between the main regional states. It has embraced ASEAN’s 
diplomatic centrality and managerial role within the Forum as a way to enhance 
multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific and to avoid US domination of the institution.
57For a discussion on Japan’s motives to actively take part in the formation of the ARF, please refer 
to Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japanese Security Policy: The Case of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1997), pp. 480-503.
58This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan.
59Singapore’s Foreign Minister Prof. S. Jayakumar, Addenda to the President’s Address: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 8 October 1999.
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This position has also been adopted by Russia and by India since it joined in 1996. 
In addition, the PRC supported India’s participation during the ARF’s third annual 
meeting as a means for promoting a multipolar regional order. In essence, China 
has regarded the ARF as an instrument for opposing a new US policy of 
containment. Segal wrote in 1997 that “Chinese officials now privately admit that 
they see a virtue in regional multilateralism as a way to exert counter-pressure 
against a United States that now seems more prepared to threaten the use of force 
in order to balance China.”60 The Forum provides the PRC with a diplomatic tool 
to preserve its political ties with the ASEAN states and to avoid potential isolation 
in the Asia-Pacific. China has also used the ARF as a means to question US 
bilateral alliances by arguing that these agreements may no longer be required in a 
less menacing security environment.61 On this question, it has the support of India 
and Russia. Beijing has openly addressed Southeast Asian leaders on the 
superiority of cooperative security over the use of “outdated” Cold War alliances.
In the post-Cold War, the PRC has become deeply concerned about the US 
unipolar status, which Beijing viewed as having been demonstrated by the Gulf 
War of 1991. Tense ever since the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, 
Sino-US relations have been further complicated since the creation of the ARF. 
For example, Beijing resented the American decision to offer Taiwanese President 
Lee Teng Hui a visa for a private visit to the United States in June 1995. Bilateral 
relations worsened due to the events in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 that 
demonstrated an American willingness to act as a source of countervailing power 
against the PRC. Beijing was also critical of the joint US-Japanese Declaration of 
April 1996. Wang Jisi explains that “The newly enhanced US-Japanese military 
coordination has unambiguously reinforced Chinese anxiety about these two 
powers’ joint efforts to counterweight Chinese power.” Sino-US relations 
improved following the official trip of the Chinese President Jiang Zemin to the 
United States in November 1997 and the return visit of President Clinton to China
60Gerald Segal, “How Insecure is Pacific Asia?,” International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (1997), p. 
247.
61Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol. 20, No. 2 (August 1998), p. 131.
62Wang Jisi, “The United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View from China,” The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1997), p. 12.
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in June 1998. Bilateral Relations again deteriorated as a result of the US bombing 
of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in early 1999, which was regarded in Beijing 
as part of a new US policy of containment.63
Beyond its participation in the ARF, China has aimed to oppose US 
unilateralism in the Asia-Pacific through other diplomatic means. It has tried to 
improve relations with Southeast Asian states. It normalised relations with 
Indonesia in 1990 and with Vietnam in 1991. China also opened diplomatic ties 
with Singapore and Brunei respectively in 1990 and 1991. Moreover, the PRC 
supported Malaysia’s initiative for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) that 
would have excluded non-Asian states. First initiated by Malaysia in 1990, the 
EAEG lapsed after a strong US objection as Washington refused to be excluded 
from East Asian economic cooperation but also as a result of coolness within 
ASEAN. In response, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
modified it to an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in October 1991. The 
project has revived through the ASEAN + Three (China, Japan and South Korea) 
summit of heads of government that first met in 1997. The PRC also takes part in 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that was inaugurated in Bangkok in March 
1996 and which brings together the heads of government from the EU and 
ASEAN states as well as from Japan, China and South Korea. The ASEAN + 
Three and ASEM are structures of dialogue that exclude the United States and 
provide China with alternative economic and strategic partners.
Malaysia has stood behind China’s preference for a multipolar security 
structure in the Asia-Pacific. Sino-Malaysian relations have improved in the 
1990’s as a result of economic cooperation but also due to a shared desire for a 
multipolar regional order and a common apprehension of US interference in their 
internal affairs.64 Malaysia has opposed a US domination of the ARF and APEC. 
Acharya explains that “Malaysia, more than any other ASEAN state, wants neither
63Michael Leifer, The Political and Security Outlook for Southeast Asia, Trends in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, January 2000), p. 1.
^For a discussion of Sino-Malaysian relations since the end of the Cold War, please refer to 
Joseph Liow Chin Yong, “Malaysia-China Relations in the 1990s: The Maturing of a Partnership,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 672-691.
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Beijing nor Washington to dominate the region.”65 The PRC has supported 
Malaysia’s increasingly anti-Western foreign policy as indicated by the Chinese 
willingness to go along with its initiative to establish the EAEC. Interestingly, 
Malaysia’s original proposal to form an economic grouping was initially 
announced during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Peng to Malaysia in December 
1990 and without prior consultation with ASEAN partners.66 It should be said that 
most ASEAN members have feared some of the potential consequences of the US 
unipolar status in the post-Cold War. In particular, they have shared China’s 
concerns about US pressure on human rights, trade issues, environmental 
protection, and the need for democratic reforms. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia 
and Vietnam have also been “uneasy about the possibility of the United States
c*!
attempting to link its security presence to such domestic issues....”
Beyond its support for a multipolar security perspective in the Asia- 
Pacific, China has at least paid lip service to the standard international norms 
promoted by the ASEAN states through the ARF. The PRC has introduced since 
the mid-1990’s an element of relative moderation in its foreign policy and has not 
attempted to pose challenges to the regional order. Huxley explains that:
There is considerable evidence that, in general, China recognises that its 
emerging superpower status entails huge responsibilities, particularly in terms of 
requiring international behaviour which gives priority to regional and global 
stability and adherence to international norms over a sense o f historical 
entitlement.68
Hence, it may be asserted that the PRC has not been acting as a revolutionary 
power. Self-restraint characterised China’s reaction to the construction in 1996 of 
a lighthouse on Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands by Japanese right-wingers. These 
islands, located in the East China Sea, are claimed by the PRC and Japan. It is also 
interesting to note China’s muted response to the victory of Chen Shui-bian, the 
pro-independence leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, in the Taiwanese
65Amitav Acharya, “Containment, Engagement, or Counter-Dominance? Malaysia’s Response to 
the Rise o f China,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The 
Management o f an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 143.
66Liow, “Malaysia-China Relations in the 1990s: The Maturing of a Partnership,” p. 676.
67Sheldon W. Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1998), p. 203.
68Tim Huxley, “A Threat in the South China Sea? A Rejoinder,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 1 
(March 1998), p. 117.
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presidential election of March 2000.69 This should be distinguished from China’s 
military exercises in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 to intimidate Taiwan and 
influence its coming presidential election.
The relative moderation in China’s foreign policy can also be observed in 
the context of the South China Sea dispute. Although the PRC expanded its 
structures on Mischief Reef in late 1998, it has not seized additional disputed 
features in the Spratlys since 1995. This may be contrasted with Malaysia’s 
seizure of Navigator Reef in March 1999. The PRC has stood firm on the question 
of sovereign jurisdiction. The other claimants, however, have also refused to make 
any concession on this matter. Significantly, Beijing has been careful not to allow 
the South China Sea question to become an issue in Chinese domestic politics. 
Miles writes that “Even during the 1995 Mischief Reef dispute with the 
Philippines, China avoided turning the issue into a major subject of domestic 
propaganda.”70 In short, Beijing’s policy towards the South China Sea question 
has included some moderation since 1995. The element of control in China’s 
foreign policy can be explained by a desire not to antagonise the ASEAN states 
and its fear of the entire region becoming infected with the virus of irredentism.
China’s response to the question of preventive diplomacy within the ARF 
should also be mentioned. Beijing has strongly opposed any attempt to move 
towards the second stage of development, primarily due to the fear of external 
interference in its domestic affairs. It should be noted that the United States has 
also rejected the implementation of formal measures that would constrain its 
regional policy and bilateral ties. Still, the PRC has been supportive of the process 
of preventive diplomacy. It has taken part in the ARF track-two seminars on the 
subject organised respectively in Seoul in May 1995, in Paris in November 1996 
and in Singapore in September 1997. Moreover, it was a participant at a workshop 
on preventive diplomacy organised by the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence 
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in Bangkok on 28 February-2 March 
1999.
69James Miles, “Chinese Nationalism, US Policy and Asian Security,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4 
(Winter 2000/01), pp. 56-57.
70Miles, “Chinese Nationalism, US Policy and Asian Security,” p. 67.
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Conclusion
The establishment of the ARF involved balance of power considerations. 
The balance of power perspective and the associative dimension, discussed in 
chapter two, were closely intermingled in the formation of the Forum. Indeed, the 
anticipated political constraint likely to be imposed on the major participants was 
expected to be primarily dependent on their stake in the emerging cooperative 
security regime. Yet, it should be questioned whether the ARF has so far 
succeeded in constraining China’s foreign policy through non-military means. The 
Mischief Reef incident indicated a Chinese readiness to undermine the premises of 
confidence-building and trust on which the Forum was initially based. The ARF 
does not entail sufficient incentive to counter a disposition towards hegemony by 
China. That said, the PRC has generally respected since the mid-1990’s the 
standard international norms promoted by the ARF and has aimed not to upset the 
regional order. It has also viewed its participation in the Forum in balance of 
power terms. In contrast to the United States, Japan and most ASEAN states, 
China has regarded the ARF as a vehicle for promoting multipolarity in the Asia- 
Pacific to counter America’s unipolar status in the post-Cold War.
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Chapter Seven
ASEAN’s Post-Cold War Involvement in the South China Sea 
Dispute: The Relevance of Associative and 
Balance of Power Dimensions
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the South China Sea dispute in relation to 
ASEAN’s ability to conduct itself as an associative body and considers its 
initiatives to bring the balance of power to bear. The associative dimension will be 
examined as involving the promotion of a code of conduct for the South China 
Sea respected at least by the member states. The balance of power perspective will 
be analysed in a conventional sense and as a political factor within the ARF with 
reference to the South China Sea. It will be argued that ASEAN’s involvement has 
been defined by the absence of both dimensions. The lack of associative conduct 
may result from the absence of intra-mural cohesion over the territorial dispute 
and ASEAN’s failure to establish a code of conduct for the South China Sea. Its 
inability to practice conventional balance of power politics may arise from the 
lack of access to an external source of countervailing power. Finally, it will be 
asserted that China’s participation in the ARF has not led to any concessions or 
compromises regarding its territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The chapter will consist of three sections. The first will review the nature 
of the South China Sea dispute by discussing the relevance of International Law, 
the conflicting territorial claims and the economic and strategic interests involved. 
The second section will deal with the emergence of the territorial dispute as a 
regional security issue in the post-Cold War. Additionally, it will be pointed out 
that the ASEAN members have contradictory views on China’s potential threat as 
a rising power. Finally, ASEAN’s post-Cold War involvement in the South China 
Sea dispute will be addressed by studying its conduct through both associative and 
balance of power perspectives.
I. The Nature of the South China Sea Dispute
The overlapping territorial claims over the Spratly Islands represent a 
difficult case of disputed features between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
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Philippines and Malaysia. Controlled by the PRC since 1974, the Paracel 
archipelago is claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. This chapter will focus on the 
Spratly issue. The South China Sea dispute may be examined in the context of 
International Law. The Third United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS HI) was adopted on 30 April 1982 and came into force on 16 
November 1994. It was ratified, among others, by Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and eventually by China, Malaysia and Brunei in
1996. The Convention aims to establish a new maritime regime by calling for 
closer cooperation on maritime issues, offering procedures for the resolution of 
territorial disputes and introducing new concepts, rights and responsibilities.1
The 1982 Convention imposes conditions to regulate internal waters, 
archipelagic waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs), continental shelves and high seas. Maritime zones are measured from 
base points on land. The Convention provides coastal states with the authority to 
extend their sovereign jurisdiction under a specific set of rules. It authorizes 
expansion of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles and limits the contiguous 
zone to twenty-four nautical miles. The EEZ “shall not extend beyond the 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.”2 The sovereign rights of a coastal state over the EEZ are limited to the 
exploration and exploitation of its living and non-living resources. Continental 
shelves may not be extended beyond a limit of three-hundred-and-fifty nautical 
miles from territorial baselines. The sovereign rights of a coastal state over the 
continental shelf are reduced to the exploration and exploitation of its non-living 
resources. The Convention defines the rights and privileges of archipelagic states 
and recognises that archipelagic waters fall within their sovereign jurisdiction. It 
also ensures the freedom of navigation, the right of innocent passage and the 
passage through straits.
'Please refer to Rebecca M. M. Wallace, International Law, Second Edition (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1992), pp. 128-165. For a discussion on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea and East Asian security, please refer to Michael Leifer, “The Maritime Regime and 
Regional Security in East Asia,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1991), pp. 126-136.
2Article 57, 1982 Convention. Official Text o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the 
Sea with Annexes and Index (New York: United Nations, 1983).
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A peaceful maritime regime in Southeast Asia depends on the 
interpretation and application of the Law of the Sea by the various regional states. 
Moreover, the 1982 Convention is based on assumptions of agreement on 
sovereignty and does not provide for resolution of disputes, except through a 
diplomatic compromise. International or regional arbitration is therefore not 
compulsory under the terms of the Law of the Sea. The claimants have not agreed 
on the problem of sovereign jurisdiction over the islands of the South China Sea 
and the overlapping claims have not been presented to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. On the contrary, 
some of the parties have misused the Convention to extend their sovereign 
jurisdiction unilaterally and justify their claims in the South China Sea. Yet, the 
question of whether the Spratly Islands may generate maritime zones needs to be 
mentioned. UNCLOS HI defines an island as “a naturally-formed area of land, 
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”4 An island is also capable 
of naturally supporting life. In contrast, UNCLOS declares that “Rocks which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”5 Features that cannot sustain 
human life and artificial islands are only entitled respectively to a twelve nautical- 
mile territorial sea and a five-hundred metre safety zone. These terms of the 1982 
Convention seem to apply to most features in the Spratly archipelago. In short, due 
to their status the disputed features in the South China Sea may not be a legitimate 
basis for claiming maritime jurisdiction.
The claims made by the parties involved in the South China Sea dispute 
can be separated into historical claims of discovery and occupation and claims that 
rest on the extension of sovereign jurisdiction under interpretations of the 
provisions of UNCLOS. The PRC views the South China Sea as an exclusive 
Chinese sea and claims nearly its entire territory. Its historical claims are based on 
the discovery and occupation of the territory.6 In 1947, the Nationalist government 
of Chiang Kai-Shek defined China’s traditional claims by an area limited by nine
3Leifer, “The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia,” p. 128.
4Article 121, 1982 Convention.
5Article 121(3), 1982 Convention.
6For a discussion on the Chinese territorial claims, please refer to Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys! 
(New York: Dolphin Books, 1995), pp. 5-35.
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interrupted marks that cover most of the South China Sea. Zhou En-lai formalised 
the claims for the PRC in 1951 as a response to the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 
which Japan renounced all claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands without 
stating their new ownership. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea 
have not changed since 1951. Relying on its claim to historical administration of 
the area, Beijing has not provided a legal explanation for or given specific 
delimitations to its territorial claims. In fact, historically-based claims over nearly 
an entire maritime territory, rather than specific islands, seem legally 
indefensible. Claiming a comparable area in the South China Sea, Taiwan relies 
on similar historical arguments. Taipei has occupied since 1956 the island of Itu 
Aba, the largest feature in the Spratly group. Despite the Taiwan question, the 
PRC has tolerated Taipei’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its control
o
of Itu Aba. Until the reunification of Vietnam, Hanoi had recognised Chinese 
sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Since 1975, it has claimed both 
groups based on historical claims of discovery and occupation. Its claims rely on 
the Vietnamese administration of these islands in the 19th century and on the 
French involvement in the area as a colonial power. Vietnam also established in 
May 1977 a 200-nautical-mile EEZ.
The original ASEAN members involved in the dispute present conflicting 
claims that differ from those discussed above. They are limited to specific parts of 
the Spratly archipelago and tend to rely on International Law; including, the 
extension of the continental shelf, rather than on historical arguments.9 Among the 
member states, the Philippines claims the largest area of the Spratlys, a zone 
referred to as Kalayaan. These claims are largely based on the so-called discovery 
of the area by an explorer, Tomas Cloma, in 1956. First officially proclaimed in 
1971, a 1978 presidential decree declared the Kalayaan part of the national 
territory. The Philippine claims also rest on a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, which is 
said to cover the Kalayaan. Malaysia extended its continental shelf in 1979 and
7This point was made by R.M. Sunardi, former Admiral of the Indonesian Navy (1985-1995). The 
interview was held in Jakarta on 22 March 2000.
8Michael Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Policy in the South China Sea,” in 
Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security 
(London: Routledge, 1996), p. 144.
9Amitav Archarya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Adelphi Paper No. 279 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 33-34.
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included features of the Spratlys in its territory.10 Brunei established in 1988 an 
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles that extends to the South of the 
Spratly Islands and comprises Louisa Reef. Yet, the Sultanate does not claim the 
reef as such. Finally, Indonesia is not a party to the Spratly dispute. It was neutral 
in the South China Sea issue until 1993 and the suspected extension of the 
Chinese claims to the waters above the Natuna gas fields, currently exploited by 
Indonesia.
Important economic, strategic and domestic interests are involved in the
South China Sea dispute. The area is rich in fishery resources and expected to hold
substantial oil and gas reserves.11 Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam are already
important oil producers but China became a net energy importer from 1994 to
sustain its economic growth and development. That said, the oil reserves of the
South China Sea are uncertain and initial estimations have been reduced. Also,
none of the claimants have so far gained from their oil or gas exploration. The
exploitation has until now been limited to continental shelves. The situation in the
South China Sea could quickly change for the worst if proof was found of
sufficient oil reserves for commercial usage. The free navigation of commercial
vessels in the South China Sea is essential for regional and international trade.
Major shipping lanes used by the United States, Japan and other maritime powers
cross these waters. Valencia explains that “Japanese tankers carry 70% of Japan’s
oil through the South China Sea and the US Seventh Fleet requires free, flexible
1 0and, for its nuclear submarines, undetected passage in the area.”
The South China Sea dispute has a strategic dimension. If it succeeds in 
realising its territorial claims, the PRC would “be able to extend its jurisdiction 
some one thousand nautical miles from its mainland so as to command the virtual 
Mediterranean or maritime heart of Southeast Asia with far-reaching
l0Please refer to Lo Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes (London: Routledge, 
1989), pp. 153-154.
uFor a discussion on the economic dimension of the South China Sea dispute, please refer to Bob 
Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1997), pp. 44-65.
12Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes: Conflicting Claims and Potential 
Solutions in the South China Sea, Adelphi Paper No. 298 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), p. 28.
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consequences for the strategic environment.”13 A Chinese naval presence at the 
heart of the sub-region would be threatening for Vietnam and the Philippines but 
also for Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The control of the maritime 
communication routes would also have a strategic value as it would endanger the 
economic and security interests of the US, Japan and others.14 Finally, the 
territorial claims have assumed a nationalist importance in the states concerned; 
above all, in the PRC. The claimants have been inflexible on the sovereignty 
issue. Retracting territorial claims or a willingness to make concessions on the 
question of sovereign jurisdiction would be costly domestically and perceived 
regionally as a sign of weakness.
Following a strategy of Southward expansion, the PRC has used force to 
consolidate its position in the South China Sea. In January 1974, China completed 
its control over the Paracel archipelago by acting militarily against South Vietnam 
before the expected fall of Saigon and the reunification of the country.15 This 
military action should be examined as part of the Sino-Soviet struggle and fear of 
a Soviet encirclement of the PRC.16 Beyond the Cold War calculations, the events 
of 1974 reinforced China’s influence in the South China Sea. In part due to its 
limited capacity to project power, the PRC remained absent from the Spratly 
Islands until the second half of the 1980’s. Except for Brunei, all the other parties 
involved already controlled features in the Spratlys. Claiming the entire 
archipelago, China needed urgently to secure a military presence in the Spratlys 
and occupied some features in 1987. The construction of permanent foundations 
on uninhabitable and occasionally submerged features has been viewed by most 
claimants as a way to manifest their sovereign jurisdiction. A naval confrontation 
with Vietnam on 14 March 1988 led to a new Chinese seizure of territory.17
13Michael Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform: the Impact on Policy in the South China Sea,” p. 
142.
l4This point was made by R.M. Sunardi.
15For a discussion on China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands, please refer to Gerald Segal, 
Defending China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 197-210.
l6Please refer to Mark J. Valencia, “The Spratly Imbroglio in the Post-Cold War Era,” in David 
Wurfel, ed., Southeast Asia in the New World Order (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 
255; and Lo, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes, pp. 63-68.
17Please refer to Shee Poon-Kim, “The March 1988 Skirmish over the Spratly Islands and its 
Implications for Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” in R.D. Hill, N. Owen and E.V. Roberts, eds., 
Fishing in Troubled Waters: Proceedings o f An Academic Conference on Territorial Claims in the 
South China Sea (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991), pp. 177- 
191.
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Despite the ongoing Third Indochina Conflict, the regional strategic context had 
dramatically changed by 1988. Eager to achieve a rapprochement with the PRC, 
the Soviet Union failed to assist or support Vietnam. The lack of a reaction further 
undermined the reliability of the Soviet Union as a military ally, which had been 
previously questioned by the absence of a Soviet response to China’s punitive 
attack against Vietnam in early 1979. On 8 February 1995, the Philippines 
discovered Chinese in occupation of Mischief Reef located in the Kalayaan. The 
PRC had taken for the first time territory claimed by an ASEAN member. China 
has not seized disputed features in the Spratlys since the Mischief Reef incident, 
but Malaysia has in 1999.
II. ASEAN’s Post-Cold War Relations with China and the South China 
Sea Question
During the Third Indochina Conflict, the problem of the overlapping 
claims in the South China Sea was set aside in Sino-ASEAN relations. Thailand 
needed access to an external source of countervailing power to oppose Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia while the PRC was reliant on Thai collaboration to assist 
the Khmer Rouge militarily. Some regional states, primarily Singapore, were also 
concerned about the growing Soviet naval influence in Southeast Asia. Though 
the naval clash of 1988 revived the issue in some ASEAN capitals, the tacit 
alliance with China and the regional isolation of Vietnam meant that the territorial 
question was overlooked during most of the decade. The PRC did not act 
aggressively against any of the ASEAN claimants during that period. The Paris 
Accords of October 1991 and Vietnam’s military withdrawal from Cambodia put 
an end to the complementary security interests that had united China and the 
Association. Rather than a threat to Southeast Asian stability, Vietnam was now
1 ftkeen to reach a detente with the United States and the ASEAN members.
18For a discussion on Vietnam’s foreign policy since the end of the Third Indochina Conflict, 
please refer to Michael Leifer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Coping with 
Vulnerability,” in Robert S. Ross, ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 267-293; and Richard K. Betts, “The Strategic Predicament,” in 
James W. Morley and Masashi Nishihara, eds., Vietnam Joins the World (London: M.E. Sharpe, 
1997), pp. 94-114.
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In the regional strategic context of the post-Cold War, the territorial 
dispute over the Spratly Islands has become a major regional security concern. 
That said, the dispute is still primarily a political rather than a military issue 
thanks to the limited naval capabilities available to the different claimants. For 
instance, the modernisation of China’s naval force since the late 1980’s, which has 
included the slow acquisition of limited blue-water capabilities, has been modest 
and should not be exaggerated. Its naval position in the South China Sea has 
continued to be weak, particularly in the Spratly Islands, due to its limited power 
projection. It should also be mentioned that the ASEAN states have been eager not 
to antagonise the PRC or to over-emphasise the South China Sea question in their 
bilateral as well as multilateral talks with Beijing.
Before analysing ASEAN’s response to the Spratly dispute, attention 
should be given to the intra-mural disparities. Though all the members are 
confronted with China’s rising power, they have differential relationships with the 
PRC that derive from various aspects that include: contrasting historical 
experiences, ethnicity, economic relations as well as domestic and international 
conditions. As will be later discussed, contradictory views on China have 
complicated the establishment of a common position on the South China Sea.
The Philippines maintained good ties with China after the opening of 
bilateral relations in July 1975. Isolated from mainland Southeast Asia, the 
Philippines supported ASEAN’s tacit alliance with the PRC during the 
Cambodian conflict. Yet, post-Cold War bilateral relations have been complicated 
by the South China Sea question and affected by the Mischief Reef incident. 
Moreover, the Philippines has become since the 1992 US withdrawal the most 
vulnerable actor in the Spratly dispute. Manila has aimed to internationalise the 
issue and proposed in 1992 to organise an international conference on the problem 
under the auspices of the United Nations.19 In contrast, the PRC has constantly 
refused any form of international mediation.
Indonesia has perceived the PRC as its primary external security concern. 
Bilateral relations were only normalised in August 1990, after having been 
suspended by Jakarta in 1965, and feelings of mistrust and suspicion towards 
China have remained strong in Indonesia, specially among the armed forces. For
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instance, Lt. General TNI Agus Widjojo explained to the author that uncertainties 
exist with regards to the PRC and its regional role in the post-Cold War due to its 
traditional propensity to use force.20 Indonesia fears external interference from 
China and is concerned about its remaining subversive influence. It is also 
apprehensive that China’s rising military and economic power may increase its 
role in Southeast Asia. Bilateral relations have been complicated by the suspected 
inclusion of the waters above the Natuna gas fields into the Chinese claims in the 
South China Sea. As Indonesia favours a Southeast Asian order based on its own 
managerial role, Beijing and Jakarta should also be viewed as geopolitical 
competitors for regional influence in the post-Cold War.21
During the 1980’s, Malaysia generally shared Indonesia’s threat 
perception. This has changed in the post-Cold War as a result of a more 
cooperative relationship with China. Political and economic ties have been 
enhanced since the early 1990’s, as first manifested by the visit of Chinese 
Premier Li Peng to Malaysia in December 1990. Rather than perceiving the PRC 
as a threat, Malaysia has concentrated on the opportunities provided by its 
economic growth and expects China to be constrained by regional economic 
interdependence.
Singapore and Thailand have no territorial claims in the South China Sea 
and have maintained strong links with the PRC. While Bangkok is more 
concerned about China’s rising influence in Myanmar, the city-state is eager not to 
alienate Beijing and to see the non-violation of the freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea. Singapore’s interest in the territorial dispute therefore results 
from its concern for regional stability and economic prosperity. Singapore’s long­
term economic links with the PRC includes large scale investments in the Suzhou 
and Shenzhen special economic zones. Khong points out that Singapore aims to 
respond to China’s growing power by engaging the PRC economically and
19Catley and Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea, p. 102.
20This point was made by Lt. General TNI Agus Widjojo. The interview was held in Jakarta on 24 
March 2000.
21Michael Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement,” in 
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management o f an 
Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 99.
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22politically but also by modernising and consolidating its own military forces. As 
an ethnic Chinese state in Southeast Asia, Singapore has traditionally been 
concerned with its Malay neighbours; primarily Malaysia and Indonesia. To 
demonstrate its Southeast Asian identity, the city-state decided to be the last 
ASEAN member to open relations with the PRC. Despite the prior existence of 
excellent economic ties, Singapore and China only formalised their relations in 
November 1990.
III. ASEAN’s Involvement in the South China Sea Dispute
A. The Absence of an Associative Dimension
The Association has never attempted to address the problem of sovereign 
jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands. The ASEAN claimants have been unable to 
agree on the territorial question and attention should be given instead to intra­
mural cooperation of a confidence-building kind. Accordingly, ASEAN’s 
involvement in the South China Sea dispute should be analysed in relation to its 
ability to conduct itself as an associative body. An associative dimension could 
involve the promotion of a code of conduct respected at least by the member 
states. In this section, it will be argued that the absence of such an associative 
dimension has resulted from the lack of intra-mural cohesion over the territorial 
dispute and ASEAN’s failure, so far, to establish a code of conduct for the South 
China Sea.
ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute started in the late 
1980’s after the Sino-Vietnamese naval confrontation of March 1988. The 
member states wished to take a conciliatory approach towards China in light of the 
economic and security interests at stake and to engage it in a peaceful and stable 
regional order. It was believed that the search for a collective diplomatic stand on 
the South China Sea could alienate the PRC.23 Moreover, China was leading a 
peaceful campaign towards the Association and seemed willing to show restraint 
vis-a-vis the ASEAN claimants. The Philippine President Corazon Aquino
22Khong Yuen Foong, “Singapore: A Time for Economic and Political Engagement,” in Alastair 
Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management o f an Emerging Power 
(London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 110-111.
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travelled to China in April 1988 and was supposedly told that Chinese naval 
forces would not attack Philippine troops located in the Spratlys.24 Visiting 
Singapore in August 1990, Prime Minister Li Peng declared that the PRC was 
prepared to set aside the territorial dispute and proposed joint exploration and 
development of the Spratlys with the Southeast Asian states. China’s 
accommodating position with regard to the ASEAN claimants was in sharp 
contrast to its policy towards Vietnam, which was devoid of any concession. Sino- 
Vietnamese relations were normalised in November 1991 during the official visit 
of Vietnam’s Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet to Beijing but bilateral tensions 
remained despite Li Peng’s return trip to Vietnam in November 1992.
The first attempt to establish a multilateral dialogue on the South China 
Sea was independent from the Association. Launched in 1990, the Workshops on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea is an Indonesian-sponsored 
project financed by Canada that has focused on confidence-building over maritime 
issues. By avoiding the question of sovereign jurisdiction, the Workshops have 
attempted to encourage a multilateral dialogue and enhance a peaceful 
management of the conflict.25 In January 1990, an initial Workshop was organised 
in Bali that gathered the six ASEAN states to a preliminary meeting. Held in 
Bandung in July 1991, the second event brought together the members of the 
Association, China, “Chinese Taipei,” Vietnam and Laos. In his opening 
statement, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas declared that “our attention and 
efforts have been and should continue to be directed towards finding ways to 
transform potential sources of conflict into constructive forms of cooperation for 
mutual benefit.” Indonesia was then neutral in the South China Sea issue. This 
changed at the 1993 Workshop where Chinese officials released a map of the 
Chinese claims that included the waters above the Natuna gas fields. By hosting
23This point was made by Dr. Lee Lai To, Associate Professor, Department o f Political Science at 
the National University of Singapore (NUS). The interview was held at NUS on 14 March 2000.
24Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 34.
25Please refer to Ian Townsend-Gault, “Confidence and Cooperation in the South China Sea: The 
Indonesia-Canada Initiative,” in Jusuf Wanandi, ed., Regional Security Arrangements: Indonesian 
and Canadian Views (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), pp. 69-80 and 
Ian Townsend-Gault, “Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2 (August 1998), pp. 182-187.
26Address by H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Opening the Second 
Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, 15 July 
1991.
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the Workshops, Indonesia as a non-claimant introduced a new dimension to its 
foreign policy and consolidated its position as a peaceful and leading regional 
player. The initiative should also be viewed as an Indonesian attempt to enhance 
its managerial role in Southeast Asia. Despite their limited success, the 
Workshops have never been incorporated within the institutional framework of the 
Association.
China’s willingness to show restraint vis-a-vis ASEAN claimants was 
questioned when on 25 February 1992 Beijing passed “The Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas.” It reiterated 
China’s claims in the South China Sea and stipulated the right to use force to 
protect islands, including the Spratlys, and their surrounding waters. Though only 
repeating the traditional Chinese claims in the South China Sea, the law 
questioned the peaceful management of the territorial dispute and was regarded by 
the Association as a political provocation that contradicted prior diplomatic 
gestures towards the member states. In May 1992, the PRC also granted an oil 
exploration concession to the US-based Crestone Energy Corporation in the 
Vanguard Bank, a zone claimed by Vietnam as part of its continental shelf. The 
PRC guaranteed to protect these installations by force if necessary. China’s first 
oil concession contradicted Li Peng’s proposal for joint exploration and 
development of the Spratlys and challenged the Vietnamese leadership.27 In 1994, 
Hanoi granted an oil exploration concession to the US company Mobil 
Corporation within an area of the Vanguard Bank claimed by the PRC.
The ASEAN members responded to the Chinese law during their annual 
meeting of the foreign ministers held in Manila in July 1992. The ministerial 
session led to the formulation of the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, 
which was an outcome of the joint statement of the Bandung Workshop of July 
1991.28 As ASEAN’s first common position on the South China Sea, the 
Declaration was an attempt to promulgate an informal code of conduct based on 
self-restraint, the non-use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes. It relied 
on the norms and principles initially introduced in the TAC. Hence, it was a non­
27Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Policy in the South China Sea,” p. 148.
28Joint Statement, Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, 
Indonesia, 15-18 July 1991.
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specific document that failed to move beyond the simple assertion of standard 
international principles to the context of the dispute. The Philippines had argued 
for a more precise document.29 The Declaration stated that the foreign ministers 
“Emphasize the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues 
pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;” and 
“Urge all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a 
positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.” It also “Command all 
parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Co­
operation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international 
conduct over the South China Sea.”30
The Manila Declaration did not deal with the problem of sovereign 
jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands. It was not an expression of consensus on the 
territorial question but rather an attempt to ensure a peaceful management of the 
dispute. An informal code of conduct for the South China Sea should thus be 
associated with the notion of conflict avoidance rather than conflict resolution. 
Through its formulation, ASEAN conducted itself as an associative body by 
reaching a compromise on the South China Sea. The adoption of a broad 
diplomatic stand was an achievement as it reflected the cohesion of the 
Association despite intra-mural differences.31 The Philippines, Malaysia and 
Brunei have conflicting claims in the Spratlys. The sovereignty question has also 
further complicated Philippine-Malaysian relations that have been strained since 
the 1960’s by the territorial dispute over Sabah. For instance, three Philippine 
vessels were intercepted by Malaysian military forces in April 1988 while fishing 
in areas claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines as part of their EEZs. Thailand 
and Singapore have no territorial claims in the South China Sea and had therefore 
no benefit in taking a stand that implicitly criticised the Chinese law on 
“Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas.” Despite these disparities, the member 
states shared an interest in promoting Southeast Asian stability and avoiding any 
confrontation with China. It was believed that a potential source of threat could be
29Lee Lai To, “The South China Sea: China and Multilateral Dialogues,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 
30, No. 2 (1999), p. 170.
30ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, the Philippines, 22 July 1992.
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reduced by the emergence of an embryonic regime in the South China Sea based 
on ASEAN’s norms and principles. Mak writes that “the AMM declaration should 
be seen as an attempt by the ASEAN members to handle China using non-military 
means as a specific response to a situation which could potentially disadvantage 
all the ASEAN countries.”32
Nevertheless, the relevance of the 1992 Declaration was reduced by the 
lack of external support. In contrast to its involvement in the Third Indochina 
Conflict, the ASEAN members were unable to rely on external players to advance 
their associative position. Leifer argues:
The Declaration on the South China Sea was ASEAN’s attempt to maintain its 
role in shaping regional order, but its diplomatic impact was far less than that 
registered during the Cambodian conflict. The changed pattern of international 
and regional alignments had reduced ASEAN’s political significance.33
While strongly supported by Vietnam which had adhered to the TAC during the 
1992 AMM, China was not receptive to the Declaration and did not formally 
adhere to its principles. Having a limited stake in ASEAN, Beijing could easily 
ignore the document and repeat its preference for bilateral rather than multilateral 
discussions on the South China Sea. The United States was unsupportive and 
maintained its position of neutrality in the territorial dispute despite the attendance 
of US Secretary of State James Baker at the 1992 PMC. Hence, ASEAN’s 
associative position was not assisted by a favourable strategic context that would 
strengthen internationally the relevance of its norms and principles.
Some members of the Association aimed to internationalise the South 
China Sea dispute by putting it forward in multilateral meetings and international 
fora. Indonesia and other ASEAN states introduced the issue in the agenda of the 
Non-Aligned Conference held in Jakarta in September 1992. The South China Sea 
question was also addressed one month later in the ASEAN-European Union 
Dialogue. China’s inclination to show restraint vis-a-vis the ASEAN claimants 
was repeated in 1993. While visiting Kuala Lumpur in May, China’s Defence
3‘This point was made by Dr. Bantarto Bandoro, Head of the Department of International Relations 
at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The interview was held at CSIS on 22 
March 2000.
32J.N. Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build-up: Implications for the Regional Order,” The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995), p. 308.
33Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model o f Regional Security, 
Adelphi Paper No. 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 18.
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Minister Chi Haotian declared that the PRC would not resort to force to promote 
its claims in the Spratlys. Significantly, China agreed to participate in the ARF, 
which was inaugurated in July 1993. ASEAN’s ambition to apply its norms and 
principles to the South China Sea was an underlying factor in the creation of the 
Forum. The Chinese participation in a multilateral dialogue was regarded as an 
approach to contribute to the peaceful management of the territorial dispute. Yet, 
the formation of the ARF undermined the traditional call for regional autonomy. 
The latter has been affected in the post-Cold War by increased security 
interdependence between North and Southeast Asia and the revival of some 
security concerns; above all, the Spratly issue. Leifer points out that “the price of 
engaging China may be at the expense of Indonesia’s exclusivist vision of regional 
order.”34
The first ARF meeting was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. The Spratly 
issue was mentioned briefly in Bangkok but not included in the 1994 chairman’s 
statement. Though refusing to discuss the question of sovereign jurisdiction in a 
multilateral forum, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen repeated Beijing’s 
peaceful intentions and rejected the resort to force as a means to solve the 
dispute.35 By limiting itself to bilateral negotiations with the other claimants, 
China aimed to dominate the discussions and avoid being ganged-up on during 
multilateral sessions. This complicated ASEAN’s attempt to develop a code of 
conduct for the South China Sea.
ASEAN’s efforts were shattered by the 1995 Mischief Reef incident. 
China’s assertive action in the Spratlys violated the norms and principles included 
in the 1992 Declaration and repeated in the context of the ARF. The PRC being 
dependent on investments and technology from ASEAN states, Segal writes that 
“The conventional wisdom in East Asia was that China would no doubt continue 
to take territory claimed by Vietnam, but it would not encroach on territory 
claimed by ASEAN states.” Instead, Beijing used force and broke the informal 
code of conduct that the Association had aimed to establish for the South China 
Sea. The Philippine President Fidel Ramos strongly criticised China’s policy in
34Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement,” p. 100.
35Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 37.
36Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 
4 (Spring 1996), p. 120.
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the Spratlys and attempted to build-up international support to condemn its latest 
action. The PRC and the Philippines agreed to hold talks and on 10 August 1995 
signed a bilateral code of conduct that rejected the use of force and called for the 
peaceful resolution of their bilateral disputes in accordance with the principles of 
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.37
No common complaint was formulated by the Association. Singapore, 
Thailand and Malaysia were eager not to antagonise China in light of the 
economic and security interests at stake. This provoked disunity among the 
member states. Leifer explains that “ASEAN’s initial corporate response to the 
revelation of China’s act of assertiveness was a deafening silence, indicative of 
internal dissent on how to cope with China as a rising power.” ASEAN did not 
have the political will or necessary means to confront the PRC. Under pressure 
from the Philippines, the Association eventually repeated its commitment to the 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea during a meeting held in Singapore 
on 18 March 1995. Though China was not mentioned, the ASEAN foreign 
ministers expressed their “serious concern over recent developments which affect 
peace and stability in the South China Sea.” They also called “for the early
I Q
resolution of the problems caused by the recent developments in Mischief Reef.” 
The statement was supported by Vietnam. On the eve of the first ASEAN-China 
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) held in Hangzhou in April 1995, Chinese and 
ASEAN officials met for an informal meeting during which the latter expressed 
their concern about China’s aggressive action. This diplomatic initiative surprised 
the Chinese representatives who were made to understand the political 
consequences of the Mischief Reef incident. Still, ASEAN’s constructive and 
informal approach indicated the need to avoid any diplomatic confrontation with 
the PRC.
The second annual ARF meeting was held in Brunei on 1 August 1995. 
The ministerial meeting was influenced by the Mischief Reef incident and a 
deterioration of Chinese relations with Washington and Tokyo. Sino-US ties had
37Joint Statement on RP-PRC Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of 
Cooperation, 9-10 August 1995.
38Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 38.
39Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Development in the South China Sea, 
Singapore, 18 March 1995.
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worsened due to a private visit by Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui to the 
United States in June 1995. Relations with Japan had been affected by China’s 
testing of an underground nuclear device in May 1995 despite the coming 
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The South China Sea 
issue was alluded to in the 1995 chairman’s statement of the ARF. It stated that 
the participants “encouraged all claimants to reaffirm their commitment to the 
principles contained in relevant international laws and convention, and the 1992 
Declaration on the South China Sea.”40 It also referred to the Workshops on the 
South China Sea. At China’s insistence, the Mischief Reef incident was not 
openly discussed at the ARF meeting. Prior to the annual ministerial session, 
China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made concessions to the members of the 
Association at the ASEAN-PMC. He declared that the PRC was prepared to hold 
multilateral discussions on the Spratlys, rather than limit its diplomacy to bilateral 
talks, and to accept the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as a basis for 
negotiation.41 The Chinese concessions were made in an ASEAN context and 
were not directly raised at the ARF. They resulted primarily from a need to 
accommodate the Association and ease its worries in light of a deterioration of 
Chinese relations with the United States and Japan.42 In addition, these 
concessions did not alter China’s territorial objectives in the South China Sea. The 
PRC was still unwilling to address the question of sovereign jurisdiction and 
persistently repeated its territorial claims over nearly the entire area.43 
Consequently, the 1995 concessions should not be associated with a new Chinese 
desire to respect an ASEAN code of conduct for the South China Sea.
After the events of 1995, China’s conciliatory attitude towards the ASEAN 
states continued to emanate from short-term interests. Sino-US relations worsened 
in 1996 due to the Joint US-Japanese Declaration and the Taiwan Straits crisis. As 
a result, the PRC needed to preserve its political ties with the members of the 
Association to avoid a potential diplomatic isolation in East Asia. Moreover, an
40Chairman’s Statement, the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
Darussalam, 1 August 1995.
4ISheldon W. Simon, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, 
eds., Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment o f Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific 
Region (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 47.
42Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” pp. 128-129.
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aggressive policy in the South China Sea could entail an important economic cost. 
China’s economic development had greatly benefited from and would continue to 
be in part dependent on prosperous economic relations with regional states. 
Finally, China’s policy was influenced by its weak naval position in the Spratlys 
and the absence of concrete evidence on the oil reserves of the South China Sea. 
These factors led to a Chinese policy of self-restraint regarding the affirmation of 
its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.44 In addition, the PRC ratified the 
Law of the Sea Convention in May 1996.
Nonetheless, the new peaceful campaign towards the Association should 
not be overestimated. China did not alter its sovereignty claims over the South 
China Sea and it misused the 1982 Convention to strengthen its position in the 
territorial dispute. Though the Philippines and Indonesia are the only archipelagic 
states in the region, the PRC applied the archipelagic principle when drawing 
maritime baselines around the Paracel Islands. The illegal use of the principle was 
a source of concern to some ASEAN states, including the Philippines, Vietnam 
and Indonesia that protested, due to its possible application to the Spratly Islands 
in the future. The PRC also extended on 7 March 1997 its oil exploration in 
Vietnam’s continental shelf, an action that Vietnam strongly criticised. ASEAN 
failed to formulate a statement to support Vietnam diplomatically. The 
installations were removed before the ASEAN-China SOM of 17-19 April 1997 45 
China again repeated its conciliatory rhetoric towards the Association during a 
meeting of the heads of state/government held in Kuala Lumpur in December
1997. The ASEAN states and the PRC jointly stated:
...they undertook to resolve their differences or disputes through peaceful means, 
without resorting to the threat or use of force. The parties concerned agreed to 
resolve their disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations and 
negotiations in accordance with universally recognized international law, 
including the 1992 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.46
43Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 43.
^Michael Leifer, “China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation,” in David S. 
Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 168.
45Sheldon Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review, Vol 11, No. 2 (1998), p. 202.
^Joint Statement o f the Meeting of Heads of State/Government o f the Member States of ASEAN 
and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 16 December 1997.
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Having reviewed ASEAN’s limited involvement in the South China Sea 
dispute up to 1997, let us now examine some more recent developments as well as 
the reasons for the absence of a common associative dimension. The lack of a 
collective stand derives from the absence of intra-mural consensus over the 
Spratly issue and ASEAN’s failure to establish a formal code of conduct for the 
South China Sea. Despite conflicting interests and the lack of a shared threat 
perception, the member states showed unity in their diplomatic opposition to 
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. A similar associative position has not been 
achieved in the case of the Spratlys. If an embryonic regime seemed to be 
emerging in the South China Sea, it was seriously affected by the Mischief Reef 
incident. Only applied to the Association, the 1992 Manila Declaration has also 
not been respected by all the member states. Direct military clashes have not 
occurred between the ASEAN claimants. However, some members have used 
military means to take control of reefs claimed by other states. For example, 
Malaysia’s seizure in March 1999 of Navigator Reef, claimed by the Philippines, 
strained relations with Manila but was also criticised by Vietnam, Brunei and 
China. Smaller incidents have also taken place between the Philippines and 
Vietnam and the Philippines and Malaysia. In addition, individual members now 
seem more willing to develop bilateral codes of conduct with the PRC, which 
further weakens ASEAN’s ability to conduct itself as an associative body. 
Malaysia’s approach to the South China Sea dispute is here of great significance.
Malaysia was until the early 1990’s critical of China’s actions in the 
Spratly Islands. Yet, its diplomatic stand on the South China Sea has over the last 
few years come closer to the PRC than to other ASEAN claimants.47 Malaysia 
refuses to address the question of sovereignty. It favours bilateral negotiations 
with China and would prefer to avoid a constraining regional code of conduct or 
external mediation48 It is, for instance, interesting to mention events at the 
informal Manila Summit of November 1999 where Malaysia dissented from a 
latest version of a code of conduct promoted by the Philippines and supported by 
Vietnam. The proposed code of conduct was an attempt to peacefully manage the
47This point was made by Dr. Andrew T.H. Tan, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies (IDSS). A discussion was held over lunch at IDSS on 18 February 2000.
48This point was made by Dr. Lee Lai To.
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South China Sea question by preventing a deterioration of the situation. In 
particular, it aimed to avert the additional occupation by the claimant states of 
disputed and presently uninhabitated features.49 Though not a binding document, 
the initiative was more specific than the 1992 Manila Declaration. It tried to move 
beyond the simple assertion of standard principles and proposed joint 
development of the Spratly Islands. Malaysia’s contrary position manifested a lack 
of intra-mural cohesion and embarrassed the Association. The Philippine proposal 
was also rejected by the PRC. The chairman’s press statement at the informal 
summit only declared that the heads of state/government “noted the report of the 
Ministers that ASEAN now has a draft regional code of conduct, and further 
consultations will be made on the draft with a view of advancing the process on 
the adoption of the code.”50
Preliminary meetings have since then been held with the PRC to identify 
the elements that ought to be included in the formulation of a joint code of 
conduct for the South China Sea. At a session held in Thailand in March 2000, the 
member states and China agreed that a regional code of conduct should rely on the 
principles set forward in the UN Charter, the TAC and UNCLOS and on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Moreover, it was decided that “the code of 
conduct should include confidence-building measures and areas of cooperation, 
starting with those that are least controversial and easiest to implement.”51
ASEAN’s failure to develop a common position among the claimant states 
results from several factors. The PRC has constantly repeated that its sovereignty 
over the South China Sea is indisputable. Partly due to a need to preserve their 
domestic political legitimacy, Chinese leaders refuse to make any concession on 
the issue. By consistently reiterating its preference for bilateral negotiations, the 
PRC has divided the ASEAN states diplomatically and undermined their efforts to 
establish a multilateral discussion on the territorial dispute.52 Beijing has held 
bilateral talks with other claimants. For instance, the PRC and Vietnam agreed
49This point was made by Dr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Special Assistant to the Secretary- 
General of the ASEAN Secretariat. The interview was held at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, on 
23 March 2000.
50Chairman’s Press Statement, Third Informal Summit of the ASEAN Heads o f State/Government, 
Manila, Philippines, 28 November 1999.
5’Press Release, ASEAN and China Held a Successful Consultation on Regional Code of Conduct 
in the South China Sea, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, 15 March 2000.
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during the visit of China’s President Jiang Zemin to Hanoi in November 1994 to 
create a Joint Working Group on the Spratly issue that first met the following 
year. Moreover, the PRC has succeeded in dividing the ASEAN members 
concerned by offering bilateral codes of conduct that would benefit their separate 
interests. Beijing seems also only prepared to support a multilateral code of 
conduct that would be limited to the Spratly Islands and focus on dialogue and the 
preservation of regional stability rather than the problem of sovereign 
jurisdiction.53 In short, the formulation of an ASEAN diplomatic stand has been 
undermined by China’s intransigence and its ability to control negotiation on the 
territorial question. Unable to impose its initiatives, ASEAN’s influence on the 
South China Sea dispute is clearly limited.
Nevertheless, the absence of an intra-mural consensus on the South China 
Sea needs to be kept in mind. The ASEAN states have differential relationships 
with the PRC and contrasting views on its potential threat. Also, some members 
have conflicting claims in the Spratlys while others are not concerned about the 
problem of sovereignty. These sources of disunity have complicated the 
attainment of a collective stance. Moreover, the ASEAN claimants involved in the 
dispute are unwilling to make concessions with regard to their territorial claims. 
They have not held discussions to address the problem of sovereign jurisdiction 
over the Spratly Islands and develop a common position on the issue.54 This has 
weakened ASEAN in its talks with the PRC. The question of sovereignty is 
central to the calculations of the member states and is the cause of most bilateral 
disputes within the Association.55 The constant search for solidarity and 
consensus-building has resulted in the failure to even discuss these matters. 
Finally, cooperation on the South China Sea has been affected by persisting 
mistrust among the ASEAN claimants. The strained relations between Malaysia 
and the Philippines are significant when examining the lack of consensus. 
Bilateral ties again worsened in 1998 when Philippine President Joseph Estrada
52This point was made by R.M Sunardi.
53This point was made by Dr. Lee Lai To.
54Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1999), p. 32.
55For a discussion on the intra-mural territorial disputes, please refer to Harald David, Tensions 
within ASEAN: Malaysia and its Neighbours (Hull, Monographs on Southeast Asian Politics and 
International Relations, 1996).
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commented on the sacking and physical mistreatment of Malaysia’s former 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and met with members of his family.
The current absence of cohesion also results from the fact that the problem 
of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands does not yet represent a direct danger to the 
national security of individual members.56 In contrast, Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia in December 1978 affected Thailand’s security environment and 
located hostile military forces on its Eastern border. Additionally, the events in 
Indochina had a domestic relevance due to the communist insurgencies operating 
within the ASEAN states. These explicit threats do not exist in the case of the 
South China Sea.57 That said, Vietnam and the Philippines feel endangered by 
China’s actions in the Spratlys. Vietnam perceives its relation with the PRC over 
the South China Sea as a reflection of its traditional antagonism and patterns of 
power with Beijing. By seizing Mischief Reef, China has demonstrated the new 
Philippine weakness that has resulted from the 1992 US withdrawal.
ASEAN’s cohesion on the South China Sea issue has been further reduced 
by the gradual weakening of ASEAN since 1997. A series of regional crises have 
complicated the process of consultation and questioned the application of ASEAN 
principles. The need to focus on domestic problems has also diminished intra-
co
mural solidarity and ASEAN’s significance as a diplomatic player. That said, 
China did not take advantage of the vulnerability of the ASEAN claimants during 
the financial crisis to expand its occupation of the Spratly Islands.59 On the 
contrary, it contributed to regional stability and enhanced its position in East Asia 
by not devaluing its currency and providing some financial assistance. The 
expansion of membership has also complicated the attainment of a consensus on 
the South China Sea. The newest members have no interest in the dispute and are 
eager not to antagonise Beijing. During the sixth formal summit held in Hanoi in 
December 1998, the ASEAN states only managed to call for the peaceful
56Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build-up: Implications for the Regional Order,” p. 308.
57This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes at the Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) and former member of the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs of Singapore. The interview was held at IDSS on 3 March 2000.
58“China and the Philippines: Reef-Stricken,” The Economist, 29 May 1999, p. 83.
59This point was made by Dr. Chin Kin-Wah, Associate Professor, Department o f Political Science 
at the National University of Singapore (NUS). The interview was held at the London School of 
Economics (LSE) on 19 May 2000.
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resolution of the disputes in the South China Sea in accordance with UNCLOS 
and the 1992 Manila Declaration. They also called on “all parties concerned to 
exercise restraint and to refrain from taking actions that are inimical to the peace, 
security and stability of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.”60 The 
question of sovereignty was once again avoided. ASEAN has so far been 
incapable to promote a code of conduct for the South China Sea within as well as 
beyond the walls of its arrangement.
The enlarged political association, which lacks the political will and 
cohesion to address the South China Sea problem, cannot be compared to the 
entity that collectively opposed the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 
ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute is undermined by 
unfavourable conditions. The Association is short of external backing, which 
significantly reduces its associative influence. The South China Sea question 
reveals the limits of ASEAN’s diplomacy without supporting sanctions to its 
collective conduct. Yet, it can be argued that the lack of external assistance results 
to a certain extent from ASEAN’s inability to conduct itself as an associative 
body. Indeed, this failure may in part explain the US unwillingness to give 
diplomatic and military support to the ASEAN claimants.
To conclude, attention should be given to the ARF, which was established 
partly to apply ASEAN’s norms and principles to the South China Sea. Its 
influence on the dispute has been limited. While the first two ministerial meetings 
were discussed above, it may be said that no advance has been made since 1995. 
The problem of the South China Sea was mentioned in the chairman’s statement 
that concluded the third ARF meeting held in Jakarta in July 1996. It welcomed 
the efforts of the parties involved to seek solutions in accordance with UNCLOS 
and referred to the contributions of the Workshops on the South China Sea.61 
Similar points were repeated in the statements that concluded the following annual 
ministerial meetings. The 1999 chairman’s statement emphasised the principle of 
freedom of navigation and noted the commitment made by the claimants to 
exercise self-restraint and to peacefully resolve the disputes in the South China
60Hanoi Declaration of 1998, Sixth ASEAN Summit, Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of 
State/Government, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15-16 December 1998.
61Chairman’s Statement, the Third Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, Indonesia, 23 
July 1996.
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Sea.62 The issue was not addressed in any meaningful way at the seventh ARF 
meeting organised in Bangkok in July 2000.
China argues that the problem of sovereign jurisdiction concerns only a 
few states and that it should therefore not be raised within an ARF framework. 
The PRC does not want the Forum to become an institutional vehicle available to 
the other claimants to gang-up on its territorial objectives in the Spratlys. 
Moreover, it is keen to avoid an American involvement in the territorial issue. The 
United States has so far only indicated its concern regarding the absence of 
diplomatic progress. Due to China’s pressure, the South China Sea has been 
addressed in general terms but never directly in the annual ministerial sessions nor 
in the context of the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs). The problem has only been discussed openly in the Workshops 
on the South China Sea. Yet, the Indonesian-sponsored project has failed, despite 
ten years of existence, to move from a multilateral dialogue to the application of 
preventive diplomacy.63 It is unlikely that Beijing will ever accept the 
implementation of such measures in the case of the South China Sea. The lack of 
advance towards preventive diplomacy both within the Workshops and the ARF 
does not only result from China’s intransigence but also from dissenting views 
among the ASEAN members.64 Malaysia, in particular, seems to oppose the 
implementation of such measures for the Spratly dispute.
B. Balance of Power Dimension
ASEAN’s inability to conduct itself as an associative body with reference 
to the South China Sea problem has been discussed. Let us now examine its 
initiatives to bring the balance of power to bear. The South China Sea dispute is 
directly related to the issue of the regional distribution of power. If it succeeds in 
realising its territorial claims, China will gain an hegemonic position in maritime 
Southeast Asia. In this final part of the chapter, it will be argued that ASEAN is 
unable on its own to constrain Chinese actions in the Spratly Islands and lacks
“ Chairman’s Statement, the Sixth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, 26 July
1999.
“ This point was made by Dr. Dino Patti Djalal, Deputy Director for ASEAN and the ARF at the 
Foreign Ministry of Indonesia. The meeting was held in London on 26 April 2000.
“ This point was made by Dr. Dino Patti Djalal.
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access to an external source of countervailing power. Moreover, it will be pointed 
out that China’s participation in the Forum has not led to a policy of self-restraint 
regarding its irredentist claims in the South China Sea.
It is important though not to exaggerate the current Chinese military threat 
in the South China Sea. Despite the ongoing modernisation of its navy, China’s 
naval position in the Spratly Islands remains weak. Disposing of a small power 
projection, the PRC has not extensively increased its ability to sustain naval 
operations away from its mainland bases.65 Most features in the Spratly 
archipelago are too small to offer bases for further naval activities. China’s lack of 
air power in the Spratlys also limits its influence. Hence, the PRC may not 
currently possess the necessary capabilities to control the Spratly group militarily. 
Furthermore, command over the maritime communication routes that cross the 
South China Sea may only result from a significant naval dominance and 
superiority in the region rather than the occupation of tiny features that may not 
offer a legitimate basis for claiming maritime jurisdiction.66 The PRC does not yet 
possess the technology, military capabilities and power projection to impose such 
a naval hegemony in Southeast Asia.67 That said, military power should also be 
examined in relative terms and in light of regional standards.68 China disposes of a 
significant military advantage when compared to some vulnerable Southeast Asian 
states that fear its regional hegemonic ambitions. Moreover, China’s current 
conciliatory attitude towards the ASEAN states “may be interpreted as a pragmatic 
but impermanent tactic intended to buy time, and to foster complacency in 
Southeast Asia, until China possesses sufficient military power - to back up its 
South China Sea claims with force.”69 In sum, the South China Sea dispute is 
currently a political rather than a military issue that challenges the ASEAN 
claimants. In the longer run, it may become a military threat and the dominant 
security concern in Southeast Asia. In the meantime, an armed conflict seems
65Please refer to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
66Leifer, “The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia,” p. 130.
67This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan.
68This point was made by Dr. Derek da Cunha, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS) and Co-ordinator for Regional, Strategic and Political Studies. The interview was 
held at ISEAS on 22 February 2000.
69Tim Huxley, “A Threat in the South China Sea? A Rejoinder,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 1 
(March 1998), p. 114.
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unlikely although risks exist of miscalculations or accidents that could lead to 
limited confrontation.
The Association is unable on its own to act as an effective source of 
countervailing power in the South China Sea. A conventional practice of balance 
of power politics is unachievable due to the limitations associated with 
cooperative security, which excludes military cooperation and relies on an intra­
mural basis. Focusing on conflict avoidance and management, ASEAN is devoid 
of two elements essential for any formal or tacit alliance; joint military capabilities 
and the existence of a common threat perception. A move towards alliance 
formation to contain a Chinese threat would be in accordance with a realist 
interpretation of security cooperation. Yet, ASEAN has not indicated in the post- 
Cold War any disposition to evolve into a defence arrangement. Even if such a 
transformation occurred, it would not have the joint military capabilities to deter 
Chinese actions in the Spratly Islands. Contradictory security perspectives within 
the Association have also undermined the potential development of an alliance in 
Southeast Asia. The lack of a common position on the PRC caused intra-mural 
tensions during the Third Indochina Conflict and has led to divisions with regard 
to the South China Sea dispute in the post-Cold War. In short, any kind of military 
cooperation over the Spratly issue seems particularly unlikely.
The absence of a common threat perception among the ASEAN states was, 
for example, demonstrated in 1995. The PRC took advantage of the Philippine 
vulnerability to expand its presence in the Spratly Islands but perhaps also to test 
the US reaction and its involvement in the South China Sea problem.70 San Pablo- 
Baviera explains that “The Philippines considers the Chinese occupation of 
Mischief Reef a serious threat to its security, not so much by the nature of China’s 
occupation of the reef alone, but because it represents a breach of the regional
71modus vivendi which regional states had been painstakingly trying to develop.” 
The Philippines responded firmly to the discovery of the Chinese occupation of
70Brigadier Chris Roberts, Chinese Strategy and the Spratly Islands Dispute, Working Paper No. 
293 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, April 1996),
p. 22.
7 Eileen San Pablo-Baviera, “Philippine Security in the South China Sea,” in Carolina G. 
Hernandez and Ralph Cossa, eds., Security Implications o f Conflict in the South China Sea: 
Perspectives from Asia-Pacific (Manila: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, 1997), p.
72 .
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Mischief Reef by seeking multilateral support and taking retaliatory measures that 
included the destruction of Chinese territorial markers on other features and the 
arrest of Chinese fishermen in March 1995. The Philippines also announced a 
defence modernisation programme. That said, its navy has remained so ill- 
equipped that it cannot even be expected to patrol the Kalayaan.
Indonesia’s traditional threat perception was confirmed by the Mischief 
Reef incident and the suspected extension of Chinese claims to include the Natuna 
region.72 China’s behaviour reinforced the fear among the military elite of a 
Chinese irredentist policy in the South China Sea. During his visit to the PRC in 
July 1995, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was provided with no 
clarification regarding the Chinese claims to the waters above the Natuna gas 
fields. Indonesia’s involvement in the territorial dispute and the need to develop a 
deterrence strategy against the PRC played a part in Suharto’s decision to sign a 
security agreement with Australia in December 1995. Initiated by Paul Keating, 
the Australian prime minister at the time, the agreement was influenced by three 
considerations.73 It was an attempt to reduce persisting mistrust between two 
states that had no territorial designs on each other. In particular, the agreement 
indicated that Indonesia should not be perceived in Australia as a possible threat to 
its security. It also tacitly acknowledged that both states shared a common 
strategic outlook and similar security concerns. Finally, it was influenced by the 
close personal links that existed between Suharto and Keating. The two leaders 
discussed the forthcoming agreement during private meetings held in Jakarta in 
June 1995 and at the APEC summit in Osaka in November.74 Jakarta failed to 
inform its ASEAN partners prior to the joint announcement made by Australia and 
Indonesia at the ASEAN heads of government meeting in Bangkok in December 
1995.
Both Ali Alatas and Lt. General TNI Agus Widjojo explained to the author 
that the security agreement was not developed with a common external threat in
72Catley and Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea, p. 167.
73These points were made by Sabam Siagian, former Chief Editor of the Jakarta Post and former 
Ambassador of Indonesia to Australia (1991-95). The interview was held in Jakarta on 20 March
2000.
74Bob Lowry, Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation: For Better or Worse?, Working Paper 
No. 299 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, August
1996), p. 10.
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mind.75 They pointed out that it should therefore not be examined as a defence 
arrangement against the PRC. Indeed, the bilateral agreement had mostly a 
political and psychological significance and did not modify Indonesia’s defence 
capabilities. Yet, it marked a revision of strategic outlook by Indonesia and can 
still be examined as an example of conventional balance of power politics. 
Indonesia and Australia shared a security interest in constraining Chinese actions 
in the South China Sea. The agreement mentioned the possibility of joint military 
operations and was regarded regionally as formalising existing defence ties 
between the two states. It declared that Indonesia and Australia would consult “in 
the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests 
and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or 
jointly and in accordance with the processes of each party”.76 The agreement also 
sent a political signal to Beijing and indirectly consolidated Indonesia’s defence 
ties with the United States. In addition to cooperative security, Indonesia seemed 
now willing to rely on traditional countervailing tactics to manage its relations 
with the PRC and restrain its irredentist ambitions in the South China Sea. In 
September 1996, Indonesia also held extensive military exercises in the Natuna 
region. Discussing these exercises, a security analyst at the Indonesian Institute of 
Science declared that though Indonesia is engaged diplomatically with the PRC, it 
“would be foolish for us to be completely naive. China respects strength. If they 
see you as being weak, they’ll eat you alive.”78
In the meanwhile, Malaysia and Singapore adopted a more conciliatory 
attitude towards the PRC. Malaysia was eager to preserve and further develop its 
economic ties with China, even at the cost of collective solidarity towards another 
ASEAN member.79 In January 1995, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad declared that “it is high time for us to stop seeing China through the
80lenses of threat and to fully view China as the enormous opportunity that it is.”
75Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia (1988-1999). The interview was held in Jakarta 
on 21 March 2000. Lt. General TNI Agus Widjojo. The interview was held in Jakarta on 24 March 
2000.
76Quoted in Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 50.
77Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement,” p. 102.
78Quoted in “Indonesia Plans War Games to Caution China,” International Herald Tribune, 16 
August 1996, p. 4.
79This point was made by Dr. Khoo Kay Kim.
80'New Straits Times, 21 January 1995.
242
While indicating the shift in Malaysia’s threat perception, the statement was also 
an implicit criticism of the Philippines. As noted above, bilateral relations have 
long been strained by the territorial dispute over Sabah and complicated by 
conflicting claims over the Spratlys, as for example manifested by Malaysia’s 
seizure of Navigator Reef in March 1999. Additionally, the two states have 
followed contrasting approaches with regard to the PRC and the South China Sea 
problem. The Philippines has aimed to internationalise the territorial question 
while Malaysia has been more inclined to negotiate bilaterally with China. During 
his visit to the PRC in May 1995, Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
mentioned the need to discuss the feeling of insecurity that the Chinese policy in 
the South China Sea provoked among the ASEAN members.81 Yet, rather than an 
actual sign of concern, this declaration was meant to confirm the Southeast Asian 
identity of the city-state and express ASEAN solidarity.82 In an interview with the 
Straits Times, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew played down the Mischief Reef 
incident and China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea.83 In short, Singapore 
was keen not to alienate the PRC.
Despite its limitations, ASEAN’s diplomatic position on the Spratly issue 
was strengthened by its enlargement to include Vietnam at the AMM in July 1995. 
The Paris Accords of 1991 and Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia had started 
a process of detente between Vietnam and the ASEAN states. Suharto had already 
travelled to Vietnam in 1990. In November 1991, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Vo 
Van Kiet had visited Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Prior to the trip, Vietnam 
had indicated its desire to become a member of the Association. Regional relations 
had thus been radically transformed by the time of the fourth ASEAN summit held 
in Singapore in January 1992. Vietnam adhered to the TAC in July 1992 during 
the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers and was invited to participate 
as an observer to future occasions. Its forthcoming membership was announced in 
December 1994. The enlargement presented some difficulties. ASEAN became 
more deeply embroiled in the Spratly issue and lost its neutral position in the 
territorial dispute over the Paracel Islands. Different security outlooks also co­
81“Give China Time and Space,” Far East Economic Review, 25 May 1995.
82Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” p. 131.
83Straits Times, 13 May 1995.
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existed among the original members. Indonesia regarded Vietnam as an ally 
against China’s regional ambitions and actively supported its participation. In 
contrast, Thailand was in competition with Vietnam over influence in Cambodia 
and Laos. In addition, Thailand and Singapore were still concerned about a 
potential Vietnamese threat and wished to maintain their strong ties with the PRC.
The first post-Cold War enlargement should be analysed through both 
associative and balance of power perspectives. It was related to the original hope 
of uniting the entire sub-region under ASEAN auspices and symbolised the 
institutionalisation of a process of diplomatic reconciliation between Vietnam and 
the member states. An analogy can be made with the associative origins of 
ASEAN, which primarily resulted from an act of reconciliation between Indonesia 
and Malaysia.84 Though Vietnam had been invited to join the TAC in 1976, its 
membership was unthinkable until the end of the Cold War due to the ideological 
polarisation of the region and the Cambodian Conflict.85 The enlargement enabled 
the original members to cope peacefully with Vietnam and strengthen the political 
unity and cohesion of Southeast Asia. Balance of power politics played a part in 
the expansion process. Kissinger writes that “Though they will disavow it, the 
nations of Southeast Asia are including the heretofore feared Vietnam in their
o n
grouping (ASEAN) largely in order to balance China and Japan.” At issue was 
the need to constrain China’s actions in the South China Sea. The rapid inclusion 
of Vietnam was perceived by the PRC as a means for the Southeast Asian states to 
restrain its manoeuvres in the Spratlys and gang-up on its territorial claims. 
Although ASEAN did not provide Vietnam with a source of countervailing 
power,88 Hanoi may have joined the cooperative security regime with the regional 
distribution of power in mind. The new membership provided Vietnam with a 
countervailing factor in its relations with the PRC. It may have expected more 
Chinese restraint towards the Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea due to its 
participation in the political association.
84Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle 
East? (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University,
1998), p. 6.
85This point was made by Kwa Chong Guan.
86This point was made by Sabam Siagian.
87Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1994), p. 827.
88Leifer, “Vietnam’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Coping with Vulnerability,” p. 285.
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Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of the process of reconciliation 
between Vietnam and the original ASEAN states, that influenced the 
normalisation of US-Vietnamese relations on 11 July 1995, has not modified the 
regional distribution of power to their advantage. On the contrary, the PRC has 
been the prime beneficiary of the changing strategic circumstances in East Asia in 
the post-Cold War. Moreover, Vietnam’s membership has not improved 
ASEAN’s ability to practice conventional balance of power politics to constrain 
Chinese actions in the Spratlys. ASEAN’s relevance as an effective countervailing 
force has also been further undermined by the recent loss of Indonesian leadership. 
As the largest member of the Association, Indonesia may have been expected with 
the assistance of Vietnam and Australia to lead a common stand in opposition to 
China’s potential hegemonic ambitions in Southeast Asia. This is now unlikely in 
view of its deep internal problems. Its relations with Australia were also 
complicated during 1999 by the issue of East Timor, which led Jakarta to 
repudiate its security agreement with Canberra in September that year. Except for 
some support from Vietnam, the Philippines may therefore be isolated in its 
attempt to resist the Chinese claims in the Spratlys.89 The Association failed, for 
example, to support Manila in its protest against the Chinese expansion of its 
structures on Mischief Reef discovered in November 1998. A sense of isolation 
was expressed on 15 April 1999 by the Philippine Foreign Affairs Under­
secretary Lauro Baja. Pointing out the lack of support, he declared in a speech to 
the Rotary Club that “some of our ASEAN friends are either mute, timid or cannot 
go beyond espousal of general principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and 
polite words of understanding given in the corridors or meeting rooms.”90
In short, the Association cannot operate on its own as an effective source 
of countervailing power and needs to rely on external military support to constrain 
China’s actions in the Spratlys. Yet, as we shall now discuss, ASEAN does not 
enjoy access to an external source of countervailing power. The member states 
involved in the territorial question; above all, the Philippines, do not benefit from 
external military assistance to contain the PRC in the South China Sea. Discussing
89Robyn Lim, “Failure of Australian-Indonesian Cooperation is a Loss,” International Herald 
Tribune, 30 September 1999, p. 8.
^“Concern over Spratlys Statement,” The Straits Times, 27 April 1999.
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the dispute, Leifer explains that the Association “has no power to deploy because 
it is neither a defence community nor a party to a countervailing structure of 
alignments.”91 In that respect, the Third Indochina Conflict and the South China 
Sea dispute indicate very different patterns of power. The favourable strategic 
circumstances that prevailed during the Cambodian conflict, which resulted from a 
convergence of interests between China, the US and the ASEAN members, have 
disappeared in the post-Cold War. The new distribution of power and the 
transformed security relations in East Asia account for ASEAN’s limited influence 
on the South China Sea dispute.
The American departure from its military bases in the Philippines removed 
a source of deterrence against Chinese actions in the Kalayaan as an ongoing US 
presence might for instance have dissuaded the PRC from taking control of 
Mischief Reef. China has become a dominant strategic player in the South China 
Sea due the 1992 US withdrawal, Japan’s limited involvement in the area and the
Q9scaling down of Russian naval activities in Vietnam. However, Singapore 
reached an agreement with Washington in November 1990. Despite its good 
relations with the PRC, the city-state was eager to secure a US engagement to 
uphold a stable distribution of power in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s decision to 
accommodate US facilities was first not well-received in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
These views later changed with the planning of the US withdrawal from the 
Philippines.93 After 1992, Malaysia and Indonesia were prepared to provide access 
to the US Navy. It should be noted that the Royal Malaysian Navy had already 
been conducting annual joint exercises with the US Navy since 1984.94 Singapore 
extended its links with the United States in 1992 when a US Navy logistics unit 
was re-located from the Philippines to the city-state. In January 1998, it declared 
that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its
91Michael Leifer, “ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?,” in Hadi Soesastro, ed., ASEAN 
in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1995), p. 141.
92Shee Poon-Kim, “The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol. 19, No. 4 (March 1998), p. 377.
93Please refer to Leszek Buszynski, “ASEAN Security Dilemmas,” Survival, Vol. 34, No. 4 
(Winter 1992/93), pp. 103-105.
94Derek da Cunha, Southeast Asia ’s Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity o f Approaches Amidst 
Changing Geopolitical Circumstances, ISEAS Working Papers (Singapore, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, July 1999), p. 19.
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completion in the year 2000.95 Even the Philippines has attempted to lessen the 
effect of the 1992 US withdrawal. Initially signed on 10 February 1998, the 
Philippine Senate ratified in May 1999 a Visiting Forces Agreement with the 
United States that enabled the resumption of joint military exercises. The 
Philippine desire to reach a bilateral agreement with Washington only seven years 
after the American departure can be associated with its inability to patrol and 
protect the Kalayaan. In short, the US deployment in Southeast Asia has not been 
overly affected by its withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base.
The absence of an external source of countervailing power to constrain 
Chinese actions in the Spratlys does not result from a US strategic retreat. Instead, 
it arises from an American unwillingness to get involved with the question of 
sovereign jurisdiction. In contrast to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, the US 
Congress does not consider the South China Sea dispute as a vital security 
concern.96 Though following closely the developments in the South China Sea, the 
United States has consistently limited its interest to the preservation of the 
freedom of navigation and the mobility of its Seventh Fleet. Joseph Nye, the 
former US assistant secretary of defence for international security, said on 16 June 
1995 that the United States would ensure the free passage of ships in the case of a 
conflict in the Spratlys that would affect the freedom of navigation.97 Due to its 
own economic interests, the PRC is not expected to interrupt the shipping lanes 
that cross the South China Sea. Washington has also stated that the Philippine 
claimed-territories were not covered by the Mutual Defence Treaty of 30 August 
1951 that ties the Philippines to the United States. For instance, the Mischief Reef 
incident did not lead to a strong US diplomatic reaction, except for a statement on 
freedom of sea-lanes. The US Department of State declared on 10 May 1995:
The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims 
to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China 
Sea. The United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime 
claim, or restriction on maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not 
consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.98
95da Cunha, Southeast Asia’s Security Dynamics, pp. 18-19.
96This point was made by Dr. Lee Lai To.
97Please refer to Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, pp. 26-27.
98US Department of State, “Spratlys and the South China Sea,” Statement by Christine Shelly, 
acting spokesperson, 10 May 1995.
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The US unwillingness to get involved in the territorial dispute may result 
from a desire not to complicate further its relations with the PRC but also from 
ASEAN’s failure to establish a common position among its members. In fact, the 
benefits provided by a US involvement would most likely be limited due to the 
absence of an intra-mural consensus." It should also be mentioned that some 
member states; primarily Malaysia and Indonesia, do not seem to support the need 
for a more direct US participation in the Spratly issue.100 No other external source 
of countervailing power exists. The Russian influence in Southeast Asia has 
dramatically declined in the post-Cold War. Despite the economic and strategic 
interests at stake, Japan has not developed a coherent and active policy on the 
South China Sea problem. As a legacy of the Pacific War, most ASEAN states 
fear the prospect of Japan extending its security role in East Asia. In short, though 
China does not dispose of the necessary capabilities to impose a naval hegemony 
in Southeast Asia, the military imbalance in the South China Sea should be 
expected to increase and may influence the PRC to use force to solve the territorial 
dispute.101
In sum, ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea has been defined 
by the absence of conventional balance of power politics due to the limitations 
associated with cooperative security and the lack of access to an external source of 
countervailing power. That said, the ARF may be regarded as a vehicle to 
constrain Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the South China Sea. Acharya writes:
While the ARF may never develop into a fully fledged instrument of conflict 
resolution, the norms created within the framework of the ARF and other 
regional security fora, such as the ASEAN-China dialogues on regional security, 
may impose greater and more meaningful constraints on Chinese military options 
in the South China Sea. In this respect, the development of normative behaviour
"This point was made by Daljit Singh, Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS) and former member of the Ministry of Defence of Singapore. The meeting was held at 
ISEAS on 23 February 2000.
l00This point was made by Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor at the Habibie Centre and 
former spokesperson of President B.J. Habibie. The interview was held at the Habibie Centre, 
Jakarta, on 24 March 2000.
101Bilveer Singh, “Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: A Singaporean 
Perspective,” in Carolina G. Hernandez and Ralph Cossa, eds., Security Implications o f Conflict in 
the South China Sea: Perspectives from Asia-Pacific (Manila: Institute for Strategic and 
Development Studies, 1997), p. 53.
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will constitute an alternative form of containment (‘containment by other means,’
as some have called it).102
Nonetheless, China’s seizure of Mischief Reef was an unconstrained and 
aggressive action that complicated relations with some ARF participants. In spite 
of the first ministerial meeting held in July 1994, the construction of structures on 
the disputed reef appears to have taken place during the second half of that year.103 
Hence, the establishment of a multilateral dialogue has not led to a Chinese policy 
of strategic self-abnegation. Leifer points out that “China’s participation within 
the ARF has not appeared to have affected the steely rectitude with which it has 
asserted its irredentist agenda in the South China Sea.”104 The Forum does not 
include sufficient incentive to constrain Chinese ambitions in the South China 
Sea. In short, the balance of power factor within the ARF has not proven relevant 
in the case of the dispute.
Conclusion
ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea has been defined by the 
absence of associative and balance of power dimensions. No code of conduct 
based on ASEAN’s norms and principles is currently applied to the dispute nor 
does an associative position unite the member states. The 1992 Declaration on the 
South China Sea has not been respected by all the ASEAN countries and a latest 
version of a code of conduct set forward by the Philippines in November 1999 has 
not been endorsed. Moreover, the Association has failed to bring the balance of 
power to bear in the South China Sea. It is unable on its own to act as an effective 
source of countervailing power and it does not enjoy access to external military 
support. Instead, some members have strengthened their reliance on external 
actors to ensure their security. Similar factors help explain the absence of 
associative and balance of power perspectives. The lack of shared principles and a 
common threat perception complicate the attainment of a common stand on an
102Amitav Acharya, “Containment, Engagement, or Counter-Dominance? Malaysia’s Response to 
the Rise of China,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The 
Management o f an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 142.
103Ang Cheng Guan, The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited, IDSS Working Paper Series No. 4 
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, August
1999), p. 13.
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extra-mural security issue. The unavailability of external diplomatic and military 
support, which results to a certain extent from an inability to reach an intra-mural 
consensus, weakens ASEAN’s collective efforts and makes the practice of 
conventional balance of power politics unachievable.
104Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement,” p. 100.
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Conclusion
The primary contribution made in this dissertation to the study of ASEAN 
and the ARF has been the systematic application of the balance of power concept 
to an examination of their modalities. This thesis has offered a persistent analysis 
of the influence of the balance of power factor on the formation and later 
developments of both arrangements. The core argument developed in this 
dissertation is that the balance of power, defined both in a conventional and 
unconventional manner, should be focused on when analysing ASEAN and the 
ARF. Indeed, examining the balance of power factor is required in order to 
achieve a good understanding of the history of both regimes for cooperative 
security. The relevance of this factor within ASEAN and the ARF has therefore 
been established. The central role of the balance of power factor has been to deny 
hegemony within and beyond cooperative security. Its purpose is to keep a 
cooperative security arrangement and its participants secure from threatening 
hegemonic states both at an intra- and extra-mural level. The constraining of 
power is dependent on political means within cooperative security and on a 
conventional source of countervailing power when the security regime is faced 
with an external military threat.
In addition to indicating the existence and relevance of the balance of 
power factor, this thesis has focused on the possible co-existence between 
associative and balance of power dimensions in the case of ASEAN and the ARF. 
It has been able to demonstrate the presence of these two co-existing factors 
influencing the operation of associative arrangements and the calculations of the 
participants. That said, the intention has not been to determine which aspect has 
been more influential due to the fact that it is impossible to measure the relative 
importance of the associative and balance of power dimensions, as they have been 
mutually re-enforcing.
Beyond noting the co-existence of associative and balance of power 
perspectives, the dissertation has determined the kind of relationship that has 
existed between them. The associative experience and the constraining of power 
have been closely intermingled in the modalities of ASEAN and the ARF. Both 
regimes for cooperative security were partly constructed and later developed with
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the denial of hegemony in mind. Balance of power considerations are part of the 
process of cooperative security. On the one hand, the constraining of power needs 
to be identified in the context of the associative dimension, and especially with 
reference to norms and principles advanced by a cooperative security arrangement. 
The operation of the balance of power factor is reliant on the associative evolution 
of a security regime. On the other hand, norms and principles promoted by an 
associative arrangement formalise regional power relationships and play a key role 
in the management of an intra-mural distribution of power by political means.
It is important to question if the balance of power factor is a source of 
strength or weakness within a regime for cooperative security. It presents positive 
and negative aspects. It promotes the cooperative process and the application of 
associative principles by constraining intra-mural hegemonic dispositions. It 
provides an additional incentive to cooperate by preventing unrestrained struggles 
through the institutionalisation of the constraining of power. In that regard, the 
balance of power factor positively influences the creation and institutional 
evolution of a cooperative security regime. Nevertheless, it provides expression of 
the limits of the cooperative process. The persistence of contradictory strategic 
perspectives and competing security interests restrict the institutional development 
of the security regime. The ongoing relevance of the balance of power factor 
within cooperative security therefore casts doubt upon a neo-liberal analysis that 
infers a gradual and progressive approach to security cooperation.
This dissertation has contributed to the study of institutions and should 
therefore be located in a specific body of IR literature. ASEAN and the ARF fit 
the definition of a security regime. They are characterised by specific norms, 
principles and practices. The thesis has discussed and critically assessed power- 
based and interest-based theories of international regimes. Yet, the objective has 
not been to take part in the traditional debate between the realist and liberal 
paradigms. The contemporary discussion opposing neo-liberal and neo-realist 
thinkers generally deals with the necessary conditions for international 
cooperation, relative versus absolute gains, and the significance of institutions in 
international politics.
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I. The Balance of Power Factor within and beyond Cooperative Security
The object of this dissertation has been to indicate a dimension of the 
balance of power concept that has not often been discussed in theoretical and 
empirical studies. Beyond its conventional understanding, the balance of power 
can also be interpreted in political terms. This is based on the premise that 
potential hegemonic dispositions can be restrained through political and 
institutional means and without the use of war, the traditional instrument of the 
balance. Rather than offering a reformulation of the balance of power theory, the 
thesis has thus focused on one specific dimension of the traditional concept, which 
has frequently been ignored in the IR literature.
The interpretation of the balance of power factor within cooperative 
security is based on the general principles and assumptions found in the 
conventional understanding of the concept. The analysis of the balance of power 
factor needs to be positioned in the traditional problem of security; namely, how 
do states secure themselves from possible external aggressions. To preserve their 
survival, states focus on the prevention of global or regional dominance by a 
potential menacing hegemon. The balance of power ensures that no single actor 
becomes so powerful so as to challenge the sovereignty and independence of other 
states. By preserving its central logic, the notion of a balance of power factor 
within cooperative security holds the core simplicity and explanatory qualities of 
the traditional concept. However, attention needs to be given to the differences 
between balance of power in its conventional interpretation and practice and the 
balance of power factor within cooperative security regimes. The constraining of 
power within cooperative security is dependent on political rather than military 
means. As a result, the method by which power is constrained within security 
regimes distinguishes the balance of power factor from a more conventional 
application of the concept.
The balance of power factor within cooperative security needs to be 
identified in the context of norms and principles promoted by an associative 
arrangement. At issue is the constraint imposed on larger participants through 
their stake in a cooperative security arrangement and from which smaller and 
medium states can benefit to enhance their own security. A common code of
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conduct based on standard international norms and respected by all the member 
states constrain the larger participants and ensure that they do not threaten their 
smaller cooperative partners. Any aggressive action or act of hegemony would 
undermine these norms and rebound adversely on the political cohesion of a 
security regime as well as on the interest of larger participants with a stake in its 
viability. Serving as a means to contain hegemonic dispositions, norms and 
principles advanced by a regime for cooperative security play a central part in the 
denial of hegemony. In short, the restraint from political association has a power 
balancing relevance. It is interesting to note that in contrast to this interpretation, 
the application of standard international norms has often been viewed as in 
conflict with the operation of the balance of power.
This dissertation has focused on the workings of regimes for cooperative 
security but also in the case of ASEAN on its interaction with the outside world. 
The constraining of power through political and institutional channels has no 
relevance outside of cooperative security. External players have only a limited 
stake in the norms promoted by a cooperative security regime that functions 
exclusively on an intra-mural basis. Moreover, a conventional practice of balance 
of power politics is unachievable due to the limitations associated with 
cooperative security, which excludes alliance formation. A cooperative security 
arrangement is thus dependent on an external source of countervailing power 
when faced with an external military threat. In short, its activities become reliant 
in these circumstances on a favourable strategic context. In the absence of external 
military support, an associative arrangement is unable to exert diplomatic 
influence beyond the walls of its political association.
The balance of power factor within and beyond cooperative security is 
characterised by a commitment to the preservation of regional order and the 
national sovereignty of individual states. This factor should be associated with a 
vision of regional order that emphasises the sanctity of state sovereignty and non­
intervention in the internal affairs of states. The fundamental purpose of the 
balance of power factor in this context is to keep a cooperative security regime 
and its participants secure from threatening hegemonic powers both at an intra- 
and extra-mural level rather than to create and uphold a power equilibrium in the 
international system. This distinguishes the study of the concept from a systemic
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interpretation of the balance of power theory. Finally, the operation of the balance 
of power is dependent on the actions of states. The interpretation of this factor 
rejects a structural and deterministic understanding of the balance of power theory. 
The notion of choice in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is 
clearly present in this dissertation. Indeed, great attention has been given to the 
consequences of individual power calculations, foreign-policy decisions and inter­
state interactions on the regional cooperative process.
II. The Influence of the Balance of Power on ASEAN and the ARF
This dissertation has aimed to address one core question: to what extent 
may the balance of power, defined in policy terms, play a part in ASEAN and the 
ARF and in the calculations of the participants? Both these regimes for 
cooperative security should be regarded as attempts to move beyond conventional 
balance of power tactics but not as steps to move beyond the core objective of the 
balance of power; namely, the denial of hegemony through constraining 
hegemonic dispositions. Yet, the identities and priorities of institutions change 
over time. Hence, one should not expect a single outcome to arise from the 
examination of the balance of power factor but rather different conclusions 
depending on the particular historical period considered.
Three periods come to mind in the case of ASEAN. The formation and 
early institutional evolution of the Association (1967-1975) were dominated by 
the need to cope with Indonesian power and influence, and constrain its 
hegemonic dispositions through its integration in an embryonic regime for 
cooperative security. This first period was therefore defined by a denial of intra­
mural hegemony through political measures. A second period (1975-1991) was 
first characterised by the ASEAN states aiming to manage their relations with a 
reunited Vietnam and then by their diplomatic struggle against its invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia. An external dimension therefore came into play during 
these years. The reaction to Vietnam’s policy in Indochina was reliant on 
conventional balance of power tactics which influenced intra-mural relations. In 
the post-Cold War, the ASEAN members have been confronted with China’s 
rising power in East Asia, as for instance indicated by its irredentist agenda in the
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South China Sea. In response, the Association partly conceived the ARF with 
balance of power considerations in mind.
A. ASEAN and the Constraining of Indonesia
The attitude of Indonesia needs to be discussed to understand the role of 
the balance of power factor within ASEAN. Indonesia was nearly a failed state in 
1965. The economy had been terribly neglected by President Sukarno and the 
Indonesian state was starting to break down. General Suharto was aware that 
Indonesia would only succeed to play a central role in regional affairs after having 
first reached a level of domestic socio-economic viability. In fact, Jakarta would 
later expect ASEAN to represent a synergy between national and regional 
resilience. In a post-Confrontation period, Indonesia was keen to restore its 
credibility and was willing to follow a policy of self-constraint in order to promote 
domestic economic development within a framework of regional stability. The 
domestic economic imperatives of Indonesia had thus a direct impact on its 
patterns of behaviour within the emerging regime for cooperative security. 
Interestingly, ASEAN was originally not much more than a revival of ASA. 
Suharto sought to transform Indonesia into a good international citizen. The 
country needed to feel secure regionally and to be accepted and welcomed by 
former enemies, predominantly Malaysia. Furthermore, Suharto wanted the 
Association to provide Indonesia with a diplomatic barrier that would offer 
protection against Chinese infiltration and influence. By embracing a policy of 
self-restraint, Jakarta decisively influenced the formation and later success of the 
Association.
The original success of a cooperative security regime is dependent on a 
willingness by the potentially dominant power to follow a policy of self-restraint 
within the cooperative framework. Forced by domestic economic needs, Indonesia 
respected the intra-mural denial of hegemony and adopted a policy of political 
self-abnegation. This policy did not include a strategic dimension. Indonesia did 
not change its regional vision in principle and felt that it was entitled to a position 
of natural leadership within ASEAN as a result of its size, population, strategic 
location and military struggle for independence. In addition to its vast land area,
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the largest in Southeast Asia, Indonesia consists of an extensive maritime territory 
that derives from its status as an archipelagic state. Moreover, Indonesia is the 
largest Muslim state in the world though its state identity has never been defined 
through Islam. Indonesia was recognised by the other member states as first 
among equals and thus as the natural leader of the Association. Indonesia expected 
to become the prime manager of the regional order although its sense of 
entitlement was not articulated in an hegemonic fashion within ASEAN. It hoped 
for an autonomous regional order free from external intervention or interference. 
Its preference was indicated in the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN and later in 
SEANWFZ and put forward through the principles of national and regional 
resilience, which were informally adopted as a common security doctrine among 
the member states. In short, ASEAN was created partly to cope with Indonesia but 
also to institutionalise its managerial position in Southeast Asia.
The constraining of Indonesian power and influence within ASEAN 
should be identified in the context of norms and principles promoted by the 
regime for cooperative security. The restraint imposed on Indonesia resulted from 
its growing stake in ASEAN. As originally expressed in the Bangkok Declaration 
of 1967, the Association has been committed to the principles of national 
sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and has 
tried to reinforce their application in Southeast Asia. Significantly, Indonesia 
endorsed the TAC in February 1976 as a code of conduct to regulate regional 
inter-state relations. Though giving great importance to the power of norms to 
enhance order and stability, ASEAN’s normative approach to international politics 
has been unexceptional. Indeed, it has aimed to advance standard international 
norms that directly emanates from the principles of the Westphalian states system, 
constructed on the sovereignty of nation-states. Its approach to cooperative 
security has continued up to this day to rely on the conventional principles 
enunciated in the TAC.
Beyond an examination of the role of the balance of power in the 
formation of ASEAN, this dissertation has shown the relevance of this factor on 
its initial period and on its expansion of membership in the case of Brunei. The 
operation of the balance of power factor was reliant on the political evolution of 
the regime for cooperative security. As a result of its interest in its viability,
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Indonesia was encouraged to adhere to the standard international norms promoted 
by ASEAN and particularly to respect the national sovereignty of the member 
states. The constraint imposed on the larger members directly benefited Brunei’s 
security interests. The Sultanate was keen to secure its newly-obtained sovereignty 
and may have perceived the arrangement as a form of defence for containing its 
neighbours. The practice of the balance of power by other than conventional 
means played an implicit role in the rationale for the enlargement and overlapped 
with the institutionalisation of the act of reconciliation.
The member states attempted during ASEAN’s early years to manage an 
intra-mural distribution of power through political means. The constraining of 
power within the Association was mostly relevant for the security and stability of 
maritime Southeast Asia. No equal distribution of power existed in the region as 
Indonesia continued to be viewed as a natural hegemon. That said, the ASEAN 
members did not bandwagon with Indonesia as they hoped to restrain its 
behaviour rather than benefit from its potential aggressive actions. Indonesia 
displayed its willingness to follow a policy of self-restraint. It should be 
questioned how its pattern of behaviour evolved over time. Jakarta became 
restless during the Third Indochina Conflict. Thailand’s imposition of a tacit 
alliance with China violated its preference for an autonomous management of the 
regional order. Indonesia resented the external interference in Southeast Asia and 
rejected China’s policy of attrition against Vietnam, which it regarded as a useful 
buffer state against the PRC. Nevertheless, Jakarta accepted ASEAN’s tacit 
alliance with Beijing in order to preserve the cohesion and unity of the regime for 
cooperative security.
Indonesia’s status as a regional power has diminished since 1997 and the 
country has been disgraced by a series of events. Over the last few years, it has 
faced deep internal difficulties, which have dramatically reduced its regional 
influence. It was most affected by the East Asian economic crisis that severely 
worsened its socio-economic problems and provoked the unexpected downfall of 
President Suharto in May 1998. Indonesia has been embarrassed by the imposition 
of strict IMF conditionalities on loans required to stabilise its domestic economy. 
It has been desperate for external financial support due to the consequences of the 
financial crisis. It has also been forced to renounce its sovereignty over East
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Timor. The loss of territory has been a deep humiliation for Jakarta and in 
particular for the armed forces. The issue of East Timor and separatist movements 
in Aceh and West Irian have brought further instability to its domestic politics. It 
is important to distinguish the problems of Aceh and West Irian from the case of 
East Timor. The former were part of the Netherlands East Indies until the 
independence of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949 while East Timor 
was under Portuguese control from 1520 up until 1975. Finally, the ASEAN 
members officially declared in 1999 their support for the territorial integrity of 
Indonesia in light of the events in Aceh and West Irian. The need for such a 
collective position has humiliated a state that used to represent the core political 
centre of the Association. Rather than playing a crucial role in Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia is now included in regional calculations as a case of a giant 
neighbouring state on the brink of collapse.1
Indonesia’s domestic instability has had dramatic consequences on the 
Association. The current lack of leadership and the absence of a political centre 
have weakened ASEAN. The Association’s success up until 1997 was dependent 
on Indonesia’s stability and active participation. Suharto’s commitment to regional 
cooperation was viewed regionally as a pillar for Southeast Asian security. The 
pivotal influence of individual leaders, primarily Suharto and Lee Kuan Yew, on 
the workings of the Association should therefore be noted. Although Indonesia 
still seems committed to its policy of self-restraint, it is now absorbed by domestic 
difficulties and has lost its managerial position within the cooperative security 
arrangement. Hence, it may no longer be perceived as the backbone of regional 
security nor as first among equals within the Association.
The importance of the balance of power factor within ASEAN needs to be 
reassessed due to the new context of Indonesia. The Association’s relevance as a 
source of constraint is questionable because its dominant power is undermined by 
severe economic and political difficulties. Indeed, should Indonesia still be 
regarded as a potential threat to regional stability and to the national sovereignty 
of some ASEAN members? It can be argued that Indonesia has not represented a
‘Michael Leifer, “Diminished Status in International Relations, the Case of Indonesia,” 
Presentation given at the Seminar on Asia and the Pacific in International Relations, London 
School of Economics (LSE), 22 February 2001.
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conventional threat to the region and its cooperative partners for a long period of 
time. The primary danger for its neighbouring states presently arises from non- 
conventional security problems and specifically from the potential consequences 
of its domestic instability; namely, the illegal migration of Indonesian workers, the 
fear of Indonesia’s fragmentation that could lead to a large flee of refugees and the 
recurrence of ecological disasters with regional repercussions.
B. ASEAN and the Power Struggles in Indochina and the South China Sea
In the case of the Third Indochina Conflict, changes in the regional 
distribution of power were imposed on the ASEAN members. The latter 
demonstrated during the Cambodian conflict their ability to exercise international 
political influence, chiefly in the United Nations General Assembly. Still, the 
Association’s reaction to the invasion and occupation of Cambodia was limited to 
collective diplomacy due to its lack of military capabilities and the existence of 
opposing strategic outlooks within the security regime. In short, the conflict 
revealed the limits associated with cooperative security. Even so, the Association 
played an important diplomatic role in the Cambodian conflict thanks to 
favourable strategic circumstances that resulted from a convergence of interests 
between the PRC, the US and the ASEAN members. In particular, its diplomatic 
response was conditional on China’s willingness to act as a source of 
countervailing power against Vietnam. As pointed out earlier, the engagement in 
conventional balance of power practice became a factor in intra-mural 
cooperation. In sum, ASEAN operated successfully as a regime for cooperative 
security during the Cambodian conflict thanks to the application of balance of 
power tactics by external actors.
The settlement of the Cambodian conflict, which ensued directly from the 
nature of the end of the Cold War, changed ASEAN’s security environment. It 
terminated the complementary interests that had united China and the Association 
during the 1980’s and transformed Vietnam into a potential cooperative partner. 
Interestingly, ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute has been 
limited, in contrast to its reaction to the Third Indochina Conflict, by the 
unfavourable strategic circumstances of the post-Cold War. The Association has
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failed to operate as a cooperative security arrangement due to the absence of an 
external source of countervailing power to contain China’s hegemonic 
dispositions in the South China Sea. That said, it would take time and be costly for 
the PRC to build up its naval capabilities. The Vietnamese membership has not 
improved ASEAN’s ability to practice conventional balance of power politics and 
has more deeply embroiled the Association in the question of sovereign 
jurisdiction. The lack of external support can partly be explained by ASEAN’s 
inability to develop a common position among its members. They have failed so 
far to reach an intra-mural consensus over the Spratly issue and to promulgate a 
specific code of conduct for the South China Sea.
C. The ARF and the constraining of China in the post-Cold War
The Asia-Pacific security context at the end of the Cold War was defined 
by an uncertain multipolar structure. The regional strategic architecture was said 
to be primarily dependent on a triangular relationship between the United States, 
Japan and the PRC. The formation of the ARF was an attempt to cope with a 
potential menacing hegemon through unconventional methods. Its creation, 
however, illustrated ASEAN’s diminished significance in the new regional 
security context of the post-Cold War and represented an informal abdication of 
the commitment to realise ZOPFAN. The ASEAN members conceived the Forum 
partly as a diplomatic instrument for ensuring an ongoing US involvement in East 
Asia and for including the PRC in a rule-based arrangement to encourage it in 
habits of good international behaviour. ASEAN wanted China to be constrained in 
its actions by conforming to standard norms of international conduct. The PRC 
has also come to perceive its participation in the ARF with reference to the 
balance of power.
China may have realised since the mid-1990’s the advantages of adopting 
a restrained regional policy based on established norms. It has introduced an 
element of relative moderation in its foreign policy and has respected the standard 
international norms promoted by the ASEAN states through the ARF. For 
instance, China has played a constructive role with regards to the Korean 
Peninsula and has been an active participant of the ASEAN + Three summit of
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heads of government. Moreover, Beijing’s approach towards the South China Sea 
dispute has been temperate since the Mischief Reef incident.
Yet, it should be questioned if these recent developments have derived 
from ARF activities. It is unclear whether the Forum has so far succeeded in 
constraining China’s foreign policy through non-military means. The element of 
control in China’s foreign policy since the mid-1990’s can be explained by 
focusing on its desire to improve relations with Southeast Asian states in light of 
its complicated ties with the United States and Japan. The PRC has aimed to 
build-up its relations with the ASEAN states, India and Russia as a means to 
promote a multipolar structure in the Asia-Pacific. It has also sought to maintain 
stable relations with the United States and Japan. The Chinese leadership has 
focused on domestic political stability and economic development in order to 
avoid the experiences of Russia and Indonesia. Moreover, it has been preoccupied 
with the domestic situation and, in particular, with the force of nationalism in the 
PRC. Anti-Western sentiments were indicated, for instance, after the bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in early 1999, which was viewed domestically 
as a direct US attack against Chinese people. Finally, the PRC may have realised 
that changing its perception abroad and to downplay the image of a China threat 
would facilitate its acquisition of a great power status. Yet, it is unclear if its 
restrained behaviour has resulted from a substantial transformation among its 
leaders or simply from an exercise in international public relations.
III. Concluding Remarks
The present interpretation of the balance of power factor within and 
beyond cooperative security has provided a conceptual framework for the study of 
ASEAN and the ARF. The balance of power factor has played an important part in 
both regimes for cooperative security and in the calculations of the participants. 
ASEAN and the ARF were established with the denial of hegemony in mind, but 
not in a conventional sense. The balance of power also became a factor in their 
later developments. Hence, an historical examination of both associative 
arrangements has enabled us to reject the notion that they should be defined as 
alternatives to the core objective of the balance of power. ASEAN and ARF
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practices have supported the operation of the balance of power although their 
rhetoric have implicitly rejected conventional balance of power politics.
The balance of power factor has influenced the creation and institutional 
evolution of the Association by constraining intra-mural hegemonic dispositions 
and thus providing some member states with an additional incentive to cooperate. 
By joining a tacit alliance with the PRC in the 1980’s, the members also 
demonstrated a disposition to promote countervailing arrangements through 
diplomatic alignment beyond cooperative security. ASEAN has over the years 
contributed to conflict avoidance and management and has decreased the 
likelihood of regional states using force to resolve disputes. These achievements, 
however, have not reduced the role and relevance of the balance of power factor 
within ASEAN due to the persistence of feelings of suspicion, contradictory 
strategic perspectives and a post-Cold War revival of bilateral disputes. The recent 
expansion process has led to the incorporation of additional bilateral contentions. 
Local struggles for influence have led to a series of competitive distributions of 
power within the Association. The practice of conventional as well as 
unconventional balance of power politics by individual members has set a limit to 
the cooperative process and partly explains why ASEAN has remained a rather 
weak security regime despite its long existence.
The formation of the ARF involved power balancing considerations. Its 
limited experience indicates though that it has failed as an instrument to constrain 
the PRC in a way that corresponds to ASEAN’s degree of success with Indonesia. 
Various ASEAN states have continued to depend on bilateral links with the 
United States to ensure their security. This measure of failure can be explained by 
the fact that the PRC joined the Forum as the main beneficiary of the changing 
strategic environment in East Asia and that it has continued to feel subject to 
American containment. In short, the ARF does not contain sufficient incentive to 
encourage China in adopting a policy of political self-abnegation. Nevertheless, it 
has provided Beijing with a diplomatic forum to promote a multipolar security 
structure in the Asia-Pacific and thus with a means for countering US 
unilateralism in the post-Cold War through other than conventional methods.
Regardless of their limitations and current difficulties, ASEAN and the 
ARF still serve some of their purposes. Both these regimes for cooperative
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security regimes operate as diplomatic instruments to avoid the recurrence of 
conflict by seeking to address the climate of regional relations rather than tackling 
specific security problems. Instead of concluding on a pessimistic note, it seems 
therefore more appropriate to refer to a series of challenges they face and to 
reiterate their ongoing usefulness.
The political fragility of most ASEAN members, primarily Indonesia but 
to a lesser extent also the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, has been exposed 
by the financial crisis. The applicability of ASEAN’s basic norms and decision­
making process is now also questionable. The Association as well as its primary 
member are currently weak and have lost a great share of international credibility. 
ASEAN appears in these circumstances to be unable to function as an effective 
diplomatic instrument. Ironically, this loss of influence and cohesion occurs when 
for the first time all the ten Southeast Asian states are members of the cooperative 
security regime. Furthermore, the strategic significance of Southeast Asia has 
declined in the post-Cold War and China’s relative power has increased. The sub- 
region has lost some of its importance for the great powers, particularly since the 
end of the Third Indochina Conflict. Nonetheless, in spite of the challenges and 
difficult new prospects, none of the member states have expressed a desire to 
withdraw from the institution. The members still seem convinced by the benefits 
provided by the Association. Though perceived as an humiliation in Jakarta, the 
common position on the territorial integrity of Indonesia indicated, for example, 
ASEAN’s continuing purpose and its commitment to the national sovereignty of 
individual states. In addition, the absence of domestic political stability has not so 
far affected the rather benign regional security environment. Indeed, there is no 
prospect of a clash of arms in Southeast Asia despite the persistence of numerous 
bilateral disputes. The ASEAN states continue to realise that it is not in their 
interest to go to war with each other.
ASEAN’s declining unity and significance should be expected to 
negatively impact the relevance of the ARF. The Association seems currently 
unable to contribute to the peaceful management of the key triangular relationship 
in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, regardless of its original suspicion, China has 
attained a position in which it can use the Forum. It has increased its influence on 
the cooperative security arrangement and has gained some control over its
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decision-making process. That said, the ARF has not become a vehicle for 
Chinese interests. Instead, it has provided a basis for some restraint by the PRC. 
As discussed previously, Beijing has several motives to generally respect the 
standard international norms promoted by the Forum and to introduce an element 
of relative moderation in its foreign policy. Hence, the importance of the ARF as 
an embryonic regime for cooperative security should be kept in mind despite the 
fact that its constraining influence on China may not be as strong as originally 
hoped for by the ASEAN members.
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